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Sheriff Act 1900 Review
Arguments against such a move may be made on the grounds of any remaining common law role the Sheriff may have, the breaking of historical links stretching back into the middle ages and the difficulty of coming up with an alternative title that accurately captures that office’s modern functions. For convenience, the remainder of the Discussion Paper will use the current title.
In Queensland the requirement in relation to fitness to be a member of the protective security service is spelt out in the legislation, and means a person who has not been convicted of a crime or misdemeanour State Buildings Protective Security Act 1983 (Qld) section 9. It could be argued that such a requirement sets the bar too high and does not make any allowance for old or trivial offences. This approach appears to be inflexible and may place too much weight on the importance of the criminal record. In some cases criminal records might better reflect a person’s age and socio-economic status more than their character. There is no simple and universal way to ensure that a person is fit to take on a particular role and different approaches may need to be taken in different circumstances. Assessing a people fitness may involve questions during an interview, a check of referees or a check of a person’s criminal or financial history. 2.2.3 Oaths
There is no requirement in the Oaths Act for either the Sheriff or Sheriff’s officers to take an oath Sections 7 and 9 of the Oaths Act 1900 (NSW) allow the Governor to order that certain public officers or judicial officers take an oath, however no such orders have been made in relation to the Sheriff or Sheriff’s officers.. Sheriff’s officers therefore have no clear duty to take an oath although there may be such a requirement where the Sheriff delegates a power to the Sheriff’s officer as they are then acting in the capacity of the Sheriff. It is suggested that, in the interests of clarity, the oath requirements of the Charter of Justice be repealed. This leaves the question of what, if anything, should replace those requirements. Advice from the Crown Solicitor has suggested that the taking of oaths is normally required when an office holder will be required to exercise personal responsibility and judgement in the carrying out of duties in the public interest and where those duties have some special attribute to them. For example the Police Service Act requires all people exercising the functions of a police officer to take the oath or make the affirmation of office as a police officer in accordance with the regulations Police Service Act 1990 (NSW) section 13. A similar provision also applies to correctional officers Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999 (NSW) section 236. It may be argued that the Oaths Act already grants the Governor the power to require the Sheriff and Sheriff’s officers to take an oath and this should be considered satisfactory. Against this it might be argued that the Sheriff and Sheriff’s officers have powers that are, in some respects, analogous to those of police and correctional officers. If this is accepted then the Sheriff Act should contain an express requirement for the Sheriff and Sheriff’s officers to take an oath. It should be noted that the Oaths Act allows any person who objects to taking an oath to instead make an affirmation Oaths Act 1900 (NSW) section 12.
2.2.4 Qualifications and training
Training is an important adjunct to any grant of power as it ensures that the person understands the nature of the power and its limitations. However, the question is whether training should be required in any legislation or whether this should be left as an administrative matter. Training is not currently addressed in the Sheriff Act 1900. The Security Industry Act, from which Sheriff’s officers have an exemption Security Industry Regulation 1998 (NSW) clause 5(d), makes it a requirement that applicants must have successfully completed an approved security industry training course Security Industry Act 1997(NSW) section 17. It is therefore arguable that Sheriff’s officers because of their more extensive duties should be required by legislation to receive training. There are strong policy arguments for not spelling out the training requirements in detail in the legislation as this would stifle the Sheriff’s ability to adapt training to new situations as they arise. A possible compromise between being overly prescriptive and ignoring the issue of training may be to simply require that it be a prerequisite for all Sheriff’s officers to satisfactorily complete a period of training as approved by the Sheriff. This is the position taken in New Zealand in relation to court security officers, where each officer must undergo a course of training approved by the chief executive Court Security Act 1999 (NZ) section 9(1).
