10.1 The grant of an AVO has consequences for both applicants and defendants. The main consequence for applicants is that the AVO provides protection from violence and other types of unpleasant behaviour such as threats and unwanted communication. For defendants, the grant of an AVO may prevent or restrict them from approaching the family home. Defendants must also dispose of any firearms in their possession and a licence or permit to possess a firearm will not be issued for a period of 10 years if the person has been subject to an AVO.1 A defendant is also disqualified from serving on a jury for the duration of an AVO.2
10.2 Apart from the consequences of granting an AVO, another related issue is with regard to the consequences of breaching an AVO. While an AVO is a civil order and does not give the defendant a criminal record, the breaching of an AVO is a crime. Thus, the consequences of breaching an AVO can be significant for defendants.
10.3 This chapter focuses on the most controversial consequence of granting an AVO, that is, the restrictions imposed on issuing and holding a firearms licence and the consequences of breaching an AVO.
FIREARMS LICENCE
10.4 A firearms licence is automatically suspended if an interim AVO is taken out against the licence or permit holder.3 It is automatically revoked if the interim AVO becomes final.4 Defendants must dispose of any firearms in their possession or surrender them to the police,5 and a licence or permit to possess a firearm must not be issued to a person who is, or who has, at any time within 10 years before the licence or permit application was made, been subject to an AVO.6 These provisions do not currently apply to Telephone Interim Orders (“TIOs”).
Views expressed in submissions
10.5 This provision can have a significant impact on defendants who require a firearms licence for work as a security guard and for defendants who work in rural areas. Many women at rural consultations who had been victims of domestic violence expressed the view that it is not only detrimental to defendants but also to themselves as it impacts on the family income, thus restricting their freedom to seek protection from domestic violence.7
10.6 The main criticism was with regard to the duration of the prohibition. Most people in rural areas were opposed to the 10 year period.8 Some were of the view that any suspension should be enforced in 6 months blocks, while others suggested that firearms licences should only be suspended or revoked for the duration of the AVO. There was also a suggestion that the revocation of a gun licence should only apply where there has been physical violence or where the order has been breached.
10.7 Another issue that has been raised is with regard to access to explosives. While access to firearms and prohibited weapons is restricted under Part 15A, a defendant can still legally hold a Powderman’s Certificate, a Shot Firer’s Certificate and a Shot Firer’s Permit, which gives the holders access to explosives, detonators, and detonating cord. A NSW Police committee addressing these licensing issues reported instances where explosives were used, or threatened to be used, against victims of domestic violence. Accordingly, NSW Police recommends that consideration be given to the restriction of the Powderman’s Certificate, a Shot Firer’s Certificate and a Shot Firer’s Permit in a similar fashion to the restrictions placed on defendants with firearms and prohibited weapons.9
10.8 Lastly, there is the issue of whether the restrictions should also apply when a TIO is granted. The rationale for lesser restrictions with regard to TIOs is that these orders are granted ex parte without a hearing. The counter argument is that these orders are granted in emergency situations when the most protection is needed.10
The Commission’s views
10.9 The Commission agrees that the restriction with regard to firearms and prohibited weapons is excessive, particularly when other restrictions such as the disqualification from serving on a jury apply only for the duration of the AVO.11 The Commission considers that, while meant to protect applicants, the restriction appears to have an adverse effect on all parties, particularly in rural areas.
10.10 Accordingly the Commission recommends that the suspension apply only for the duration of the order and that it should apply to TIOs, interim and final orders. The Commission believes that the suspension ought to apply to holders of the Powderman’s Certificate, a Shot Firer’s Certificate and a Shot Firer’s Permit for the duration of an AVO.
RECOMMENDATION 43
The Firearms Act 1996 (NSW) and the Weapons Prohibition Act 1998 (NSW) should be amended so that the 10 year prohibition on holding a firearms licence be replaced by a suspension of the licence for the duration of an AVO (whether TIO, Interim or Final Order) and that the suspension also be applied to holders of a Powderman’s Certificate, a Shot Firer’s Certificate and a Shot Firer’s Permit for the duration of an AVO.
