I. INTRODUCTION

15.1 The major objectives of the Transport Accidents Scheme are to promote the rapid and effective rehabilitation of transport accident victims and to ameliorate the unavoidable consequences of accidents by establishing a comprehensive compensation system. The principles by which these objectives are to be achieved have been discussed at length in earlier Chapters. Should the proposals be accepted, these principles will be embodied in legislation which will provide the framework for the day-to-day operation of the Scheme.

15.2 The legislation cannot be self-executing. The administration of the legislation will shape the nature of the Scheme. “Administration” refers to the functions necessary to ensure that people injured in transport accidents receive the benefits to which they are entitled and that the statutory scheme is carried into effect. It includes processing claims made by injured people, assessing initial and continuing entitlements to benefits, providing benefits (whether in the form of monetary compensation goods or services), developing procedures to detect and minimise abuse and providing policy advice relating to the Scheme.

15.3 A number of submissions took up the theme that the quality of administration is central to the ultimate success of the Scheme. ¹ Some, although sympathetic to the Administrative objectives outlined in our Working Paper, were sceptical as to whether they could be achieved. For example, the Paraplegic and Quadriplegic Association of New South Wales expressed its concern

... that the proposed Corporation will become another costly Government instrumentality that would award compensation according to strict guidelines rather than being sympathetic to the needs of the transport accident victim and determining the level of compensation accordingly. ²

In New Zealand, supporters of the principles embodied in that country’s accident compensation scheme have been critical Of unnecessary rigidity in the administration of that scheme. Writing in 1981, GWR Palmer, one of the framers of the New Zealand scheme and now the Deputy Prime Minister of New Zealand, commented that:

... one of the most substantial Sources of complaint ... has related to the adversary attitudes which have been taken up in the administration of the scheme. There has been something of the attitude of an insurance company out of whom money must be prised with the help of lawyers. Some of this penny-pinching has probably cost more than it has saved and is certainly incompatible with the principles upon which the scheme is based. ³

We are aware of the potential for abuse. However, it is feasible, by a combination of legislative directions and guidelines, high quality decision-making, effective external scrutiny of the administering authority and a departure from the traditional adversary approach to the resolution of compensation claims, to attain the objectives of the Scheme.

15.4 Clearly the administration of the Scheme will play an important role in determining whether the objectives of the legislation are achieved. For example, the emphasis we place in this Report on the rehabilitation of accident victims will require a commitment from administrators going beyond a grudging willingness to abide by the letter of the legislation. If rehabilitation is to be pursued vigorously and effectively, it will be necessary not only to devote resources to the task, but to ensure that decision-making reflects rehabilitation as a paramount objective. Similarly, it is essential that the administering authority accepts the responsibility of ensuring that injured people receive their full statutory entitlement. Should the authority insist that all claimants establish, without assistance, every element of their claim, the task confronting them will often be very formidable and important objectives of the Scheme would be frustrated.

15.5 This Chapter first considers the objectives of administration. It then examines the general functions that should be performed by the body responsible for the administration of the Scheme. Next, the nature and structure of that body (which we call the Accident Compensation Corporation of New South Wales) are examined. Finally, the Chapter considers a mechanism for policy review, involving the establishment of an agency independent of the Corporation. Chapter 16 examines the process of claims assessment and appeals from Corporation decisions. The purpose of these Chapters is not to resolve all the issues that will be faced by administrators, but to provide a framework within which they will discharge their responsibilities.

II. PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATION

15.6 Few would dispute the proposition that all compensation schemes should be administered efficiently. One way of assessing efficiency is to determine the proportion of the Scheme’s income that is consumed in administrative expenses (or, to put it another way, the ratio of expenses to compensation and other benefits provided for claimants). Clearly it is desirable that the administrative expenses incurred by the Scheme be kept as low as possible, consistent with the Scheme’s overall objectives. Every dollar spent unnecessarily on administration reduces the resources available to claimants or, alternatively, requires additional funds to be channelled to the Scheme. But this does not mean that the Scheme’s administrators should regard the reduction of administrative expenses as a goal to be pursued at all costs. There are other objectives, of equal or greater importance, which administrators of the Scheme should attempt to achieve. Some of these will increase administrative expenses, while others will certainly increase the total benefits provided to claimants. Thus it is not enough simply to judge the Scheme by reference to a criterion such as the ratio of expenses to benefits. It is necessary to take account of other goals. There are five matters which should be taken into account in determining questions relating to the administration of the Scheme.

15.7 The first does not relate solely to administration, but should influence strongly the decision-making processes of the Corporation. This can be described as the principle of entitlement. By this we mean that the legislation should create a right to benefits and that the Scheme should be administered so as to ensure that claimants receive their full statutory entitlement. In addition, claimants should receive the assistance required to present their claims effectively. It follows from this principle, as far as administration of the Scheme is concerned, that doubts about eligibility should be temporarily resolved in favour of claimants until it is clearly established that they are not eligible. As a former Chairman of the New Zealand Accident Compensation Corporation has suggested:

[c]ompensation is to be looked on as an entitlement; there is no room for a suspicious or grudging attitude towards claimants. ⁴

This is particularly the case in a scheme designed to provide comprehensive compensation to a class of accident victims. The principle requires that benefits under the Scheme should be accessible to accident victims, regardless of their understanding of the system or their place of residence. The Accident Compensation Corporation must be prepared to take measures to overcome the problems created by ignorance, language difficulties, lack of means and geographical isolation.