2.2.5 Identification of officers
2.2.5.1 Identification cards or badges
Under the Security Industry Act a holder of a class 1 or class 2 security licence must wear a licence that contains a photograph at all times while carrying on a security activity Security Industry Act 1997(NSW) section 36. In addition to the photograph, the licence must also bear the signature of the licensee and contain the licence number Security Industry Act 1997(NSW) section 22. Authorised officers under the Commonwealth court security legislation need only carry an identity card. This displays a photograph of the officer and states that the holder of the card is an authorised officer Public Order (Protection of Persons and Property) Regulations 1999 (Cth) clause 5. Queensland on the other hand requires its officers to have identity cards containing a photograph, name, signature and designation State Buildings Protective Security Act 1983 (Qld) section 10A. It is suggested that the inclusion of a name on an identification badge or card should be optional in the case of Sheriff’s officers, as it may expose the officer and their family to risk. Sheriff’s officers are obliged to undertake some jobs, such as evictions, that may cause a great deal of ill will and anger. In the case of officers with more unusual names it could be relatively easy for a disgruntled person to identify their home address and subsequently harass them. The requirement for an officer to wear a photographic badge or card containing a clearly visible and unique number (which should ideally be kept as short as possible) would allow an officer to be identified in relation to legitimate complaints while protecting the officer from harassment.
If an identity badge is not compulsory then it is suggested that there should be a specific right for people dealing with a Sheriff’s officer to demand information regarding the officer’s identity. For example the right to be given an identification number. Victoria requires authorised court security officers to wear their identity card whenever they are on duty and also to produce the card whenever requested to do so. Failure to do so attracts a penalty Court Security Act 1980 (Vic) section 2B(3). New South Wales requires members of the security industry to produce their licence when requested by a police officer or by any other person with whom the licensee has dealings when carrying on any security activity. A person who refuses to do this can be subjected to a penalty of up to 20 penalty units Security Industry Act 1997(NSW) section 35. Likewise authorised officers under the Passenger Transport Act are required to comply with any person’s reasonable request for the officer to produce identification demonstrating that he or she is an authorised officer Passenger Transport Act 1990 (NSW) section 57.
Uniforms offer other advantages in that they may also increase a sense of professionalism in an officer. This may come about either by reminding an officer of his or her role or by making that officer aware that he or she is on public display as a member of a certain profession and should therefore act accordingly. Against this it may be argued that many people will not know of, or properly understand, the role of the Sheriff and may mistakenly assume that Sheriff’s officers are police officers. Whether this is a genuine problem is not clear, however, even if valid it may be better overcome in other ways, for example by requiring that Sheriff’s officers explain to a person who they are before exercising any powers. It is suggested that the above advantages should necessitate the inclusion of a requirement that Sheriff’s officers should always be in uniform when conducting any of their official duties. However, as some tasks may involve specialised clothing, for example seizing particularly dirty equipment, there may be a need for different uniform requirements for particular duties. It may therefore be appropriate to leave the details of what will make up the uniform in particular circumstances to the discretion of the Sheriff See for example Police Service Regulation 2000 (NSW) clause 27(2) which allows the Commissioner to approve police officers wearing other clothing when performing certain types of duty.. 2.2.5.3 Marked vehicles
Against this it could be argued that such markings cause great prejudice to people with whom the officer’s may be dealing. Many people may associate Sheriff’s officers with debts and evictions, therefore marked vehicles parked outside a person’s home may cause them embarrassment in front of neighbours.
It needs to be considered whether any additional requirements may need to be placed in the Sheriff Act. For example it may be appropriate to place some sort of limitation on the use of the weapons such as making it a requirement that the weapons are only to be carried and used in accordance with a specific Sheriff’s policy on the issue. A second issue is whether the Sheriff Act or Regulation should contain a provision allowing the Sheriff to remove the privilege of carrying a weapon as a form of discipline where a Sheriff’s officer may have used the weapon inappropriately. Such a measure may allow the Sheriff to revoke a person’s right to carry a particular weapon for a finite period (eg 1 month or until the person has taken some form of additional training) or on a permanent basis.
