I. RETENTION OF LIMITATION PERIOD
6.1 The Commission recommends that the limitation of personal injury actions be governed by a primary fixed limitation period running from the date of accrual of the cause of action, with a general discretion conferred on the court to extend the primary period where injustice would otherwise result. Injustice refers to injustice between the particular parties to the action, not injustice in the abstract, and would involve consideration of the respective circumstances of the parties. The discretion would operate as an exception to the primacy of the fixed period.
6.2 The Commission believes that the primary limitation period should be retained as a sanction for those who do not commence their actions promptly. Although available evidence is far from conclusive (see para 5.2 1) and the sanction may not be necessary as a deterrent given the plaintiff’s own interest in bringing an action promptly (see para 5.18) a fixed limitation period does put a definite limit on the litigation of late claims, thus ensuring the benefits of prompt litigation. These include more reliable and readily available evidence; the protection of defendants from the continuing threat of liability which accords with both a personal sense of justice and allows efficient use of resources, the latter being necessary for effective commercial practice; and the efficient operation of the machinery of justice which requires claims to be dealt with expeditiously.1 These are benefits to both individual plaintiffs and defendants and to the community.
6.3 Nevertheless the Commission recognises that any such system can cause injustice as between individual plaintiffs and defendants if applied without exception. In Chapter 3 we have outlined the main areas for concern. As well as certain identifiable categories such as latent injury and disease there are the myriad cases which, because of peculiarities and combinations of circumstances, result in hardship to the plaintiff. Such cases require provision for extension beyond the fixed limitation period.
II. LENGTH OF LIMITATION PERIOD
6.4 The commencement of personal injury actions in New South Wales is governed by a six year limitation period, as are actions founded on contract or tort generally.2
6.5 In England, the six year limitation period for personal injury was reduced to three years in 1954.3 This reduction was followed in Queensland4 and South Australia5 in 1956, in Victoria6 in 1958 and in Tasmania7 in 1965. In each case, the limitation period for actions founded on tort or contract generally, remained at six years. The Northern Territory legislation, enacted in 1981, provides for a three year limitation period for actions based on tort or contract generally, including those claiming damages for personal injury.8
6.6 The shortening of the limitation period in England implemented the recommendations of the Monckton Committee. The Committee stressed that although the plaintiff must be given adequate time within which to commence an action, the six year limitation period was too long.
It seems clearly unreasonable that a prospective plaintiff should have the power to keep the threat of an action hanging over the [defendant] for so long a period as six years.9
The Committee consequently recommended that personal injury actions be governed by a three year limitation period and this has remained the situation in England since 1954. The Orr Committee, in its 1974 Report, supported the retention of the three year period having received no evidence that it be either “extended or abridged”.10
6.7 In 1975, this Commission echoed those sentiments and recommended the introduction of a three year limitation period for all actions based on tort including those involving personal injury, with power in the court to extend up to one year further “if satisfied that sufficient cause is shown or that having regard to all the circumstances of the case, it would be reasonable so to do”.11 Actions founded on contract would continue to be governed by a six year period.12 The Commission argued that although the six year period went back as far as 1623 and was familiar to the community, it was ultimately an arbitrary limit which could be altered without harm.13
6.8 There is an interaction between the length of the limitation period and the existence of provisions for extension of that period. The main argument for the lengthening of the limitation period is to prevent the exclusion of worthwhile cases, such as those involving latent injury and disease. However, all such cases will never be fairly accommodated under a rigid system of limitations running from the date of accrual of the cause of action; unless the period is so long as to be meaningless in terms of the rationale for limitations.14 There is always the risk that time will run, and even expire before the injury is discovered or reasonably discoverable. If, however, a satisfactory extension formula is found for such cases, there is no need for a lengthy primary limitation period.
6.9 While there has been an overall tendency since the 1950s to shorten limitation periods applicable to personal injury actions, the most recent Australian amendments have restored the six year period. In the 1983 Victorian amendments, which simplified the discovery rule and introduced a discretionary extension, the primary limitation period was extended from three to six years bringing it into line with actions founded on tort or contract generally. In his second reading speech on the amending Bill, the Victorian Attorney General stated that
[t]he Government does not understand why a claim for damages arising out of personal injury should be treated differently from any other cause of action.15
6.10 The Law Reform Commission of Western Australia also recommended the retention of the six year limitation period for personal injury actions notwithstanding its recommendation for the introduction of a broad power of extension.16
6.11 There is much to be said for uniformity between States and Territories, but preservation of a six year limitation period in New South Wales would not produce uniformity. A shorter period is desirable, primarily to encourage the early determination of contested claims. The argument for a longer period is met by a provision for discretionary extension of time. The primary limitation period in cases of personal injury should therefore be three years from the date of accrual of the cause of action.