15.8 The principle of entitlement also suggests that the Accident Compensation Corporation should refrain from adopting an adversary approach to claimants. It is not appropriate, for example, that the Corporation should require a claimant, at his or her peril and without assistance, to prove every element of a claim. In practice the interests of the Corporation and of claimants will not always be identical. Obviously it will be necessary for the Corporation to take measures to detect fraudulent or false claims. Equally clearly some claims, although made in good faith, will not be accepted by the Corporation-Disputes on both matters of fact and of law will arise and will have to be resolved, ultimately (if necessary) by an appeal tribunal. But the fact that some disputes are unavoidable should not prevent the Corporation from actively assisting injured people to lodge claims. Nor should it prevent the Corporation attempting to ensure that claimants, however diffident or unfamiliar with official procedures, receive their full statutory entitlement to compensation. The provision for interim assessment, discussed in Chapter 16, is an important practical application of the principle of entitlement.

15.9 A second matter relevant to administration is the principle of independence. The administration of the Scheme should be independent of the Government of the day to the maximum extent possible. Obviously, this principle is subject to the ultimate law-making responsibility of Parliament, which retains the power to amend or repeal the legislation governing compensation arrangements. In this sense it might be said that compensation schemes are vulnerable to political interference. But this is true of all schemes including the common law negligence action, and follows inevitably from the system of parliamentary democracy. Our concern is that the day-to-day administration of the Transport Accidents Scheme should be independent of control or influence by government and that any significant policy changes should be implemented through legislation rather than by means of directions to the administrators of the Scheme. It would be destructive of the Scheme if, for example, a Minister could direct, without any amending legislation, that harsher eligibility criteria should be adopted as a means of curbing expenditure on benefits. Similarly, it would be unacceptable if government directions effectively limited the seances available to transport accident victims under the Scheme.

15.10 Thirdly, administration of the Scheme should be influenced by the principle of flexibility. As has been explained elsewhere, the Scheme must be capable of performing a range of functions, not merely the payment of monetary compensation to claimants. For example, this Report has consistently stressed the importance of rehabilitation as an objective and the complex relationship between rehabilitation and the assessment of compensation. The recommendations contemplate that benefits should be made available to injured people in a variety of forms, including professional and support services. Depending on the circumstances, these might be provided by the Corporation itself or might be provided by existing agencies at the Corporation’s request and at its expense. Moreover, the administrators of the Scheme will need to assess entitlement to compensation or to continuing benefits in an infinite range of circumstances and to formulate guidelines for the exercise of powers and discretions. Consequently the Scheme must be capable of responding flexibly to the particular circumstances and needs of claimants or people receiving benefits and of adjusting rapidly to the competing demands placed on the compensation system.

15.11 The remaining principles relate specifically to the decision-making process. If the Scheme is to be successful the administrators must accept the fundamental importance of the principle of high quality decision-making. As Professor T G Ison, a former chairman of the British Columbia Workers’ Compensation Board, has recently observed, the failure to develop such a system can have “a very high cost in terms of delay, confusion, error and injustice”. ⁵ Accordingly, the initial determination of claims and the continuing assessment of entitlement should be the responsibility of well-trained and well-educated decision-makers who have the necessary authority to determine claims and to undertake appropriate investigations. It would be a basic error if the assessment of entitlement to compensation whether initially or on a continuing basis, were entrusted to relatively junior employees of the Corporation. This vital task should be the responsibility of senior assessing officers who deal with applications and review files and who are the claimants I point of contact with the Scheme (see paragraphs 16.16-16.19). The Corporation will need to take steps to ensure that a consistent approach to claims and to the assessment of continuing eligibility is maintained by assessing officers. It would be an equally basic error if reliance were placed on the appeal system to correct poor quality decision-making. If this occurred, the cost in both economic and social terms would be considerable and the opportunity, among other things, for rapid rehabilitation would be seriously reduced. The appeal structure proposed in Chapter 16 is of course designed to enable a dissatisfied claimant to secure independent review of an unfavourable decision. However, the decision-making process is designed to encourage the Corporation to make decisions on the basis of full information and a careful assessment of relevant criteria, rather than to act on inadequate material in the hope that errors will be corrected at the next stage in the process.