2.2.7 Following directions of a court
Unless the rules provide otherwise, the Sheriff may delegate to any Sheriff's officer any of the Sheriff's functions under this Act, except this power of delegation District Court Act 1973 (NSW) section 25(2). A similar provision is also contained in Local Court (Civil Claims) Act Local Court (Civil Claims) Act 1970 (NSW) section 8A(2). The Jury Act requires that the delegation occur by instrument in writing and that the instrument can delegate any of the Sheriff’s powers, authorities, duties or functions (other than the power of delegation) subject to any conditions and limitations contained in the delegation. The same mechanism (by instrument in writing) can also be used to revoke a delegation either wholly or in part. The Sheriff may exercise any powers even if they have been delegated Jury Act 1977 (NSW) section 74. Instead of having the power to delegate contained in various Acts it may be more appropriate to include a broad power of delegation for any of the Sheriff’s powers in the Sheriff Act. Such an approach has been adopted by the Commonwealth where the Sheriff is able to authorise people to assist in the “exercise of any of his or her powers or the performance of any of his or her functions” Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) section 18P(4).
2.2.9 Offences 2.2.9.1 Impersonating
A number of other NSW Acts contain offences for impersonating various officers. These contain a range of penalties from 10 penalty units to 6 months imprisonment See for example: Police Service Act 1990 (NSW) section 204 (10 penalty units and or imprisonment for 6 months for impersonating a police officer); Fisheries Management Act 1994 (NSW) section 247 (200 penalty units and or 3 months imprisonment for impersonating fisheries officers); Tow Truck Industry Act 1998 (NSW) section 75 (50 penalty units and or 6 months imprisonment for impersonating tow truck officers); Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983 (NSW) section 31O and also Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 (NSW) section 67 (100 penalty units for impersonating an occupational health and safety inspector); Medical Practice Act 1992 (NSW) section 123 (50 penalty units for impersonating an authorised person); and Noxious Weeds Act 1993 (NSW) section 55 (10 penalty units for impersonating a noxious weeds inspector).. From this it would appear that it would be in keeping with other statutes to retain an offence of impersonating the Sheriff or a Sheriff’s officer. The current penalty appears to be quite low, especially if one takes into account the fact that a person impersonating a Sheriff’s officer may be able to access sensitive jury information or seize valuable property. It is therefore suggested that the offence be retained in a new Sheriff Act but that the current penalty of five penalty units be increased to bring it in line with similar offences. 2.2.9.2 Assaulting, obstructing, hindering etc
In the area of civil enforcement (which is outside the scope of this paper) some specific penalties also exist. For example the District Court Act provides a penalty of 10 penalty units and or 6 months imprisonment where a person assaults, resists, interrupts or obstructs the Sheriff or a Sheriff’s officer exercising functions under the District Court Act District Court Act 1973 (NSW) section 12. It is arguable that offences relating to the Sheriff should be placed in the Sheriff Act as far as possible. The approach of placing offence provisions in the legislation that sets up the office has been taken in relation to a number of statutory offices, such the Privacy Commissioner Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) section 68 and the Ombudsman Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW) section 37. 2.2.9.3 Possession of Sheriff’s uniform or insignia
Outlawing the possession of uniforms and insignia (including facsimiles or replicas) would appear to be of assistance in limiting the opportunity for abuse. On the other hand there are cases where the possession of such items by a person other than Sheriff’s officers may be considered legitimate. Some examples may include possession by collectors, possession by retired officers who wish to keep their uniform or insignia as a memento, and even temporary possession by person such as a dry cleaner. The Police Service Act prescribes a number of offences in relation to police uniforms and insignia including wearing or possessing a police uniform, manufacturing police insignia, and using police insignia other than in the course of exercising the functions of a police officer Police Service Act 1990 (NSW) section 203; See also Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999 (NSW) section 264 in relation to correctional officer’s uniforms.. Defences to these charges include possession for the purpose of public entertainment, possession where the person has obtained a licence from the Commissioner and possession where the person can demonstrate a reasonable excuse.