6.12 The Commission is persuaded that the public interest is better served by requiring early prosecution of personal injury claims, that it will be the exceptional case only that will not be accommodated by the primary period of three years and the discretionary extension suggested.17 It must be appreciated that the delay permitted by a limitation period is that which occurs in the initiation of the proceedings and not any delay which may then ensue in bringing the matter to trial. If there are good reasons for delaying the hearing they can be dealt with under the control of the Court. Reasons for a delayed hearing are not reasons for a longer limitation period.
III. EXTENSION PROVISIONS
A. The Discovery Rule Extension
6.13 The discovery rule extension formula is concerned only with latent injury and disease and does not address wider areas of hardship arising under the primary limitation period. It has received various statutory forms since its introduction in England in 1963.18 In New South Wales it currently operates on a discretionary basis. On satisfaction of the date of knowledge criteria, the court may order that the limitation period be extended by one year from the date of knowledge.19 In England and Victoria the rule operates to allow a plaintiff to commence an action as of right on satisfaction of the criteria. Furthermore plaintiffs receive the benefit of the ordinary limitation period which then runs from the date of knowledge.20 In this way, the position of victims of latent injury and disease has been fully integrated with that of ordinary personal injury claimants. In England, the two situations have been equated as the norm, in contradistinction to cases brought under the discretionary provisions.21 In some cases also the Supreme Court is able to achieve an extension of the limitation period by use of the discretion in Part 20 of the Supreme Court Rules 1970 to allow amendments. It is clear from the decision of the Court of Appeal in McGee v Yeomans22 that such amendments may, by allowing additional causes of action in the proceedings, have the effect of allowing an extension of the limitation period in relation to such new causes of action, although only where arising out of the same or similar facts.23
6.14 The extension as of right has improved the position of victims of latent injury and disease. This improvement has been noted by recent reformers and there is a reluctance to detract from that position. The Orr Committee, in 1974, for example, referred to the valuable right which had been conferred on plaintiffs entitling them to commence their actions within three years of the date of knowledge. It was a right from which the Committee did not wish to detract. They asserted that
[t]o make the plaintiff entirely dependent on the court’s discretion would...be a retrograde step...24
6.15 In 1982 the Scottish Law Commission argued that there was
a wide acceptance of a short limitation period.....sufficiently flexible to take account of the claimant’s lack of knowledge.25
After consultation that Commission found that there had been no support for an option involving only a fixed limitation period with a discretionary extension without a discovery rule extension.26
6.16 More recently the Victorian government has upheld this principle. In his second reading speech on the Limitation of Actions (Personal Injury Claims) Bill, the Attorney General stressed that the amendments meant that
[t]he injured person in disease or disorder cases will no longer be dependent on the discretion of a court to extend the limitation period but will have a postponed limitation period as of right.27
6.17 Most recently, the Law Reform Committee of South Australia has asserted that victims of latent injury should have the right to commence an action for damages upon the discovery of that injury and not have to rely on the court’s discretion.28
6.18 However the fact remains that all of these extensions are based on a version of the discovery rule and concern has been expressed at both its formulation and its adequacy in principle.
6.19 Particular legislative drafting of the discovery rule has been criticised. The English Act was said to be “complicated, confusing and uncertain”,29 with the date of knowledge provisions, in particular, operating unsatisfactorily.30 These criticisms could, however, be overcome by improved drafting. The Victorian discovery rule, for example, has been simplified and clarified and appears to be operating satisfactorily.
6.20 More cogent has been the criticism that, while the discovery rule deals with a significant form of injustice arising under a system of fixed limitation periods, it fails to address the many other situations where injustice may arise. The enactment of specific formulae addressing each situation in turn is incapable of doing justice in every case because the legislature cannot be expected to foresee all the possibilities.