15.12 A related principle is that of speed in decision-making and in providing compensation. High quality decision-making necessarily involves the speediest possible determination of claims consistent with the verification of entitlement. Once a claim is accepted, compensation should be provided without delay. One major deficiency in the common law system of compensation is that accident victims may have to wait several years or more to obtain a decision. This not only causes financial hardship in the intervening period, but is detrimental to rehabilitation Chapter 9 stresses that early intervention is crucial to the success of rehabilitation and that accident victims require security if they are to benefit from rehabilitation programs. Moreover, the general principle of entitlement will have little practical value unless compensation under the Scheme is assessed speedily. The Scheme should be capable of providing some benefits almost immediately after the accident and of paying compensation for loss of earning capacity to incapacitated earners within two weeks of the date of the accident. Where a full consideration of a claim requires time, compensation should usually be paid promptly pending the determination.

15.13 We therefore recommend that the administration of the Transport Accidents Scheme should be founded upon five basic principles:

• entitlement;
• independence;
• flexibility;
• high quality decision-making; and
• peed in decision-making and in providing compensation.

III. ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS

15.14 The essential functions of the Accident Compensation Corporation, as administrator of the Transport Accidents Scheme, fall into six broad categories:

• promotion of the Scheme and assistance to claimants;
• policy formulation;
• assessment of claims and of continuing entitlement to benefits, payment of benefits and provision of services;
• coordination of existing services such as rehabilitation and home help;
• collection of statistics and research; and
• promotion of accident prevention and safety.

A. Promotion of the Scheme and Assistance to Claimants

15.15 The Corporation should take positive measures to publicise the Scheme, the benefits available and the procedures for making claims. Accident victims, in particular, must have ready access to information about the Scheme and advice as to the lodgment of claims. The Corporation should have a division responsible for disseminating information making contact with accident victims and assisting claimants with the preparation of claims.

15.16 One way in which the Corporation can reach the more seriously injured accident victims is by funding the employment in public hospitals of liaison staff equipped to offer information and assistance to the victims of transport accidents and their families. These officers could, for example, be social workers employed by the Health Department whose responsibilities could include advising injured people of the existence of the Scheme, supplying claim forms and offering assistance in preparing claims. In addition, these officers should be responsible for making preliminary inquiries as to likely rehabilitation needs and after-care services required and should liaise with the Corporation’s rehabilitation officers where appropriate.

15.17 This form of assistance should be supplemented by the Corporation’s own officers, whose functions would include providing information over the counter on benefits under the Scheme and eligibility for those benefits. Officers performing these tasks should not be responsible for assessing claims or continuing eligibility for benefits. They should, however, be prepared actively to assist accident victims and their families in preparing claims and in gathering material required to support those claims or to prevent the termination of benefits. The Corporation should be alert to the need to provide interpreters and, ideally, counter staff should be able to communicate directly with most non-English-speaking claimants. The Scheme should also embody the concept of independent claimant representatives who advise claimants and persons already receiving benefits and, if necessary, act on their behalf in pursuing a claim or resisting a threat to their continuing entitlement to benefits. This matter is discussed in paragraph 16.14.

B. Policy Formulation

15.18 The Corporation will need to play an active policy-making role in at least two ways. First, the day-to-day decision-making responsibilities of the Corporation will require it to formulate policy guidelines for the assistance of staff. While these guidelines must be drafted within the framework of the governing legislation and regulations, there will always be considerable room for interpretation of statutory principles and for judgment to be exercised in deciding how to implement general policies. Moreover, new strategies will be necessary to give effect to changes to the legislation, whether by amendment or by novel judicial interpretation The experience of other compensation schemes confirms that it will also be necessary to prepare detailed policy guidelines. These guidelines, although primarily intended for internal use, should be readily available to claimants, claimant representatives, legal advisers and members of the public generally. This is also discussed in paragraphs 16.23-16.24.

15.19 The second policy-making function to be performed by the Corporation is that of advising the Government on the operation of the Transport Accidents Scheme and on any proposals for change to the governing legislation. The Corporation should not be the sole source of policy advice of this kind. In particular, we later propose the establishment of an independent Policy Review Committee to advise the Government (and the Corporation) as to the administration and overall effectiveness of the Scheme (paragraphs 15.59-15.60). Nonetheless, the Corporation is likely to be able to make a major contribution to policy formulation in the light of its experience with the Scheme.

C. Assessment of Entitlements and the Provision of Benefits

15.20 The Accident Compensation Corporation will be responsible for the receipt, assessment and determination of claims from accident victims. In addition, it will have to assess the continuing eligibility of accident victims for benefits in the light, for example, of chances in their medical condition and fluctuations in the extent of their post-accident earning capacity. Where a person is eligible for benefits, the Corporation must provide, or ensure the provision of those benefits promptly. Thus the functions and powers of the Corporation should include:

• receiving claims and material in support of or bearing on claims;
• assessing claims in accordance with the legislation and policy guidelines;
• assessing the continuing entitlement of accident victims to benefits under the Scheme;
• undertaking the necessary inquiries to establish eligibility or continuing entitlement to benefits;
• paying monetary compensation to people injured and the families of people killed in transport accidents;
• ensuring the provision of medical, rehabilitation and ancillary services to injured people; and
• providing or ensuring the provision of other benefits, such as home modifications, aids and
• appliances and support services to which accident victims are entitled.