2.2.9.4 Proceedings for offences
2.2.10 Offences by Sheriff’s officers
2.2.10.1 Theft and fraud
Stolen or substituted goods, or goods sold cheaply through improper auction processes, harm both the parties involved in the civil enforcement action. The creditor will not have sufficient money to cover the debts and may be forced to undertake further enforcement actions and the debtor will have lost more goods than necessary to pay the debt. The Crimes Act currently provides a penalty of up to five years imprisonment for larceny Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) section 117. However, in the case of larceny by a person employed in the public service the maximum penalty is increased to ten years imprisonment Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) section 159. Likewise, embezzlement by a public servant also attracts a maximum penalty of ten years imprisonment Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) section 160. It should be noted that the Crimes Act also includes an offence of falsification of paperwork by a clerk or servant with intent to defraud, which would appear to cover cases where an officer falsified accounts or receipts. This carries a maximum penalty of five years imprisonment Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) section 158.
2.2.10.2 Unauthorised use or disclosure of information
There are already some legislative prohibitions in place that may be considered to adequately regulate this area. For example, in relation to juries, there is a prohibition on publishing information that may identify a juror or former juror Jury Act 1977 (NSW) section 68. A more comprehensive regime in relation to the misuse of personal information can be found in the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998. As the Office of the Sheriff is a public sector agency it is obliged to adhere to the information protection principles contained within the Act. These principles deal with the collection, use and disclosure of personal information and give individuals a variety of remedies where a breach of a principle may occur. Generally the Act focuses upon the conduct of the agency, rather than of an individual within an agency. However, the Act does prescribe penalties of up to 100 penalty units and or two years imprisonment where a public sector official intentionally discloses personal information obtained within the exercise of that person’s official functions Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) section 62. While the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act places safeguards on the misuse of personal information there may be non-personal information that falls outside of its coverage. One possible example may be business information such as, who a company’s customers may be, or the terms of business contracts. This information could be highly damaging if disclosed, but it may well fall outside the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act. A possible solution to this problem may be to include a prohibition upon the improper disclosure of any information obtained within a Sheriff’s officer’s official capacity See for example Public Order (Protection of Persons and Property) Regulations 1999 (Cth) clause 8(6) which limits the disclosure of information obtained pursuant to the Act to situations where the officer believes, on reasonable grounds, that disclosure is necessary in the interests of security.. In relation to the disclosure of non-personal information, it should be noted that the Attorney General’s Department’s Code of Conduct prohibits the disclosure of information contained in Departmental records to persons other than those having a right to the information by virtue of statute, court ruling or administrative policy.
2.2.10.3 Excessive use of force
Clearly, the use of excessive force is highly undesirable as it can lead to unnecessary injuries. The use of excessive force is already criminal by virtue of the offences contained in Part 3 of the Crimes Act. These offences cover a wide range of situations and appears to eliminate the need for any such provision in the Sheriff Act. It could possibly be argued that there may be some gap in coverage between the current legal interpretation of what is reasonable force and the level of force society, or the Sheriff, would expect Sheriff’s officers to exercise. While this may be the case such a distinction may be difficult, if not impossible, to define in legislation. It may also be argued that while an offence need not be included in the Sheriff Act, a statement may be justified which makes it clear that Sheriff’s officers are only permitted to use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances.