It is an illusion that drafting in detail achieves certainty: it inevitably leaves gaps, and, as time passes, growing uncertainty.31
6.21 This problem is heightened by the greater emphasis being placed on individualised justice, especially in the area of limitations.32 The courts have referred to the desirability of a limitations system where the actual relative merits of plaintiff and defendant can be balanced. This is in contrast to the predetermined and abstract balancing of interests which occurs under the discovery rule formula. There, every plaintiff who satisfies the statutory criteria is entitled to an extension regardless of the consequent hardship to a particular defendant. Any plaintiff who cannot satisfy the criteria is statute barred, regardless of the consequent hardship suffered by that plaintiff.
...individual justice has assumed greater importance than ever before. Our legislature has realised that if it lays down firm rules, however carefully formulated and however many express exceptions, injustice will occasionally be done, for firm rules are inflexible and unable to take account of the hard case.33
Any attempt to enshrine in fixed rules the competing claims of plaintiff and defendant seems doomed to less success than a system which allows a balance to be achieved in the light of the particular circumstances of a case.34
6.22 Furthermore there is an inherent inconsistency between on the one hand providing a detailed formula for extension and on the other hand conceding that because that formula may lead to injustice in certain cases a discretionary extension is also required. This is an acknowledgement that the discovery rule provisions are not able to resolve the very issues with which they purport to deal because, wherever there is a difficult case, the issue is left to be decided by judicial discretion.35
6.23 These arguments led the Law Reform Commission of Western Australia to reject a model for reform based on the discovery rule principle. Instead it chose to adopt a model based on a fixed limitation period with a form of discretionary extension. All those plaintiffs failing outside the fixed period must rely on an exercise of the court’s discretion. We agree with this approach.
B. The Discretionary Extension
6.24 The Commission has recommended that the limitation of personal injury actions be governed by a fixed limitation period. The significance and primacy of the limitation of actions are thereby asserted and a necessary sanction to the dilatory commencement of claims is provided. Nevertheless the Commission recognises that injustice and hardship is certain to arise under such a system. Moreover, it acknowledges that such hard cases are no longer justifiable by reference to general principles of certainty and abstract justice. The Commission recommends the introduction of a discretionary extension to resolve such injustice. The discretion would operate as a complement to, and not in substitution for, the primary limitation period. Whereas limitations legislation has traditionally involved a predetermined and fixed balancing of the interests of the plaintiff and defendant, the Commission recognises the need for an individualised balancing in cases where the primary limitation period is exceeded. The balance between litigants is to be weighed in each case according to their respective circumstances and merits.
6.25 The existence of such a discretion in relation to some causes of action was noted by the Wright Committee in 1936. They rejected its introduction into the law of limitations generally on the grounds that it would lead to uncertainty. They recognised, however, that such a discretion would
obviate the cases of hardship which are bound to occur under any rigid system of limitation, however well devised.36
6.26 The introduction of such a discretion was again rejected by the Edmund Davies Committee in 1962. The Committee had two main objections to the discretion. Firstly there was the uncertainty which would be engendered by such a discretion. Plaintiffs and defendants would not know where they stood in their ability to commence or defend an action.37 Furthermore the discretion would lead to divergences of practice among the judiciary.38
6.27 The Orr Committee was however able to counter these two objections. Although the Committee agreed that the discretion would erode the certainty of the law, it was argued that previous attempts at formulating objective criteria of extension had failed.39 In order to achieve consistency in the application of the court’s discretion, certain guidelines were formulated for the guidance of the Court.40 These guidelines are not exhaustive, nor are they prerequisites to the exercise of the discretion. The subsequent English legislation implemented the recommended guidelines with very minor changes.41 These guidelines form the basis for the latest Victorian amendments and for those proposed by the Law Reform Commission of Western Australia.42
6.28 In contrast, the discretion introduced in 1980 in Scotland is unfettered as are the discretions found in Tasmania. In Scotland, the court may allow all action to be brought after the expiry of the limitation period if it “seems equitable to do so”.43 In Tasmania the relevant criteria are “that in all the circumstances of the case it is just and reasonable so to do”.44
6.29 This Commission is persuaded of the desirability of guidelines based on those of the English Limitation Act 1980. Due to our rejection of the discovery rule formula, however, some modification will have to be made. We have, for example, included a specific reference to the plaintiff’s ignorance of the existence of an injury or of its cause as well as ignorance of a worthwhile cause of action.