15.21 Linked to these functions is the further role of detecting and minimising fraud. Fraud will be encountered in any statutory scheme providing benefits to members of the public. Clearly the governing legislation should create offences to cover the case of people making fraudulent claims or misleading the Corporation. There should also be provision for recovery of over-compensation in cases of fraud. The Corporation, although operating from a standpoint of claimant entitlement, cannot avoid the responsibility of developing procedures designed to detect offences of this kind and to discourage fraudulent practices. It is important that this responsibility should not overshadow or detract from the obligations to claimants, the vast majority of whom will be honest and seeking only to claim their rights under the legislation. The responsibility for investigating cases of suspected fraud, as opposed to carrying out standard inquiries or gathering information to support a claim should not be vested in the officer whose task it is to assess claims and eligibility for continuing benefits. If the assessing officer were to carry out or supervise the investigation of suspected fraud there would be a serious danger of confusion of roles. On occasion an assessing officer might initiate an investigation but where suspected fraud is involved it should be undertaken by a separate section of the Corporation. However, decisions as to entitlement following such an investigation should be made by the assessing officer.

D. Coordination

15.22 Many benefits to which claimants will be entitled under the legislation, including medical, hospital and rehabilitation services and support services, will not be provided by the Corporation but by existing service providers. This matter is discussed in detail in Chapters 9 and 10. The diversity of providers will require the Corporation to make strenuous efforts to coordinate the provision of services. It would be desirable for assessing officers to be responsible for coordinating the provision of services to accident victims. This would avoid the need for claimants to deal with a number of different officers and would minimise the danger of inconsistency in the approaches to assessment and the provision of services on a day-to-day basis.

E. Research

15.23 TheCorporationisuniquelywell-placedtocollectstatisticaldatarelatingtotransport accidents and the operations of the Scheme. Material of this kind is clearly essential for policy-making purposes and for predicting trends in the cost of the Scheme. In addition, the policy-making responsibilities of the Corporation require access to a wide range of information, not necessarily of a statistical nature, on such matters as accident prevention rehabilitation, disability and incapacity resulting from transport accidents and the system of review and appeal. The research required to gather the necessary statistics and other information could be undertaken by the Corporation or by outside bodies, perhaps with the financial support of the Corporation. The Corporation itself should have an active research function and should publish statistical and other material resulting from research programs. Care should be taken not to duplicate the work of existing agencies such as the Traffic Accident Research Unit.

F. Accident Prevention and Safety

15.24 In the course of discussion of the Working Paper, the primary importance of accident prevention has been repeatedly emphasised, particularly by those involved in road safety. The New Zealand Woodhouse Report stated that accidental injury demanded attack on three fronts: prevention rehabilitation and compensation in that order. ⁶ These priorities were repeated in the Australian Woodhouse Report ⁷ and they have been adopted in Chapter 5. Our recommendations concentrate on rehabilitation and compensation as the principal functions of the Corporation but this is not intended to detract from the primary importance of prevention. It is, however, consistent with the approach to other aspects of the Scheme, such as rehabilitation that duplication of the work of existing agencies should be discouraged. In the field of transport accident prevention agencies such as the Traffic Accident Research Unit of the New South Wales Traffic Authority and the STAYSAFE Committee of the New South Wales Parliament ⁸ are already in existence. The Traffic Accident Research Unit and its predecessor, the Road Safety Council, were active in the promotion of compulsory wearing of seat belts ⁹ and the First Report of the STAYSAFE Committee. ¹⁰ provided the catalyst for the introduction of random breath-testing in New South Wales. The most constructive role for the Corporation in such circumstances is to supplement the work of such agencies and to provide support which would expand their activities and enhance their effectiveness.

15.25 The Corporation will have access to data of special significance for accident prevention and safety. Statistics compiled by the Corporation should help to identify causes of accidents and of particular types of injury. The Corporation should liaise closely with existing agencies to ensure that they have the benefit of this information and to develop, where appropriate, joint strategies for promoting safety on the roads and in the public transport area. It may well be, for example, that the detailed information gathered by the Corporation on the nature and duration of incapacity arising from transport accidents will assist in identifying more specifically the factors creating a high risk of long-term incapacity. While the Corporation should not seek to duplicate the work of existing agencies, it would be appropriate for it to provide additional funds for bodies concerned with the promotion of safety and prevention. The costing of the Scheme includes provision for an allocation of $2 per vehicle for safety and prevention purposes (paragraph 17.38). In addition, the Scheme should create maximum incentives to safety, for example, by imposing loadings on the levies payable by drivers or motor vehicle owners whose activities create a high risk of accidents. This is referred to further in paragraphs 17.34-17.35.

G. Conclusion

15.26 In summary, we recommend that the body administering the Scheme should be responsible for the following general functions:

• promotion of the Scheme, dissemination of information concerning entitlements and assistance to people claiming or entitled to benefits;
• policy formulation for the purposes of administration and advice to government;
• assessment of claims and of continuing entitlement to benefits, payment of monetary compensation and the provision of other benefits;
• coordination of the delivery of services to transport accident victims;
• research; and
• promotion of accident prevention and safety.

