I. INTRODUCTION
10.1 Long and complex criminal trials present problems for the jury system which might adversely affect the administration of criminal justice and which motivate some to call for the abolition of jury trials such cases. The length of cases increases the risk of diminution of the jury by illness, pregnancy or other reasons. In a long case the greater chance that prejudicial material will be introduced or that jurors will be suborned also increases the risks of a mistrial. In a complex case there is the danger that the jury will be confused by the welter of information and unable to understand technical evidence with the result that the verdict may be unreliable. There is also concern that the strain imposed upon jurors by evidence beyond their grasp and months of hearing and deliberation time is intolerable and unfair. To be fair, just and efficient, the jury system must not only function fairly as far as the accused and the community are concerned but also for the jurors involved.
10.2 The issue of the effectiveness of juries in long and/or complex trials has been the subject of much public debate in recent times. For example, a recent Queensland fraud trial had lasted some twenty months when the jury was discharged after thirteen days of deliberation due to the illness of a juror.1 The contemplation of a failure to agree by a jury in such a case in the future led the Queensland Law Reform Commission to reverse its previous opposition to majority verdicts.2
10.3 The Federal Director of Public Prosecutions is reported to have said recently that, while juries can comprehend straightforward cases, such an understanding might not be possible in a major fraud trial or one involving complex technical evidence.3 Some of the jurors who convicted Edward Splatt in South Australia, chiefly on the basis of forensic evidence, have, since his release, publicly admitted that they did not understand that evidence.4 Recommending Splatt’s release, Royal Commissioner Shannon reportedly said that problems as complex as those involved in the Splatt case are “so detailed and convoluted that the jury needs to be furnished with considerable assistance”.5 In the Chamberlain case, Chief Justice Gibbs and Justices Mason and Murphy found that expert evidence on the traces of blood in the accuseds’ car was at a level of difficulty and sophistication above that at which a juror or. a judge might subject the opinions to critical evaluation. The result was that the jury could not eliminate reasonable doubt on the question.6
10.4 These statements, and many others of the same kind, give rise to considerable disquiet as to the propriety of jury trials In long and complex criminal (cases. Many suggestions have been made to correct the current situation, ranging from the abolition of the jury altogether in these cases to tinkering with the jury system to avert some of the more obvious risks and adopting procedural reforms to give greater assistance to juries faced with complicated matters. We consider first the suggestion that juries should be abandoned in cases involving complex evidence and the various proposal that have been made as to the constitution of an alternative tribunal. Ways of assisting juries to better organise for themselves, and to better understand, complex evidence are then discussed. Finally some proposals for averting mistrials due to diminution of the jury are considered.
II. ALTERNATIVES TO JURY TRIAL
10.5 A number of commentators in the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia argue that juries should not be used in particular types of cases or in cases where particular types of evidence are adduced. For example:
Whatever may be thought of a jury as a tribunal in criminal cases, it is probably adequate for the trial of simple, albeit serious, cases. In any event, it is extremely unlikely that public opinion would favour the complete abolition of trial by jury in criminal cases. There can be little doubt, however, that some criminal cases are quite unsuited for trial by a jury. One only has to think of complicated fraud and embezzlement cases, trials involving several accused, trials involving a large number of charges, to realize that such cases exist.7
Much recent attention has focussed on commercial prosecutions, particularly in the United Kingdom where a committee has been established to consider how the conduct of fraud trials could be improved.8 Levi has suggested that the abolition of jury trial for corporate offences and frauds might be acceptable because “fraud is not seen as an ordinary (or even ‘real’) crime” and abolition of juries in fraud cases is not seen as “infringing basic principles of criminal justice”.9 Others have noted that, even if juries were abolished only in fraud trials, some anomalies would remain.
... if a man with a gun robs a bank, he has the opportunity to be tried by a jury and to be judged by the standards of honesty of the ordinary citizen ... a man who stole from the same bank using a computer would not.10
It could, on the other hand, be argued that the discarding of jury trials may be acceptable because fraud crimes are not perceived to be as serious as other offences.
10.6 Fairness is essential to criminal trials and an impartial and capable fact finder is central to the fairness of a trial. The Jury Act, 1977 attempts to ensure that issues of fact are not submitted to jurors who are incapable of understanding the issues for elementary reasons: children cannot be jurors, for example, nor can the deaf, nor those who do not understand English. There may even to a discretionary jurisdiction to discharge an incompetent jury and to empanel a new one in the interests of justice.11 Technological developments, however, have contributed to. the development of such complex factual situations that many have argued that trial by any jury in such cases cannot be fair.