2.2.10.4 Possession or use of unauthorised weapons
It may be considered unsatisfactory for Sheriff’s officers to carry non-standard equipment that may be used as a weapon. Thus some sort of additional prohibition may be justified to prevent officers carrying any sort of weapon, illegal or otherwise, unless prior permission has been obtained from the Sheriff. 2.2.10.5 Misrepresentations
The Fair Trading Act has a number of provisions relating to the prohibition of false and misleading conduct Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW) Part 5. However, as these relate to trade and commerce, it is by no means clear whether this would address all the circumstances in which a Sheriff’s officer may make a deliberately misleading statement. It may therefore be appropriate to include some sort of broad provision prohibiting Sheriff’s officers from engaging in conduct that is deliberately designed to mislead people about their rights. Against this it might be considered acceptable for a Sheriff’s officer to mislead or deceive a person in certain limited circumstances. One example may be to protect a person’s privacy, such as in the case of a Sheriff’s officer calling a person by phone. In these circumstances the officer would generally not identify themselves as a Sheriff’s officer if a third party answers the call.
2.2.10.6 Penalties
While it is not suggested that the disciplinary process be amended it may be useful to include some sort of reference in the Sheriff Act to the disciplinary process under the Public Sector Management Act.
2.2.11 Power to remove officers
An alternative dismissal procedure is contained in the Police Service Act, which grants the Commissioner the power to remove a police officer who no longer has the confidence of the Commissioner Police Service Act 1990 (NSW) section 181D. This procedure merely requires the Commissioner to notify the officer in writing why the Commissioner no longer has confidence. The officer then has 21 days to make written submissions before the Commissioner makes a final decision. This decision is not subject to any appeal to GREAT. It should be noted that the Commissioner’s power under the Police Service Act was introduced as a response to recommendations contained within the Final Report of the Royal Commission into the NSW Police Service conducted by Justice Wood. While such a power may be justified in relation to the Police Service it is hard to make a case for a similar power in relation to Sheriff’s officers. No recommendations have been made by a body such as a Royal Commission and the powers of Sheriff’s officers are more limited than those of the Police. In the light of these matters any attempt to remove existing rights from officers appears to be unjustified. It is therefore proposed to retain the existing mechanism for the discipline and dismissal of officers.
This raises the question of whether a broader power to investigate complaints or conduct inquiries should be expressly granted to the Sheriff. Such a power may be considered beneficial as it would make clear that the Sheriff has the power to investigate complaints directed to him regarding matters related to the Office of the Sheriff. It may also be used to permit the Sheriff to carry out preliminary investigations into matters that may need to be referred to other agencies such as the Ombudsman’s Office and the Independent Commission Against Corruption. While this would not be intended to interfere with the power of these other agencies it may allow a memorandum of understanding to be drawn up to decide at which stage matters should be passed on to external agencies. Against this it may be argued that a power to conduct investigations may cause conflict between the Sheriff and external agencies as it may cause jurisdictional disputes. Further, it should be noted that most other public sector bodies do not appear to have such a legislative power. It is suggested that if the Sheriff is granted a power to investigate any matter that relates to the Office of the Sheriff and its functions, then this should be made specifically subject to the requirements of any other legislation. For example the Public Sector Management Act, Ombudsman Act, and the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act.
Currently the Ombudsman has no oversight role in relation to the Sheriff or Sheriff’s officers, as they are associated with the courts and are therefore exempt from the coverage of the Ombudsman Act Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW) Schedule 1 clause 2(a). Clearly, in some cases, it would be inappropriate for the Ombudsman to become involved in a dispute (for example, in the case of a dispute relating to whether a writ was executed properly). To allow oversight in these cases may in effect set up parallel dispute resolution mechanisms which could result in contradictory conclusions being reached in regard to the same set of facts. However, not all misbehaviour by a Sheriff’s officer would be reviewable by a court, and in these cases it is not so clear why the Ombudsman should be excluded. Independent oversight could also be advantageous in that structural problems or problems with an organisational culture may more easily be recognised. These types of problems are unlikely to be readily seen by a person operating within that organisation. A body such as the Ombudsman would also be able to apply standards equally across the public sector so that a person’s complaint would be handled in the same way regardless of where in government the subject of the complaint worked.
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