IV. THE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION

A. The Options

15.27 There are four major options in relation to the body responsible for administering the Transport Accidents Scheme. These are:

• a government department (whether existing or new);
• an existing Organisation with experience in claims handling and compensation, such as the Government Insurance Office of New South Wales or private insurers;
• the State Compensation Board of New South Wales; and
• a statutory authority specifically created to administer the Scheme.

Precedents exist for each of these models.

15.28 The Australian Woodhouse Committee recommended that the proposed national compensation scheme should be administered by the Department of Social Security. ¹¹ Because the scheme would embrace sickness benefits and invalid pensions as well as most of the widows’ pension scheme, this was thought to be the most appropriate solution In addition, the Committee considered that this course would avoid confusion for people wishing to claim benefits, and would reduce duplication of staff and facilities. ¹² The National Rehabilitation and Compensation Bill tabled in Federal Parliament in 1977 adopted the Woodhouse recommendation. ¹³ The Commonwealth Government Employees’ Compensation Scheme is administered by the Commissioner for Employees’ Compensation. ¹⁴ The Commissioner and his or her staff are established as a division of the Department of Social Security, although separate offices are generally maintained throughout Australia.

15.29 The Northern Territory no-fault motor accidents scheme provides an example of an insurer, albeit a government agency, administering a compensation scheme. The Territory Insurance Office administers the scheme in addition to conducting workers’ compensation and general insurance business. ¹⁵ In Tasmania, the Motor Accidents Insurance Board is responsible for conducting the third party insurance system, as well as the no-fault motor accidents scheme which supplements the common law negligence action in that State. ¹⁶ However, the Board was created when the no-fault scheme came into force and took over responsibility for collecting compulsory third party motor vehicle insurance premiums from the Government Insurance Board.

15.30 The State Compensation Board of New South Wales will be responsible for administering both the workers’ compensation scheme and the sporting injuries scheme. ¹⁷ The Board, which will be subject to the control and direction of the responsible Minister, will consist of four members, one being the Boards Chief Executive Officer and three being part-time members. ¹⁸ The Board will succeed to the administrative functions formerly exercised by the Workers’ Compensation Commission of New South Wales following the separation of the judicial and administrative functions of that body effected by the Workers’ Compensation (Amendment) Act 1984. The Board’s functions will include the licensing and supervision of insurers and self-insurers, the conduct of vocational and rehabilitation programs for disabled workers and the administration of certain ancillary arrangements such as the Uninsured Liability and Indemnity Scheme.

15.31 The accident compensation schemes in New Zealand and Victoria are administered by statutory authorities established for that purpose. The Victorian motor vehicle no-fault scheme, which supplements the common law negligence action, is administered by the three-member Motor Accidents Board. ¹⁹ The Board is separate from the State Insurance Office which since 1977, has been the sole compulsory third party insurer in Victoria. In New Zealand, the Accident Compensation Corporation administers the comprehensive no-fault scheme operating in that country. ²⁰ The Corporation consists of up to six members appointed on the recommendation of the Minister in addition to the Managing Director of the Corporation and the General Manager of the State Insurance Office. ²¹

B. An Independent Statutory Authority

15.32 In our view, the Transport Accidents Scheme should be administered by an independent statutory authority established specifically for that purpose. The authority should be called the Accident Compensation Corporation of New South Wales. We have five main reasons for this view.

• A statutory authority is more likely than a department or other body subject to ministerial control to be independent of the government of the day in the administration of the Scheme.
• A new statutory authority is more likely than existing agencies, particularly those which have operated within the framework of an adversary model to implement the objectives of the Scheme. The new body should formulate fresh policies, practices and procedures designed to give effect to the objectives stated in this Report.
• A statutory authority is well-placed to ensure consistency of decision-making and of practices relating to the provision of compensation in its various forms. Such consistency, which is essential to the effectiveness of the Scheme, would be difficult or impossible to achieve if more than one Organisation, such as a number of private insurers, were responsible for administering the Scheme.
• A statutory authority is also well-equipped to discharge the wide range of functions imposed on the administrator of the Scheme. No existing body, nor the future State Compensation Board, is called upon to perform such a range of functions.
• There are grave difficulties in requiring an existing agency to administer a Scheme which differs in important respects from the other responsibilities of that agency.

15.33 We recognise that there are some short-term advantages in appointing an existing agency as administrator of the Scheme. The GIO has established premises, staff experienced in compensation matters and record-keeping systems that could perhaps be adapted to the demands of a new scheme. This will also be true of the State Compensation Board which will inherit such facilities from the Workers’ Compensation Commission.