A. Trial by Judge Alone
10.7 It has been suggested that,
The problem could be solved by providing that the court
(a) shall, with the consent of the prosecutor and of all the accused and
(b) may, upon the application of the prosecutor or of one or more of the accused and upon cause being shown by any such applicant,
find that a case is unsuitable for trial by a judge and jury and direct that it shall be heard by a judge sitting alone.12
In civil trials, the Supreme Court of” New South Wales is empowered to order that all or any issues of fact be tried without a jury where “any prolonged examination of documents or scientific or local investigation is required and cannot conveniently be made with a jury”.13 Thus the Court can override the statutory right to a jury trial in cases of defamation, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment or seduction or where fraud is alleged in civil litigation.14 There are also certain serious criminal offences, most usually committed by corporate bodies and attracting severe financial penalties which are usually only tried summarily. A summary jurisdiction was conferred on the Supreme Court in 1967 and certain offences under the Clean Air Act, 1961, the Clean Waters Act, 1970, the Noise Control Act, 1975 and the Prices Regulation Act, 1948, among others, (can be proceeded with in that jurisdiction.
10.8 It has been argued that the jury is inappropriate in criminal commercial fraud trials because the technical, legal and economic concepts that arise are beyond the experience and understanding of the average juror. In 1979 a Bill was introduced into State Parliament providing for the prosecution of certain offences under the Companies Act, 1961 and the Securities Industry Acts, 1970 and 1975, among others, in the summary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. This Bill would have abolished the right to jury trial for people accused of these “white collar” offences. Such was the public outcry that the Bill was amended to provide that the summary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court can only be used at the election of the accused.15 A very small number of accused flat)e elected this form of summary trial and to date only one such trial has actually gone ahead.16
10.9 All criminal trials in the higher courts in South Australia can, since October 1984, be tried without a jury at the election of the accused. The judge must first be satisfied that the accused received legal advice before making such an election.17 This reform teas first suggested in 1975 by the Criminal Law and Penal Methods Reform Committee which suggested two reasons why an accused might prefer trial by a judge alone. An accused might feel that a judge would “perceive more clearly the validity of the defence” than would a jury. Secondly, a judge’s findings of fact would be open to appeal.
It was anticipated that a majority of accused people would elect to be tried without a jury.18 In fact to June 1985, not one accused person had elected to be tried in this way.19
10.10 Advocates of the judge-only trial argue that this is the only way to ensure a reliable verdict which can be tested on appeal.
....the most compelling grounds for advocating trial by a judge without jury are that, in complicated cases at least, it is more probable that he will arrive at a true verdict in accordance with the law, that he will give reasons for his decision, that those reasons will be made public and, if his reasons are unsound in law, his verdict can be set aside by the Court of Criminal Appeal.20
In contrast, others have argued that “there is no empirical evidence that judges, per se, are more competent than juries, per se, to determine complex factual issues”.21
Furthermore, juries have been praised for bringing elements to their decisions that judges alone cannot provide.22
10.11 Evidence to the British Committee examining fraud trials from the National Council for Civil Liberties, from Justice and from a number of police forces, has favoured retention of the jury in these trials.23 The National Council for Civil Liberties submitted that:
The decision to be made in fraud trials is: in common sense and common honesty was it a swindle? Twelve ordinary citizens using their experience and common sense with guidance on the law are best equipped to answer that question.24
There is also the difficulty of “entrusting a man’s liberty ... effectively to the decision of one man”.25 One answer to this is to provide trial by a panel of three judges . The same criticism, however, can be made of this proposal: that ordinary citizens are best equipped to assess witnesses and determine facts . Moreover, it is unlikely that the system could afford the time and expense of three judges for every serious trial.