6.30 We accordingly recommend that the three year limitation period should be subject to a general discretion in the exercise of which the court would have regard to the following considerations and any other considerations that are relevant.
(a) the length of and reasons for the delay;
(b) the extent to which, having regard to the delay, there is or may be prejudice to the defendant:
(c) the extent to which the defendant has altered his or her position in reliance on the expiration of the limitation period;
(d) the extent to which the delay has prejudiced or may prejudice a fair trial of the matter by reducing the availability or reliability of oral or other evidence;
(e) the extent to which the delay may have increased the costs of the trial;
(f) the time at which the injury became known to the plaintiff;
(g) the time at which the plaintiff became aware of a connection between the injury and the defendant’s act or omission:
(h) the time at which the plaintiff became aware of the potential for an action for damages in relation to the injury;
(i) the conduct of the defendant after the cause of’ action arose, including the extent (if any) to which the defendant responded to requests reasonably made by the plaintiff for information or inspection for the purpose of ascertaining facts which are or might be relevant to the cause of action;
(j) the steps, if any, taken by the plaintiff to obtain medical, legal or other expert advice and the nature of any such advice the plaintiff may have received; and
(k) the extent of the plaintiff’s injury or loss.
6.31 The Commission recommends that the plaintiff bear the onus of showing that it is just and reasonable for the limitation period to be extended.
IV. COMPENSATION TO RELATIVES ACTIONS
6.32 The Commission recommends that the position of applicants under the Compensation to Relatives Act 1897 should be fully integrated into the above scheme. Such an applicant should be in no better nor worse position to commence an action than the deceased would have been. It is only in this way that injustices of the kind which arose in Bergfels can be resolved.
6.33 The Commission’s recommendations regarding the length of the limitation period would be applicable to actions arising under the Compensation to Relatives Act 1897. Such actions would be governed by a three year limitation period running from the date of death. In order for the applicant’s action to arise at all, however, the deceased must have had a good cause of action at the date of death. That is, the deceased’s cause of action must not have accrued more than three years before the date of death unless proceedings were commenced by the deceased in time and were incomplete at the date of death. The applicant can thus become statute barred in two ways:
- if the deceased dies more than three years after the cause of action accrued without commencing an action; and
- if the applicant does not commence the compensation to relatives action within three years of the date of death.
The Commission recommends that the discretionary extension be available to an applicant, in an action under the Compensation to Relatives Act 1897, whether the applicant is barred because the deceased died more than three years after the accrual of the deceased’s cause of action or is statute barred because the compensation to relatives action is commenced more than three years after the death of the deceased.
6.34 This accords with both the Victorian and English provisions.45 The guidelines which we recommend for the operation of the discretionary extension will have to incorporate specific reference to both the deceased’s and the applicant’s respective circumstances.46
6.35 In assessing the conduct of the applicant in a claim under the Compensation to Relatives Act 1897 the Commission recommends that the court should have regard to the conduct of the people for whose benefit the action might be brought. This recommendation is made in recognition of the nature of the claim made under the Act. Although taken in the name of the personal representative of the deceased, or of one of the dependents, the action is “for the benefit of” the dependents of the deceased. Although under a duty to consolidate their claims into one action, each dependent is conceived as having a separate entitlement. This means that the barring of one dependent does not automatically lead to the barring of all for time runs against each individually.47 The action brought by one, however, is in satisfaction of the claims of all the dependents. The responsibility for ensuring that all claims are consolidated into the one action rests on the person who brings the action and the remedy of the dependent whose claim is omitted from the consolidated action is to sue the claimant for breach of fiduciary duty.48 The Commission’s view is that unjustifiable delay on the part of one of them, whether the personal representative or a dependent, should not necessarily deprive another or others of their entitlements. It may be proper, in the circumstances of the case, for the court to allow one of the dependents to bring an action after the expiry of the limitation period while denying the right to others.