BREACH OF AN AVO
10.11 If a person “knowingly” contravenes a prohibition or restriction specified in an order, the person is guilty of an offence. It is therefore a crime to breach an AVO.12 If the defendant breaches any terms in the order, the applicant must report the breach to the police. If the police believe on reasonable grounds that the defendant has breached an AVO, they can arrest and detain the defendant without a warrant.13 The person so arrested or detained must be brought before a court constituted by a Magistrate, as soon as practicable thereafter.14 A person will not be found guilty of breaching an order unless the person was served with a copy of the order15 or was present in court when the order was made.16 The maximum penalty for breaching an AVO is 2 years imprisonment, a fine of $5500, or both.17 If the person convicted of the offence is over 18 years of age, then the defendant must be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the court directs otherwise18 and the court must give reasons if the offender is not imprisoned.19
10.12 Effective police response to breaches is the key to ensuring the safety of the protected person. It is also the key to maintaining confidence in the AVO regime. Indeed the effectiveness of AVOs is undermined where police response is inadequate. Police are instructed to “treat all breaches of AVOs seriously, no matter how minor”.20 While the provisions in the legislation are considered adequate,21 many submissions have expressed general disappointment over police response to breaches of AVOs.22
10.13 A comparative analysis of the number of breaches of AVOs from 1998 to 2002 indicates that there has been a noticeable increase in the number of AVOs breached.23 It is assumed that this figure refers to the number of breaches that have been recorded through the court’s enforcement mechanism. The reasons for the increase may be attributed to a corresponding increase in the number of AVO applications. However, the figures do not include the number of orders that have been breached but where no police or court action has followed. While an increase in breaches may be symptomatic of an ineffective AVO regime, the issue of greater community concern is that of breaches.
10.14 There are three major issues that have been raised in submissions that warrant further discussion. They are:
1. the proper enforcement of breaches;
2. the adequacy of penalties for breach;
3. whether there should be defences to a breach.
Views in submissions
Proper enforcement
10.15 By far, the greatest barrier to the effectiveness of AVOs is said to be police inactivity on reported breaches.24 A general observation made in this regard was that “there appears to be a disjuncture between the level of action that police take in applying for ADVOs and the level of action they take in responding to breaches”.25
10.16 Currently, whether there has been a breach or not depends largely on whether the person intended to breach the order. A defendant who inadvertently breaches the order, for example by entering a building without knowing the protected person is inside, will not be guilty of an offence.26
10.17 While it may be reasonable to protect a defendant against being charged for a crime that was never intended, the views expressed in the submissions and the consultations is that too many allowances are made in the context of breaches. Consequently, the perception is that there is no purpose in applying for an AVO as breaches are not routinely acted upon.27 Victims of alleged breaches have reported that the police sometimes make moral judgments about the circumstances of the breach.28 It was also reported that when a breach is complained of, police are said to take no action on the basis that it is too trivial. The view expressed by members of the community is that any breach of the conditions is a breach that must be acted on, while the severity of the penalty should be commensurate with the seriousness of the breach.29 The Commission also received many submissions which provided examples such as the following:
He was hitting me and I ran to the window and screamed. The neighbours could hear me and could see him hitting me. The Police arrived, and told him not to do it again.30
10.18 A recent research study31 indicates that many women were dissatisfied with police responses to breaches of the orders. Of the 31 women who had ADVOs, 21 had reported breaches to the Police and in 13 of those cases, charges had been laid. Most of the women interviewed recounted repeated breaches of the orders that were not acted on by the police. Some women expressed dissatisfaction about the difficulty of proving that a breach had occurred.