B. Judge and Assessors
10.12 A number of commentators have suggested that in complicated commercial prosecutions, the issues would be more fairly tried if heard before a mixed tribunal of a judge and two lay people giving reasoned judgments and with an unlimited right of appeal.26 It has been proposed that the assessors should be chosen from a panel of “citizens of experience and distinction in the commercial world”,27 or of “persons having commercial and financial experience”.28 The use of assessors has been criticised, however, on the ground that “it would be virtually impossible to ascertain the extent of formal and informal input to a judgment which an assessor may make”.29 In our view, the proper place for experts is in the witness box, where their credentials and opinions can be tested. There would be some concern that an assessor would make a judgment on the basis of his or her own knowledge and views rather than on the evidence, including expert evidence, presented to the court. Preconceived notions of any kind are unwelcome where guilt is at issue. One Australian suggestion might overcome this particular problem. It is that assessors should be, not accountants and people in business, but practising commercial lawyers ‘’capable of assessing expert and often complex evidence”.30 Yet another suggestion is that the judge should sit with two assessors with no special qualifications. Such assessors could be chosen for each case from a small pool of people. Non-expert assessors could represent the community in a way which experts would not, but they would not be necessarily more competent than a jury of twelve. A panel of two such assessors sitting with a judge would lack the broad range of experience and background found on a jury of twelve.
C. Special Juries
10.13 An alternative mode of trial in complex cases is the special jury . The original special jury was a social elite. Originally, even common jurors required a property qualification and special jurors were additionally required to hold a high social ranking.31 Modern proposals for the reintroduction of special juries would determine qualification somewhat differently. For example, a South Australian committee has proposed that special jury lists should be drawn up composed of people with certain basic educational or occupational qualifications in the fields of science and of commercial transactions. The special jury would not consist of people who had special property qualifications or community standing, but of people whose education or training in a particular field enabled them to follow evidence in certain cases better than those who had not received such education or training. It was recommended that a judge should be empowered, either on his own motion or upon the application of the Crown or of the defence, to order that a special jury be empanelled for, any case in which there were difficult questions which required an understanding of expert evidence.32
10.14 In the United States, where trial by jury is a right under the Constitution in civil cases as in criminal cases at the Federal level, it is in the civil area that alternatives to the jury are being mooted. In this context the special jury has been advocated.
A jury composed of particularly qualified individuals could understand sophisticated concepts that might be beyond the ability of either a judge or a traditional jury. Jury confusion would be less of a problem than it is with juror’s who are unfamiliar with the technical, financial and legal issues involved in much of today’s complicated litigation. There also would be less likelihood of an irrational verdict because the special jurors would be able to make a reasoned decision based on their understanding of the facts and the law.33
The special jury, however, has been criticised because of its “implications of class justice”.34 It “can give the appearance of being undemocratic”.35 Critics have also suggested that it would be impracticable.
We do not think it would be easy to devise acceptable qualifications for entry in a special jurors list which would be consistent with the principle of the random selection of jurors, and we doubt whether a jury so selected would in practice turn out to be anymore satisfactory than the ordinary jury.36
On the other hand, it could be argued that jurors having some acquaintance with the subject area of a charge are more accurately described as the peers of the accused than are jurors who are more typically empanelled.
10.15 The Commission considers that juries as currently selected are best equipped to determine serious criminal allegations including those involving allegations of fraud, those requiring assessment of complex technical or scientific evidence, and those which are lengthy. As we have discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, jurors can readily the assisted to perform more effectively and efficiently even in very difficult cases, We discuss some of the extra measures which could be adopted in long and complex trials below. We consider that the jury as an institution is such a crucial and fundamental symbol and component of democracy that it should not be surrendered until first, it is clearly shown that it operates so incompetently as to deny other democratic rights and second, that no amount of procedural tinkering can overcome this incompetence. We do not consider that this stage has been reached. We adopt the view expressed on this matter by the Chief Justice of Australia, Sir Harry Gibbs:
For my own part, I would prefer that a determined effort should be made to remould the rules of criminal procedure rather than that there should be further encroachments on the right to trial by jury. It seems particularly necessary to find a way to shorten the length of trials by more clearly defining the real issues, and in some way relieving the prosecution of the necessity to present full and detailed proofs of matters that are not really in dispute.37
We discuss some of these matters in greater depth in our Discussion Paper on Procedures Before Trial.
III. PRESENTING A COMPLEX CASE TO A JURY
10.16 Some commentators have insisted that no case is so complex that it cannot be presented to a jury in a comprehensible way . Some techniques which would improve juror comprehension have been discussed in Chapter 6. These techniques may not be adopted in every trial but could be particularly useful in a complex trial. Pre-trial hearings to define and confine the issues in dispute could reduce the amount of information to be presented to the jury. There the trial is expected to be long and/or complex the pre-trial hearing should, among other things, settle a written summary of the facts in issue and discuss the need for additional jurors (see paragraph 9.23). The former Director of Public Prosecutions of Victoria suggested that ex written summary of the facts in issue should be given to each juror and be available throughout the trial. It should convey to each juror those matters in the trial which are in dispute and those which are not. It could also include, either by consent of the parties or by decision of the judge, to glossary of technical terms and their meanings.38 In a complex case the judge’s introductory directions to the jury are also most important to introduce the jury to the case in a way that enhances their understanding of it.