15.34 Nonetheless, we are firmly of the view that the administering authority should not be one of the existing agencies. While the GIO has considerable experience in the field of motor vehicle accident compensation. this experience has been acquired within the framework of an adversary system. The GIO would necessarily encounter great difficulty in adjusting to a system in which the common law negligence action plays no part. In addition, the GIO would presumably continue to be involved in liability insurance for other kinds of accidents on a commercial basis. The very different philosophies, as well as different functions and responsibilities, would require a flexibility of management that would be extraordinarily difficult to achieve. Of course, the GIO will need to be involved in handling the residue of compulsory third party claims after the introduction of the Transport Accidents Scheme.

15.35 In its first submission, the GIO argued that it should be the body to administer the no-fault. It Transport Accidents Scheme if that Scheme were to operate in addition to the common law. ²² However, in a later submission the GIO recognised the advantages in the Scheme being administered by a new authority but contended that management of funds for investment should remain its responsibility. ²³

15.36 The problems raised for the Scheme if administered by the GIO would be greatly exacerbated if a number of private insurers also participated. NRMA Insurance Ltd., which I recently wrote compulsory third party insurance in New South Wales, expressed interest in under writing a no-fault Scheme. ²⁴ The Insurance Council of Australia submitted that private Insurers should be permitted to participate in the Scheme. ²⁵ However, the participation of a number of insurer administrators would lead to undesirable unevenness in the management of claims and the provision of services and make it very difficult to overcome the adversary approach which characterises the current system. This is of special significance in a scheme which emphasises rehabilitation and which attempts to integrate compensation and rehabilitation arrangements. Moreover, obvious difficulties would arise in processing claims in the event of and, private insurer withdrawing from the Scheme. Finally, premium competition and inter-insurer disputes of the kind experienced in the workers’ compensation industry are difficult to avoid in practice.

15.37 Neither do we consider the State Compensation Board to be an appropriate choice. While there is overlap between the workers’ compensation scheme and the proposed Transport Accidents Scheme, in relation to transport accidents occurring in the course of employment or on the way to or from work, the underlying philosophy and the range of benefits and services available are different. The Board, like the GIO would have great difficulty adapting to the new Scheme, particularly as it would retain responsibility for the administration. Of the separate workers’ compensation system. On the other hand, if in the future the benefits under the workers’ compensation system and the Scheme become uniform, or very similar, the case for a single authority would be very strong.

15.38 For these reasons, we recommend that the legislation establishing the Transport Accidents Scheme should create a new authority to be known as the Accident Compensation Corporation of New South Wales. The Corporation should be responsible for the administration of the Scheme.

V. STRUCTURE OF THE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION

15.39 This Part deals with the major issues concerning the structure and responsibilities of the Accident Compensation Corporation. It does not attempt, however, to resolve all questions which may arise in practice. It is impossible to anticipate all the administrative problems that will occur and many important details must be left to the skills of the administrators.

A. Accountability

15.40 The Accident Compensation Corporation will perform very important public functions. It will administer a wide-ranging compensation scheme and will collect and expend substantial sums of money. The decisions of the Corporation, whether relating to individual cases or to more general policy questions, will affect large numbers of people. Clearly the community has a vital interest in the administration of the Scheme and in the proper management of public funds devoted to the Scheme. It is appropriate that the Corporation should be accountable to the public at large through Parliament. Accordingly, we recommend that the Corporation should be required to submit a report on its activities to Parliament annually and that its accounts should be audited by the Auditor General. In accordance with established practice in New South Wales, a Minister will take responsibility for providing information to Parliament about the operations of the Corporation and the administration of the Scheme. We do not think it appropriate to recommend which Ministerial portfolio should incorporate this responsibility.

15.41 While a Minister will be responsible for the Corporation’s activities in Parliament the governing legislation should not subject the Corporation to the direction and control of the responsible Minister. The decisions of the Corporation in individual cases will be subject to the right of a dissatisfied claimant to appeal to an independent tribunal and the Corporation’s general policy will be subject to oversight by the Policy Review Committee recommended later in this Chapter. It will of course be open to Parliament to amend the governing legislation to correct misguided or inappropriate interpretations of the legislation Consequently the activities of the Corporation will be subject to numerous checks and to close external scrutiny. In these circumstances it is unnecessary to impose Ministerial direction and control on the Corporation. More importantly, such direction and control would contravene the principle of independence, which is of paramount importance in the administration of the Scheme. It would be unsatisfactory, for example, if a Minister could direct the Corporation to act in a manner which might affect the rights of claimants under the Scheme. While claimants would still retain their rights of appeal in such a case, the opportunities for direct political involvement in the administration of the Scheme should be minimised. For these reasons, we reject the New Zealand model which requires the Accident Compensation Corporation, in the exercise of its functions and powers, to give effect to the policy of the Government as communicated to it from time to time in writing by the responsible Minister. ²⁶ In so doing we adopt the approach taken with respect to the Victorian Motor Accidents Board and the Tasmanian Motor Accidents Insurance Board. ²⁷ Thus, we recommend that the Corporation should not be subject to Ministerial direction or control in the administration of the Scheme. In so recommending we have adopted the model of the State Bank of New South Wales which, although generally responsible to a Minister, is not subject to that Minister’s control and direction and is empowered to determine its own policy and control its own affairs. ²⁸