10.19 Another issue of concern is that police do not follow up on breaches unless there is evidence, such as the ‘black eye’.32 Although breaches are often very difficult to prove, they are a part of a pattern of behaviour aimed at maintaining intimidation and control over the applicant. There was also some concern that breach provisions are more readily used when a woman is a defendant.33
10.20 In this regard, one suggestion was that police must be bound by law to investigate every breach. Another suggestion was that police must document all reported breaches and when three are reported they should be treated in combination as evidence of a pattern of behaviour that require investigation and appropriate criminal action.34
10.21 It was also suggested that Police may be reluctant to charge for a breach because they have to prove the breach beyond reasonable doubt, with the sanction that costs can be awarded against them.35 Submissions have alleged that women have contacted police to report a breach, then found that police have not only not acted upon, but not even kept a record of the reported breach.36 The Commission also received reports that police have problems accessing its databank outside business hours, which could impact on enforcement.37 Police must make a written record of their decision whether or not to prosecute for breach under s 562I(6), but there is no provision for review of the decision not to proceed.38 In this regard, the recommendation made in a report by the NSW Ombudsman suggesting that reasons for not taking action on breaches should be recorded and reviewed, has received support. 39 The recommendation states that:
(1) the Police Service review the reasons, as recorded in COPS, for taking no action in relation to domestic violence incidents, including a review of the adequacy of the reasons given;
(2) arising out of this review, the Police Service enhance current guidance for officers in making decisions not to act.40
10.22 The Commission also received reports of police treating violence at changeover times on contact visits as a family law matter rather than requiring the laying of a charge for breaching an AVO.41 Police have also reportedly failed to act on allegations of breaches in respect of several ADVOs because they have said the ADVO was unclear when read in conjunction with the terms of the Family Law order.42 In this context, it has been suggested that there is a need to educate police that the existence of a family court contact order does not justify the breach of an ADVO.43 It has also been suggested that there should be mandatory arrest for breach and that police discretion as to whether or not to charge should be removed.44
10.23 On the other hand, it has been suggested that police complain about the lack of response from Magistrates when breach charges are brought before a court.45 It has also been reported that the police find it frustrating in many circumstances where penalties imposed seem, in the officer’s opinion, to be inappropriately low.46 For their part, the police claim to have made progress in training and information provision to officers regarding breaches and welcome further practical suggestions on how to enhance the enforcement of breaches.47
10.24 Some submissions also raised the issue of whether it is reasonable that a person with an intellectual disability be charged with contravening an order. It appears that although the legislation is not intended to cover such people, there have been instances where people with an intellectual disability have been charged for breaching an AVO. One submission has suggested that there should be a specific provision that states that a person with an intellectual disability cannot be guilty of “knowingly contravening” an AVO where they are incapable of understanding the prohibitions or restrictions.48 The Chief Magistrate has suggested that a provision similar to s 37(2A) of the Bail Act 1978 (NSW) be used as a precedent.49 This provision requires the court to be satisfied that the bail condition is appropriate having regard (as far as can reasonably be ascertained) to the capacity of the defendant to understand and comply with the condition
Adequacy of penalties
10.25 Although the maximum penalty for breaching an AVO is 2 years imprisonment, a fine of $5,500, or both, it appears that these penalties are rarely imposed.50 While some consider the penalties are adequate, others believe that the full range of penalties and sentencing options should be available.51 The police consider the legislative provisions adequate but are concerned that the penalties imposed are inappropriately low.52
10.26 Some are opposed to the requirement that where a breach involves violence there should be a term of imprisonment unless the court orders otherwise. It has been suggested that there are sound criminological reasons why mandatory imprisonment must be opposed.53
10.27 There has also been some concern about the appropriateness of fines as a penalty for breaching an AVO. For example, where the parties live together and share a household income, the applicant would effectively be paying part of the fine. Paying a fine out of household income would be clearly to the detriment of the applicant.54 Further, it has been suggested that a fine may trivialise the seriousness of the breach.55
10.28 Other submissions consider it positive that there appears a greater propensity for Magistrates to hand down custodial sentences to offenders. However, it is noted that Magistrates are still reluctant to impose custodial sentences until the offender has come before them on many occasions.56
10.29 It has also been suggested that there is a need for guidelines for Magistrates on the setting of AVO conditions for defendants below 18 years of age, particularly regarding breach.57 Young people should not be brought into the criminal justice system due to “inadvertent breaching” of AVOs.58 Young defendants should have the opportunity to remain connected with their schooling and other important relationships.59
Defences to a breach
10.30 Currently, there are no defences to breaching an order in NSW. Western Australia is the only Australian jurisdiction that provides for consent (of the person protected) as a defence to a breach.60 “Consent” must be freely and voluntarily given and does not include consent obtained by force, threat, intimidation, deceit or any fraudulent means.61 The defence is also not available where the protected person is a child or someone for whom a guardian has been appointed.62 The court may revoke the restraining order where the defence is established.