10.17 Suggestions for presenting particularly complex evidence to juries have included the suggestion from the former Victorian Director of Public Prosecutions that technical and scientific witnesses should be allowed to read their main evidence from a prepared document. This document would set out the expert witness qualifications, experience, the work done in the particular case and any conclusions or opinions reached.39 The obligation on scientific witnesses to be clear about their assertions and opinions has recently been recognised in South Australia, where the judge investigating the reliability of the conviction for murder of Edward Splatt, commented in his report:
The vital obligation which lies upon the testifying scientists is that they spell out to the jury, in non-ambiguous and precisely clear terms, the degree of weight and substance and significance which is or, ought properly to be attached to the scientific tests and analyses and examinations as to which they depose; and specifically the nature and degree of any limitations or provisos which are properly appended thereto.
And the critical responsibility which rests upon legal persons is to ask such detailed and probing questions of the scientists as are most likely to elicit the type of evidence just mentioned.40
The Commission considers that the evidence of technical and scientific witnesses should, if the presiding judge considers it would assist the jury, be capable of being given by reading a document of the kind proposed by the former Victorian Director of Public Prosecutions. In some circumstances, the parties may agree that reading is not necessary and the judge may consider. the jury would be best assisted if the document were simply tendered in evidence as an exhibit. We propose that such a method of receiving the evidence of technical and scientific witnesses should be acceptable, provided the witness is available to give evidence if required and the judge considers it would assist the jury. The question whether either procedure is to be adopted should be settled at a pre-trial hearing.
10.18 Where the complexity of a trial is due to a large number of accused and/or multiple charges, consideration should be given to instructing -the jury separately in respect of each. The jury could then be asked to consider its verdict in relation to each accused, or each charge, independently of the others. This approach, in appropriate cases, could simplify the jury’s task of properly digesting the various parts of the summing-up and giving it due consideration in reaching a verdict in the case. The Queensland Court of Criminal. Appeal affirmed in Fong that “the procedure whereby the summing up was split and the verdicts taken was lawful”.41 The Commission considers that the power of the presiding judge, in his or her discretion, to instruct the jury on individual charges and individual accused and to require the jury to deliberate separately on each should be affirmed. Another procedure for dealing with the complexity of multiple charges or even of’ alternative verdicts to a single charge is to provide the jury with a written statement setting out the various counts in the indictment and the alternative verdicts available. This method has been approved by the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal.42 Such a statement could give some order to the jury’s deliberations and would go some way towards ensuring that a complete consideration of the issues is made and that a formally correct verdict is rendered. The Commission considers that the power of the presiding judge, in his or her discretion, to provide to the jury a written statement setting out the alternative verdicts available should also be affirmed.
IV. AVOIDING DIMINUTION OF THE JURY
10.19 In trials which are likely to run for an extended period of time, it is essential that prospective jurors be given fair warning that those selected may be to serve for a lengthy period. This would give them the opportunity to make an application to be excused on the ground that long service as a juror would cause an unreasonable degree of disruption. To their employment or to their private lives. The Commission tentatively proposes that, where people are summoned to a jury panel (as opposed to a jury pool) for a long trial, a letter should be sent with the Jury Summons advising the predicted length of the trial and inviting written applications for excusal. In this way potential. jurors whose reluctance to serve is based on reasonable grounds can be excused without being required to attend the court personally.