6.36 The position under the Compensation to Relatives Act is to be contrasted with the cause of action which survives to the benefit of the deceased’s estate. A survivor action is brought or continued by the personal representative on behalf of the estate. In pursuing the action the personal representative is simply fulfilling the commitment to gather in the assets of the estate. Although the size of the estate may be expanded as a result, the action is not taken on behalf of those who are to benefit in the same way as in the case of a compensation to relatives claim. There is therefore not the same importance to be attached to the conduct of individual beneficiaries in the case of a survivor action. The conduct of the beneficiaries in the case of a survivor action may nonetheless be taken into account in an appropriate instance under the court’s general discretion to have regard to all the circumstances of the case. Accordingly, it would not be appropriate, as in the case of claims under the Compensation to Relatives Act, to make provision for a limitation period to be extended selectively for the benefit of some only of those who would benefit in the case of a survivor action.
6.37 Given that the Limitation Act 1969 currently deals with the limitation of compensation to relatives actions, the Commission recommends that the discretionary extension of such actions also be dealt with in that Act. It is both simpler and more efficient to combine the criteria applicable to compensation to relatives claims and to ordinary personal injury actions.
V. THE ULTIMATE BAR
6.38 As noted above (para 2.15), the limitation of actions in New South Wales is currently subject to an ultimate bar of thirty years from the date of accrual.49 This bar overrides any extension procedure otherwise available under the Act. For example a plaintiff could not rely on the discovery rule where the date of knowledge arose more than thirty years from the date of injury. Given that the latency period of some diseases is between twenty and forty years, this can operate as an effective bar to the commencement of any such action.
6.39 The section was originally introduced on the recommendation of this Commission because it was argued that
a statute of limitations ought not to allow an indefinite time for the bringing of actions even if the.....matters dealt with in [the discovery rule] do exist.50
The Law Reform Commission of British Columbia in its 1974 Report recommended the introduction of an ultimate limitation period of thirty years. It referred, with approval, to the reasoning of this Commission.51
6.40 More recently the Law Reform Committee of South Australia has recommended the introduction of an “outside limit” for the bringing of actions. This would override both the discovery rule and discretionary extensions also proposed by that Committee. The Committee argued that the thirty year period was the “usual limit of latency” according to current scientific knowledge but admitted that it might “not catch all latent injury.”52 No provision was made for those actions which might not be caught.
6.41 However no such provision exists in the English legislation or that of other Australian states. In 1974, the Orr Committee in England considered and rejected this so-called “long-stop” approach. Although the approach was said to add certainty to any discretion by making it finite,53 it was argued that the long-stop would either be too long to serve any useful purpose or too short to allow for recovery in many cases of latent injury or disease.54
6.42 In 1982, the Scottish Law Commission recommended that the twenty year ultimate bar then applicable in Scotland be abolished.55 Its major objection to the limit was the possibility of injustice occurring in cases of latent injury or disease.56 The Commission’s recommendations were implemented in the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1984 (UK).
6.43 The Law Reform Commission of Western Australia also rejected an approach which would have placed an ultimate limit on the exercise of the discretion. In doing so it concurred in the above arguments of the Orr Committee.57
6.44 On balance we also find the arguments of the Orr Committee persuasive. Notwithstanding the earlier recommendation of this Commission and its subsequent implementation, we recommend that no ultimate bar should apply for personal injury claims (including claims under the Compensation to Relatives Act 1897).
FOOTNOTES
1. Scottish Law Commission Prescription and the Limitation of Actions. Personal Injuries Actions and Private International Law Questions (1982) at 3, para 1.5.
2. Limitation Act 1969 s14(1).
3. Law Reform (Limitation of Actions) Act 1954 (UK).
4. Law Reform (Limitation of- Actions) Act 1956 (Qld): now contained in Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld).
5. Limitation of’ Actions and Wrongs Amendment Act 1956 (SA); now contained in the consolidation, the Limitations of Actions Act 1936 (SA).
6. Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic); since repealed.
7. Limitations of Actions Act 1965 (Tas) provided for a limitation period for personal injury actions of Two years and six months subject to a judicial discretion to extend up to six years. The three year limitation period is now contained in Limitation Act 1974 (Tas).
8. Limitation Act 1981 (NT).
9. Departmental Committee on Alternative Remedies (Monckton Committee) Final Report (Cmnd 6860, 1946) at 47, para 107.
10. Law Reform Committee (Orr Committee) Interim Report on Limitation of Actions, Personal Injury Claims (Cmnd 5630, 1974) at 14, para 39.