10.31 The Commission received mixed responses as to whether or not there should be a similar defence in NSW. Some submissions expressed the view that there ought to be a defence similar to the Western Australian provision,63 provided it is freely and voluntarily given and not obtained by force, coercion threat or any fraudulent means.64 The defence should not be available where the person in need of protection is a child or person for whom a guardian has been appointed.65
10.32 Others suggested that (as a matter of practicality) consent ought to be a defence in relation to orders imposing physical restrictions, for instance “not to go within 500 metres”. The stated rationale is that since the person whom the AVO protects makes the complaint to the police in relation to a breach, no breach ought to be recorded if there is genuine consent to breaching the terms of the order by both parties.66
10.33 Another view was that the defence of consent is a problematic issue that should only be available if the defendant has “not knowingly or intentionally breached the AVO”.67 Others suggested that it should only be available as a defence of emergency, if carefully drafted.68
10.34 The majority of submissions did not favour including any defence,69 and particularly not consent.70 Others stated that no defence of consent should be available for statutory orders A and B.71 Consent is considered irrelevant to a breach, but may be relevant to penalty.72 The Chief Magistrate was of the view that an “AVO is an order of the court, which cannot be discarded, flouted or varied at the wishes of the parties”.73 Success and effectiveness of AVOs depends on maintaining respect for them, which would be undermined if such a defence was brought in.74
10.35 Additionally, the WA experience shows that a consent defence is impossible to enforce,75 and that police are reluctant to charge.76 Women have been charged with aiding and abetting when a defendant is charged with breach. The complexity of interpersonal relationships and domestic violence makes the concept of consent difficult.77 Any response to domestic violence must encourage the perpetrator to be responsible for his or her actions.78 Any issues of “consent” or “encouragement” by the victim should go to mitigation rather than to guilt. Responsibility for the violence and abusive behaviour must remain with the defendant. Providing a defence of consent may only facilitate an avenue whereby victims are manipulated and further held responsible for the violence and the decriminalisation of domestic violence.79
10.36 Moreover, the safety of protected persons would be jeopardised if any aspect of these orders is taken out of the court system and becomes the subject of private negotiation. This is particularly dangerous, given the power imbalance between the parties.80 Should a domestic violence victim decide to return to the relationship, which may amount to allowing the defendant to breach the AVO, it is vital that the law should not condemn her for that decision.81 Provisions dealing with variation or revocation are sufficient.82
10.37 A consent defence would also operate unfairly against people with an intellectual disability who may not understand that they have allowed the defendant to breach an AVO.83
10.38 Police already have discretion in deciding whether or not to charge.84 Given the low rate of charges for breach, it is unlikely that a charge would occur on the basis of an honest mistake made by the defendant.85
10.39 There is significant feminist literature on the difficulties of the construct of consent in the sexual assault context. It would be very unwise to introduce it in the domestic violence context. This is better addressed by making processes for variation or revocation of orders simple and timely, thus allowing for such applications to be reviewed before a court in the attempt to identify the genuine wishes of the parties.86
Aiding and abetting a breach
10.40 There is also opposition to charging victims with aiding and abetting a breach. The Police issued a circular to all police stating that charging victims of domestic violence with aiding and abetting was not police policy and should not be done. However, this approach is not in keeping with NSW Police policy according to the Standard Operating Procedures.87 Such charges continue to be made by police. It has therefore been suggested that the offence of “aiding and abetting” should not apply in relation to the person for whose benefit the order has been made.88
The Commission’s views
10.41 Clearly the effectiveness of the AVO regime is closely linked to the appropriate enforcement of breaches. The community has expressed various concerns about this issue. Police inactivity may be due to many reasons, some valid and others not. Many submissions have expressed the view that an objective test should be applied to determine whether the order has in fact been breached and that all breaches should be acted on with the seriousness of the breach being relevant only for the purposes of the penalty.
10.42 On the other hand, a strict liability approach has been rejected in New Zealand. There, the prosecution does not have to show that the defendant intended to breach the order, but does have to show that the defendant knew of the existence of the order and knew that his or her conduct may be in breach of that order.89 In the Northern Territory, it is a defence that the act complained of was necessary to enable the defendant to exercise a legal right or perform a legal duty. It is also a defence that the contravention was the result of an emergency and a similarly circumstanced ordinary person would have done the same.90
10.43 The Commission is of the view that it should be a defence to a breach that the defendant did not knowingly breach the order. Given that only the defendant will have knowledge of whether he or she knowingly breached the order, the Commission recommends that the onus must be on the defendant to prove the absence of knowledge on the balance of probabilities.
10.44 With regard to the adequacy of the penalties, the Commission is of the view that the current penalties are adequate. While the Commission appreciates the concerns regarding the perceived inappropriateness of imposing fines in relation to AVO matters, it does not favour restricting the penalty to custodial sentences only. However, the concerns regarding the imposition of inappropriately low penalties should be addressed by judicial and police education programs referred to in Chapter 3.