A. Reducing the Stress of Long and Complex Cases
10.20 A criminal jury trial can continue even though ia juror dies or is discharged by reason of illness or for any other reason, providing the jury is not reduced below ten. If three or more jurors are discharged, the trial can only continue if both the Crown and the accused consent in writing.43 It is clearly a desirable ideal, however, that the full complement of jurors should hear the whole case and return a verdict. This is consistent with the Commission’s view that the twelve-m ember jury should be retained, it being an optimum number which can represent a fair cross-section of the community. It is also consistent with the argument that the unanimity rule should be retained so that twelve people must be convinced of guilt before an accused person can be convicted,
10.21 A number of the proposals made in Chapter 6 for presenting a case to juries, and the proposals made above for clarifying and explaining complex evidence to juries, would have the added advantage of removing some of the stress which a long trial imposes upon jurors. The inordinate burden which can fall upon jurors is illustrated by the case of Miller, in which a juror was convicted of contempt of court for refusing to continue in a long and complicated rape trial. The juror had argued that he had been confused by the speeches of counsel, felt inadequate to make a decision and after two weeks of hearings, had panicked.44 The stress of a long and complex case can take its own toll of the health of jurors. This occurred after thirteen days deliberation in the Russell Island Case in Queensland, with the result that the jury was discharged without rendering a verdict. All due precautions will not avoid the possibility that, especially in a long trial, jurors will become ill, or even die, become pregnant, or request to be discharged for pressing family or business reasons. If a long trial must be aborted because the number of jurors falls below the statutory minimum, the financial loss to the State, as well as the financial and emotional strain upon the accused, would be enormous . One solution to this dilemma could be to permit the judge alone to decide whether a trial should continue with fewer than ten jurors. The Commission invites submissions as to whether doing away with the requirement of the parties’ consent in desirable, and, if so, whether this measure should complement the additional juror, procedure proposed below or substitute for it.
B. Extra Jurors
10.22 Two Australian jurisdictions have adopted systems of reserve jurors to cope with the problems of long trials. In Queensland and Western Australia reserve jurors are selected after the jury of twelve is empanelled. The reserve jurors take part in the trial in the same way as does the actual jury. If a member of the jury is discharged during the course of the trial, the first of the reserve jurors takes his or her place. Both States provide that the judge may order up to three reserve jurors to be selected. Reserve -Jurors who have not replaced an original juror are discharged immediately before the jury retires to consider its verdict and, therefore, are not available to replace any juror discharged during deliberations.45 New Zealand’s Royal Commission on the Courts in 1978 considered the Western Australian model but determined that the evidence was not sufficiently compelling to warrant the making of a provision for reserve jurors. Broadening of the power to continue a criminal trial with fewer than twelve jurors was considered to be a sufficient answer to the problems of long trials.46 A South Australian inquiry in 1975, on the other hand, recommended the adoption of the reserve juror procedure.47 This recommendation has not yet been implemented in South Australia.
10.23 An alternative procedure has been adopted in the United States. It is called the “additional juror” method. Again the judge his a discretion whether to empanel extra jurors and, if so, how many, up to a maximum of three. The difference is that the “extras” are not identified, but the jury sits as a larger jury until the time comes for deliberation. A further ballot is then held to choose the twelve who will form the final jury. Those not selected are then discharged. The American Bar Association has noted some advantages of the additional juror procedure over the Australian model:
A preference for the additional juror system has sometimes been stated on the ground that it is undesirable to give Et juror who may be involved in deciding the case second class standing during some or all of the trial. That is, one who is labelled an alternate at the outset might not take his job as seriously as the regular jurors as the chances of substitution are not great. On the other hand, where one or two additional jurors tare selected each member of the thirteen or fourteen man group knows that even if no juror is excused for cause he nonetheless has a very substantial chance of being involved in the deliberations.48
It could be argued that all jurors who have not been discharged by the time the jury retires should be permitted to join in the deliberation and rendering of the verdict. The excluded juror(s) will have given (conscientious attention to the case over a long period . He or, she may upon have been chosen as foreman. The excluded juror(s) may have a valuable contribution to make to the deliberation and would probably feel frustrated by his or her chance exclusion. On the other hand, the larger the jury, the more difficult it will be to achieve unanimity. This factor will bolster arguments in favour of majority verdicts, especially in cases where the majority required is twelve to one, two or three. On balance the Commission favours the additional juror procedure and considers it is probably preferable that “extra” jurors be discharged before deliberation. The Commission understands that amendments to the Jury Act, 1977 in accordance with the additional juror model are being considered by the New South Wales Attorney General’s Department. One modification to this model which might be considered is the exemption of the foreman from the balloting process.