B. Management

15.42 The Corporation will require a governing Board to determine policy (subject to oversight by the proposed Policy Review Committee) and to control its affairs. In turn, the Board will require a power of delegation to the executives, officers and employees of the Corporation. ²⁹ We do not make a firm recommendation as to the nature and term of appointment of members of the Board, although our preference would be a five-member Board, four of whom would hold office on a part-time basis. One part-time member could be appointed Chairperson of the Board and members would generally be appointed for five years, and be eligible for reappointment. This model is similar to that adopted for the Accident Compensation Corporation of New Zealand ³⁰ and for the Tasmanian Motor Accidents Insurance Board. ³¹ We recommend that the overall policy formulation and management of the Corporation should be the responsibility of a Board consisting predominantly of part-time members.

15.43 Board members should be appointed on the basis of their expertise and experience in matters relevant to the responsibilities of the Accident Compensation Corporation. Members might be appointed, for example, from the legal, medical or rehabilitation professions, or because of their expertise in financial management or the conduct of public corporations. With one exception we do not think the Board of the Corporation is the place for interest group representation. The one exception is that the Board should include a member with special knowledge of the problems of seriously disabled people. Such a person might himself or herself be disabled. Part-time Board members should not, by reason of their office, be subject to the Public Service Act, 1979. ³²

15.44 The full-time member of the Board should be the Corporation’s Chief Executive. This is a crucial position, especially in the early development of the Scheme. The Chief Executive’s position should be regarded as very senior, reflecting the heavy responsibilities in policy formulation and decision-making. The salary and allowances which we assume would be determined in practice pursuant to the Statutory and Other Offices Remuneration Act, 1975, should be at least equivalent to those paid to judges sitting on the Accident Compensation Appeal Tribunal discussed in Chapter 16. This would be an appropriate recognition of the Chief Executive’s role, reinforcing the view that the quality of decision-making within the Corporation of fundamental importance and that undue reliance should not be placed on appeal procedures to ensure that the objectives of the Scheme are being met. The Corporation’s Chief Executive should be designated as Managing Director, but the position should be kept distinct from that of Chairperson. ³³ This is necessary to ensure that the part-time members have a substantial and independent role to play in the conduct of the Corporation’s affairs. Thus, we recommend that the day-to-day administration of the Scheme, subject to the direction of the Board, should be the responsibility of the Corporation’s full-time Chief Executive. The Chief Executive should be a member of the Board and should be known as Managing Director.

C. Staff Structure

15.45 In order to discharge its various responsibilities efficiently and sympathetically, the Corporation will require flexibility in staffing policies. In particular, the Corporation should not be subject to staff ceilings imposed by the State Public Service Board, and should be empowered to engage consultants and others with special expertise for short-or long-term projects. The Corporation should also be free to offer terms and conditions of employment which vary from those imposed by the Public Service Act 1979. One example of the need for flexibility is in relation to medical practitioners who are required to assess claimants and to participate in their care and treatment. The Corporation should be free to enter appropriate agreements with medical practitioners, including specialists, in order to obtain the medical advice and services required. The Corporation may also wish to offer security of tenure to certain categories of staff, such as clerical and secretarial staff, and to include staff in the State Superannuation Scheme. On balance, the flexibility required by the Corporation will best be achieved if its staff are not subject to the Public Service Act. ³⁴ The fact that the Corporation’s expenses are to be met from users’ contributions rather than from Consolidated Revenue, adds weight to this conclusion. We note that in its 1983 Annual Report the GIO observed that public service employment practices created difficulties for staff and for the management of the Office.

For example, the system for appeal against appointments is expensive to administer and is demotivational in its effect on staff concerned and the State Superannuation Scheme is not satisfactory in respect of some classes of employee. ³⁵

15.46 The personnel practices of statutory authorities in New South Wales have been the subject of inquiry and report by the Review of New South Wales Government Administration. ³⁶ The most recent recommendations of that Review suggest the adoption of an Act setting down policies and procedures to which all statutory authorities would adhere. It would embody the principle of equal employment opportunities in relation to base grade recruitment, adopt similar criteria for promotion and similar procedures for recruitment to promotion positions as those under the Public Service Act 1979, and permit the Government to draw up regulations concerning the advertising of positions. Exemption of sections of an authorities workforce from some of its provisions would be possible. ³⁷ The purpose of these proposals is to improve the personnel practices of statutory authorities and to bring them into line with certain public service standards. If this legislation is implemented, consideration will need to be given to the extent to which the Corporation should be subject to its provisions in view of the need for flexibility and specialised expertise. In this respect it is relevant to recall that at present there are 24 declared statutory authorities with State Government employees outside the Public Service. ³⁸ We recommend that the staff of the Corporation should not be subject to the Public Service Act, 1979. We further recommend that the Corporation should be empowered specifically to engage consultants on a part-time, casual or sessional basis.