11. New South Wales Law Reform Commission Limitation of Actions-Special Protections (LRC 21, 1975) at 42, para 140.
12. Id at 43, para 145.
13. Id at 41, para 135.
14. See for example the comment of the Trades and Labour Council and the Federated Miscellaneous Workers’ Union of Western Australia on the draft Report of the Law Reform Commission of Western Australia that the period of limitation be extended to fifty years, “or-more sensibly-be abolished.” Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, Report on Limitation and Notice of Actions: Latent Disease and Injury (Project No 36. Part 1, 1982) at 9, para 1.12, fn 5.
15. Victorian Parliamentary Debates. Legislative Assembly, 27 March 1983 at 3453, the Hon J Cain, MLA, Attorney General.
16. Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, note 14 at 63, para 4.2.
17. For a full discussion of the Commission’s views see paras 1.10- 1.13.
18. Limitation Act 1963 (UK).
19. Limitation Act 1969 s58(2).
20. limitation Act 1980 (UK) s11(4); Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s5(1A).
21. Walkley v Precision Foryings Ltd 11 9791 2 AII ER 548 at 557, per Lord Diplock: Firman v Ellis [1978] QB 886 at 910-911. per Ormrod LJ.
22. [1977] 1 NSWLR 273.
23. Id at 280 per Glass J A and 284 per Mahoney J A.
24. Law Reform Committee, note 10 at 13, para 35.
25. Scottish Law Commission, note 1 at 2, para 14.
26. Id at 27-28. para 4.2
27. Victorian Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 14 December 1982 at 2766, the Hon J Cain. MLA, Attorney General.
28. Law Reform Committee of South Australia Claims, for Injuries from Toxic Substances and Radiation Effects (No 87, 1985) at 19.
29. Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, note 14 at 67, para 4.5.
30. Ibid.
31. W Dale “Statutory Reform: The Draftsman and the Judge” (1981) 30 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 141 at 159.
32. Law Reform Committee, note 10 at 2 1, para 56.
33. Firman v Ellis [1978] QB 886 at 911, per Ormrod LJ.
34. P J Davies “Limitations of the Law of Limitations” (1982) 98 Law Quarterly Review 249 at 277-278.
35. Id at 258.
36. Law Revision Committee (Wright Committee) 5th Interim Report (Statutes of Limitation) (Cmnd 5334. 1936) at 11, para 7.
37. Committee on Limitation of Actions in Cases of Personal Injury (Edmund Davies Committee) Report (Cmnd 1829. 1962) at 13, para 31,
38. Id at 1 4. pa ra 3 1.
39. Law Reform Committee. note 10 at 22, para 57.
40. Id at 27, para 69.
41. Limitation Act 1980 (UK) s33(3).
42. Chief Justice’s Law Reform Committee Report on Limitation of Actions in Personal Injury Claims (1981) at 8: Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, note 14 at 78-80, paras 4.26-4.32.
43. Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1980 s23.
44. Limitation Act 1974 (Tas) s5(3).
45. Limitation Act 1980 (UK) s12(3); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s20(2).
46. See for example. Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic), s29(3A).
47. Compensation to Relatives Act 1897. ss4 and 6 allow a dependent to bring the action if the personal representative fails to do so within six months of the death. This view was confirmed by Enderby J in Bendt v Green (Unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales. 7 April 1983) where the expiry of the limitation period against the wife did not bar the claims of’ the deceased’s children who were under age at the time of the death.
48. McIntosh v Williams [1976] 2 NSWLR 237 at 243, per Moffitt. P: “The responsibility for bringing in all persons, whose claims as dependents warrant consideration, rests upon the person who brings the action.” The remedy of the dependent who is omitted from the action is a claim against the claimant for breach of fiduciary duty. Erwin v Shannon’s Brick. Tile and Pottery Co Ltd (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 555 at 561 per Jordan C J.
49. Limitation Act 1969 s51.
50. New South Wales Law Reform Commission Limitation of Actions (LRC 3, 1967) at 127, para 241.
51. Law Reform Commission of British Columbia Report on Limitations (I 974) at 101.
52. Law Reform Committee of South Australia. note 28 at 27.
53. Law Reform Committee, note 10 at 13, para 36.
54. Id at 13. para 37.
55. Scotish Law Commission Time Limits in Actions for Personal Injuries (Memo No 45, 1980) at 9, para 2.8.
56. Id at 8, para 2.5.
57. Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, note 14 at 68, para 4.7.