10.45 The Commission does not favour providing a defence of consent to the offence of breaching an order. The Commission notes that the Western Australian Department of Justice has recommended the removal of consent as a defence.91 The Model Domestic Violence Laws Report also did not support including consent as a defence to breaching a protection order.92 In any event, the Commission is of the view that providing such a defence will diminish the effect of an AVO. It is important that an order of the court should not be varied by an agreement between two individuals at will, particularly when a change of circumstances can be dealt with through variation by the court.
10.46 With regard to the offence of aiding and abetting, the Commission agrees with the view that it should not be applicable in relation to the person for whose protection the order is made. There may however be other circumstances when the offence is applicable in relation to persons other than the protected person.
FOOTNOTES
1. See discussion at para 10.4-10.10 below.
2. Jury Act 1977 (NSW) Sch 1(3)(a).
3. The suspension remains until the interim AVO is confirmed or revoked: Firearms Act 1996 (NSW) s 23(2) and Weapons Prohibition Act 1998 (NSW) s 17(2).
4. Firearms Act 1996 (NSW) s 23 and s 24 and Weapons Prohibition Act 1998 (NSW) s 17 and s 18.
5. Crimes Act s 562D(3).
6. Thus where an AVO expires, the defendant cannot hold a firearm licence for 10 years but this prohibition does not apply where the AVO has been revoked: Firearms Act 1996 (NSW) s 11(5) and s 29(3)(b) and Weapons Prohibition Act 1998 (NSW) s 10(3)(b).
7. Bourke consultation; Orange consultation; Moree consultation; Campbelltown Benevolent Society Domestic Violence Unit, Consultation.
8. Campbelltown Benevolent Society Domestic Violence Unit, Consultation.
9. NSW Police Service, Submission.
10. See discussion on TIOs in chapter 7.
11. Jury Act 1977 (NSW) Sch 1(3)(a).
12. Crimes Act s 562I.
13. Crimes Act s 562I(3).
14. Crimes Act s 562I(4) and (5).
15. Crimes Act s 562J and s 562H in the case of Telephone Interim Orders.
16. This is why effective service is crucial. See also para 11.39-11.61 regarding service.
17. Crimes Act s 562I(1).
18. Crimes Act s 562I(2A).
19. Crimes Act s 562I(2C).
20. Police Service Handbook (NSW Police Service, 2000) at D–22.
21. AVLICC, Submission; Domestic Violence Advocacy Service and Women’s Legal Resources Centre, Submission; Graham Johnston, Magistrate, Submission; Hawkesbury Nepean Community Legal Centre, Submission; Jane Wangmann, Submission; Manly Warringah Women’s Resource Centre, Submission.
22. See para 3.7-3.26.
23. See P Doak, New South Wales recorded crimes statistics 1999 (NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, 2000) at 61; P Doak, J Fitzgerald and M Ramsay, New South Wales Recorded Crimes Statistics 2002 (NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, 2003) at 70. According to this research, the total number of AVOs breached in 1998 were 9897 (or 156.3 per 100,000 population) and 12109 (or 185.4 per 100,000 population) in 2002.
24. AVLICC, Submission; NSW, Department for Women, Submission; Domestic Violence Advocacy Service and Women’s Legal Resources Centre, Submission; Margrette Young, Submission; Julie Stubbs, Submission referring to M Kaye, J Stubbs and J Tolmie, Negotiating child residence and contact against a background of domestic violence (Griffith University, Families, Law and Social Policy Research Unit, Working Paper, forthcoming) Chapter 3; Shoalcoast Community Legal Centre, Submission; South West Sydney Legal Centre, Submission; Manly Warringah Women’s Resource Centre, Submission; Jane Wangmann, Submission.
25. Jane Wangmann, Submission.
26. R v Sari [1999] ACTSC 109 at para 25 (Crispin J).
27. Moree consultation; Bourke consultation; Orange consultation.
28. Shoalcoast Community Legal Centre, Submission.
29. Gosford consultation.
30. South West Sydney Legal Centre, Submission.
31. M Kaye, J Stubbs and J Tolmie, Negotiating child residence and contact against a background of domestic violence (Griffith University, Families, Law and Social Policy Research Unit, Working Paper, forthcoming).
32. Orange consultation; Bourke consultation; Moree consultation.
33. WDVCAS Network meeting (5 March 2003).
34. Western NSW Community Legal Centre, Submission.
35. Orange consultation.
36. Hawkesbury Nepean Community Legal Centre, Submission.
37. Graham Johnson, Magistrate, Submission.
38. AVLICC, Submission.
39. AVLICC, Submission; NSW, Department for Women, Submission.
40. NSW Ombudsman, Policing of domestic violence in NSW (1999) Recommendation 8.
41. Domestic Violence Advocacy Service and Women’s Legal Resources Centre, Submission; Redfern Legal Centre and South Sydney Domestic Violence Unit, Consultation.