C. Reducing Trial Length
10.24 Counsel can play a vital role in keeping hearing times ho a minimum. The English Court of Appeal in Turner invited “the attention of both judges and counsel to the need to keep trials as short as is consistent with the proper administration of justice.”49 Pre-trial procedures, if effective, will go some way to reducing the length of trials. Samuels has suggested that there should be fewer defendants that
the prosecution should concentrate upon the principal villains and not worry too much about the minor characters, who could probably be dealt with subsequently without difficulty in the magistrates’ courts following the determination of the principal issue.50
He has also proposed that there should be fewer charges on each indictment and that conspiracy charges should be tightly controlled.51
10.25 The presentation of cases can, it is argued, also be refined.
Fewer witnesses and fewer exhibits should still enable the prosecution properly to prove the case . Documents should be limited, and too much detail in the examination of witnesses should be avoided ... 52
It was stated in Fisher that,
.. in these difficult fraud cases judges and counsel should co-operate in an endeavour to shorten the hearing by limiting the number of documents put in evidence and avoiding too much detail in the examination of witnesses.53
Samuels also criticises the multiple repetition of arguments to the jury. He argues that speeches by counsel “are based on the premiss that the jury are stupid and accordingly the matters in issue must be put to them repeatedly”. He suggests restricting prosecuting counsel to a time limit, or even requiring counsel. to choose between making an opening or a closing speech, and also proposes that a single counsel should represent co-accused where there is no possibility of a conflict of interest.54
V. TENTATIVE PROPOSALS
10.26 The Commission does not underestimate the problems raised by both long and complex criminal trials. At the same time, we do not underestimate the abilities of modern juries. We note that our political system is based on the assumed competence of common people to function in a democracy. The denial of the competence of jurors, even in a limited range of cases , raises doubts about the viability of the democratic system. We believe that a jury chosen at random and representing a fair cross-section of the community is a fundamental right of all accused people, irrespective of the nature of the offence charged. Moreover, such a jury is competent, we consider, to understand the complex issues which may arise, even in modern commercial prosecutions, when these issues are clearly presented. Our proposals, therefore, are concerned to suggest ways in which the jury can be assisted to assimilate and assess complex evidence. Our proposals are also directed towards ensuring, so far as possible, that juries are not diminished in the course of lengthy trials.
1. Trial by a jury of twelve citizens randomly selected from the general (community should be retained for all serious criminal cases (paragraph 10.15).
2. The evidence of technical and scientific witnesses should, if the presiding judge considers it would assist the jury, be capable of being given by:
The question whether either procedure should be adopted should be settled at a pre-trial hearing (paragraph 10.17).
3. The power of the presiding judge, in his or her discretion, to instruct the jury as to individual charges and individual accused and to require the jury to deliberate separately on each should be affirmed (paragraph 10.18).
4. The power of the presiding judge, in his or her discretion, to provide to the jury a written statement setting out the alternative verdicts available should be affirmed (paragraph 10.18).
5. When a trial is expected to be lengthy, the summons to the jury panel should include a notice to this effect inviting potential jurors to apply to the Sheriff for excusal where necessary (paragraph 10.19),
6. The additional juror procedure should be introduced In flew South Wales by an amendment to the Jury Act, 1977. A in the end of the evidence, 01 f7 the remaining jurors exceed twelve, twelve only should be ballotted to form the deliberating jury (paragraph 10.23).
10.27 One other issue has been raised in this Chapter about which we have not made a tentative proposal. That is whether the minimum allowable size of a jury should be less than ten at the judge’s discretion and irrespective of the consent of the Crown and the accused (paragraph 10.21).
FOOTNOTES
1. The Russell Island Case (R v Nichols, Dickinson and Others), District Court of Queensland, 20 July 1981 to 9 March 1983 (unreported)).
2. Queensland Law Reform Commission, Working Paper on Legislation to Review the Role of Juries in Criminal Trials (W.P. 28, 1984) at p.138.
3. “Some Jury Trials ‘Could be Abolished’”, The Age 15 October 1984.
4. Stewart Cockburn, “When law and science collided”, Canberra Times 5 August 1984, pp.1, 9.
5. P. Willoughby, ‘’Method of aiding jury ‘needs improvement’”, Adelaide Advertiser 2 August 1984.
6. Chamberlain v. The Queen (1984) 58 A.L.J.R. 133.
7. J. Law, “Criminal Jury Trials” (1967) Scots Law Times 173.
8. Home Office Committee on Fraud Trials, chaired by Lord Roskill.
9. M. Levi, “Blaming the Jury: Frauds on Trial” (1983) 10(2) Journal of Law and Society 257, at p.268.
10. Justice, Fraud Trials.(London, 1984), at p.27.
11. R. v. Kirke (1909) 43 Irish Law Times Reports 130.
12. J. Law, note 7 above.
13. Supreme Court Act, 1970, s.89(1)(a).
14. Id., s.88.
15. Crimes Act, 1900, ss.475A, 4758.
16. Attorney General of New South Wales v. Chambers, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Criminal Division (Roden J), 24 June 1983 (unreported).