42. M Kaye, J Stubbs and J Tolmie, Negotiating child residence and contact against a background of domestic violence (Griffith University, Families, Law and Social Policy Research Unit, Working Paper, forthcoming).
43. Jane Wangmann, Submission. The need for eduction and training is discussed in Chapter 3.
44. AVLICC, Submission; NSW, Department for Women, Submission.
45. Jane Wangmann, Submission.
46. NSW Police Service, Submission.
47. NSW Police Service, Submission.
48. Intellectual Disability Rights Service Inc, Submission.
49. Chief Magistrate, Local Court of NSW, Submission.
50. South West Sydney Legal Centre, Submission; Manly Warringah Women’s Resource Centre, Submission; Moree consultation; Bourke consultation; Orange consultation.
51. Chief Magistrate, Local Court of NSW, Submission; NSW, Department for Women, Submission; Domestic Violence Advocacy Service and Women’s Legal Resources Centre, Submission.
52. NSW Police Service, Submission.
53. Julie Stubbs, Submission.
54. Julie Stubbs, Submission.
55. H Douglas and L Godden “The decriminalisation of domestic violence” (2002) 11 Australian Domestic and Family Violence Clearing House Newsletter at 8.
56. Shoalcoast Community Legal Centre, Submission.
57. NSW Commission for Children and Young People, Submission.
58. NSW Commission for Children and Young People, Submission.
59. NSW Commission for Children and Young People, Submission.
60. Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA) s 62(1).
61. Criminal Code (WA) s 319(2)(a).
62. Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA) s 62(2).
63. Western NSW Community Legal Centre, Submission; Law Society of NSW, Criminal Law Committee, Submission.
64. Law Society of NSW, Criminal Law Committee, Submission.
65. Law Society of NSW, Criminal Law Committee, Submission.
66. South West Sydney Legal Centre, Submission.
67. Blue Mountains Community Legal Centre, Submission.
68. Julie Stubbs, Submission.
69. AVLICC, Submission; Chief Magistrate, Local Court of NSW, Submission; NSW, Department for Women, Submission; Domestic Violence Advocacy Service and Women’s Legal Resources Centre, Submission; Graham Johnson, Magistrate, Submission; Hawkesbury Nepean Community Legal Centre, Submission; Intellectual Disability Rights Service Inc, Submission; Legal Aid NSW, Submission; Jane Wangmann, Submission; Wollongong consultation.
70. NSW, Department for Women, Submission; Intellectual Disability Rights Service Inc, Submission; Legal Aid NSW, Submission; Jane Wangmann, Submission; Wollongong consultation.
71. South West Sydney Legal Centre, Submission; NSW, Department for Women, Submission; Wollongong consultation.
72. Chief Magistrate, Local Court of NSW, Submission.
73. Chief Magistrate, Local Court of NSW, Submission. See also Legal Aid NSW, Submission.
74. Legal Aid NSW, Submission.
75. Chief Magistrate, Local Court of NSW, Submission; Domestic Violence Advocacy Service and Women’s Legal Resources Centre, Submission; NSW Police Service, Submission.
76. See Western Australia, Department of Justice, Evaluation of the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (1998).
77. Domestic Violence Advocacy Service and Women’s Legal Resources Centre, Submission; Hawkesbury Nepean Community Legal Centre, Submission; Jane Wangmann, Submission.
78. Domestic Violence Advocacy Service and Women’s Legal Resources Centre, Submission.
79. Multicultural Disability Advocacy Association, Submission.
80. Legal Aid NSW, Submission.
81. Hawkesbury Nepean Community Legal Centre, Submission.
82. Jane Wangmann, Submission.
83. Intellectual Disability Rights Service Inc, Submission.
84. Jane Wangmann, Submission.
85. Jane Wangmann, Submission.
86. Julie Stubbs, Submission.
87. NSW Police Service, Submission.
88. WDVCAS Network meeting (5 March 2003).
89. R v Police [1999] 2 NZLR 501.
90. Domestic Violence Act 1992 (NT) s 10.
91. Western Australia, Evaluation of the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (Department of Justice, 1998) Recommendation 27.
92. Domestic Violence Legislation Working Group, Model domestic violence laws (Report, April 1999) at 215.