17. Juries Act 1927-1984 (S.A.), s.7.
18. Criminal Law and Penal Methods Reform Committee of South Australia, Court Procedure and Evidence (Third Report, 1975), at pp.92-94.
19. B. Powell, “The State of the Jury” (1985) 7(5) Law Society Bulletin 139.
20. J. Law, note 7 above, at p.174.
21. R.S. Kuhlman, G.C. Pontikes and W.J. Stevens, “Jury Trial, Progress, and Democracy’’ (1980-81) 14 John Marshall Law Review 679, at p.683
22. “The Case for Special Juries in Complex Civil Litigation”(1980) 89 Yale Law Journa1 1155, at p.1159.
23. F. Gibb, “Reform group of lawyers defends trial by jury”, The Times 11 December 1984, at p.2; Legal Affairs Correspondent, “NCCL backs trial by jury for fraud cases” , The Times. 12 December 1984, at p. 2; S. Tendler, “Police chiefs in favour of jury trials in fraud cases, but urge reforms”, The Times 21 December 1984, at p. 5.
24. Legal Affairs Correspondent, “NCCL backs trial by jury for fraud cases”, The Times 12 December 1984, at p.2.
25. G.F.K. Santow, “Regulating Corporate Misfeasance and Maintaining Honest Markets” (1977) 51 Australian Law Journal 541, at p.550.
26. Lord Hailsham, (1974) 48 Australian. Law Journal 351., at p. 353; Lord Chief Justice Lane in F . Gibb, “ Reform long jury trial” The Times 21 March 1983, at p.3.
27. M. Sherrard, “Juries and Fraud Cases” (1970) 60 Law Guardian 9, at p.11.
28 . R.M. Jackson, The Machinery of Justice in England (Cambridge University Press, 7th ed., 1977), at p.504.
29. J. Phillips, “Complex commercial prosecutions - should juries be retained? (1983) Law Institute Journal 1214, at p.1215.
30. G.F.K. Santow, note 25 above, at p.550.
31. (1832) 2 William IV., No.3, ss.II, XXIV.
32. Criminal Law and Penal Methods Reform Committee of South Australia, Court Procedure and Evidence (Third Report, 1975), at pp. 101-102.
33. “The Case for Special Juries in Complex Civil Litigation” (1980) 89 Yale Law Journal 1155, at p.1159, footnote omitted.
34. R.M. Jackson, note 28 above, at p.504.
35. J. Phillips, note 29 above.
36. Justice, note 10 above, at p.23.
37. “Keynote Address at the Opening of the Third International Conference of Appellate Judges”, 5 March 1984, New Delhi, at pp.6-7.
38. J. Phillips, note 29 above, at p.1215.
39. Director of Public Prosecutions, Victoria, Annual Report (1983-1984), at p.18.
40. Royal Commission Reprt concerning the Conviction of Edward Charles Splatt (South Australia,-1984), at p,52.
41. R. v. Fong [1981] Qd. R 90. See also R. v . Mitchell [1971] V.R. 46; v. Turner (1980) 70 Cr. App. R.256.
42. R v. Petroff (1980) 2 A. Crim. R. 101.
43. Jury Act, 1977, s.22(a).
44. R. v. Miller. Central Criminal Court, Melbourne Victoria, 28 February 1977 (unreported).
45. Jury Act 1929 (Qld.), s.17; Juries Act 1957 (W.A.), s.18.
46. Royal Commission on the Courts, Report (New Zealand, 1978), paras. 374-375.
47. Criminal Late and Penal Methods Reform Committee of South Australia, Court Procedure and Evidence (Third Report, 1975), at p.107.
48. American Bar Association, Projects on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice: Standards Relating Trial by Jury (1968), at p.80.
49. R. v. Turner (1975) 61 Cr. App. Rep. 67, at p.76, per Lawton L. J.
50. A. Samuels, “Shortening Jury -Trial” (1976) 126 New Law Journal 988, at pp. 988-989.
51. Id., at p.989.
52. Ibid.
53. R. v. Fisher (1974) 60 Cr. App. Rep. 225, at p.227 per Cairns L.J.
54. A. Samuels, note 50 above, at p.990.