15.47 The realisation of the principle of high quality decision-making in practice will require the staff members responsible for deciding claims, whom we describe as assessing officers, to be selected with particular care. The internal structure of the Corporation should reflect their special significance in the administration of the Scheme. Candidates for appointment should be required to meet demanding educational standards and should have the personal attributes necessary to implement the objectives of the Scheme. The positions should not be filled by clerical staff. Rather, assessing officers should be appointed on the basis of open competition for advertised vacancies. The salary and work conditions of assessing officers, whose role is discussed in Chapter 16, should reflect their importance to the Scheme.

15.48 In addition the Corporation should pay particular attention to the training of assessing officers and, indeed, of other staff of the Corporation. It is important to acknowledge that many of the functions envisaged for the Corporation, including the integration of the compensation and rehabilitation systems, are novel and challenging. The Corporation will need to develop training programs to make staff aware of the objectives of the Scheme and of the measures required to achieve them. We recommend that careful attention should be paid to selecting and training the staff, especially assessing officers who will be responsible for deciding claims.

D. Decentralisation

15.49 The size of the State and the spread of its population present a potential problem for the efficient administration of the Scheme. Experience in New Zealand and elsewhere has demonstrated that prompt identification of claimants, rapid processing of claims and ready access to rehabilitation and other services are essential if the objectives of the Scheme are to be realised. Problems with the use of the State Insurance Office as an agent for claims handling have led the Accident Compensation Corporation in New Zealand to reabsorb that function decentralising its own operation at the same time. ³⁹ This process has been assisted by the installation of new computer facilities and the preparation of detailed manuals containing guidelines and instructions on all aspects of claims handling, assessment, rehabilitation and review. Professor Ison has stressed that “high quality primary adjudication” requires decentralised administration, with the adjudicator having the personal responsibility for undertaking Inquiries, including, where appropriate, the questioning of the claimant. He argues that a centralised administration is

... most unfortunate [and] tends to promote stereotyped responses to apparent Situations. Local administration makes it easier to distinguish the variables relevant in each case.... It is essential to claims adjudication that the adjudicator should be in the affected community... ⁴⁰

We have already stressed the importance of the accessibility of the Scheme to injured people.

15.50 We agree strongly with the view that decentralised administration is essential to the determination of claims and to achieve the necessary degree of direct personal communication with claimants, employers and the providers of rehabilitation services. This is particularly so in New South Wales where, apart from Sydney, Newcastle and Wollongong, there are 11 centres which with a population in excess of 23,000. ⁴¹ There are 10 major hospitals with rehabilitation facilities in the Sydney metropolitan area and most regional centres, some which have a high motor vehicle accident rates, are served by major rehabilitation units. ⁴² In addition these centres are important sources of employment, often serving surrounding districts. Despite this, some have high unemployment rates during times of recession and a concentrated effort is likely to be required by the Corporation if work is to be preserved or found for those seriously incapacitated in transport accidents. For these reasons, we recommend that, to the maximum extent practicable, the administration of the Scheme, including the assessment and determination of claims, should be decentralised. For this purpose the Corporation should be empowered to establish regional offices.

15.51 The objective of decentralisation is consistent with the Corporation establishing agency arrangements in country areas. Arrangements of this kind, using for example the GIO, government departments or health funds, might be particularly important in the early days. These arrangements should be confined to functions that can be performed by agents without detracting from the objectives of the Scheme. The functions could include receiving claims for transmission to the Corporation and paying monetary compensation at the direction of the Corporation. The assessment of claims should not be delegated to an agent. Accordingly, we recommend that the Corporation should be empowered to establish appropriate agency arrangements, but these should not extend to the determination and assessment of claims.

E. Investment of Funds

15.52 In its submission, the GIO argued that it should manage and invest the funds collected for the new Scheme. ⁴³ The reasons advanced include the following.

• If the Corporation undertook the task, it would require an investment capacity which, in the experience of the State Superannuation Board and the GIO, would not be easy to achieve, partly because of the difficulties faced by government organisations in attracting able investment staff. It would be undesirable for the new Corporation to compete with existing government bodies for scarce investment staff.
• Of the $1,400 million then in the compulsory third party fund, more thin S600 million was in the form of investments, such as loans on housing or loans to local government authorities, which could not readily be realised. The State Government had guaranteed the liabilities of the third party fund and could be called on to meet that guarantee if the fund ran down quickly and investments could not be realised.
• The net cash inflow to the third party funds was approximately $175 million. If premiums suddenly stopped, the net cash outflow would be very substantial and would impair the GIO’s capacity to support investment in areas of interest to the government.

15.53 There is a precedent for this approach in Victoria, where collection and investment of the premiums required to fund the no-fault motor accident scheme is the responsibility of the sole authorised insurer, the State Insurance Office. Funds are called for by the Board from the Office to meet its liabilities, although it has a power of short-term investment in such manner as the Treasurer approves. ⁴⁴ The consequence is that the Board acts on a cash flow basis, and does not require the investment experience or facilities of an insurer. ⁴⁵ This approach can also assist in avoiding any conflict of interest between investment and claims management policies. We therefore recommend that the GIO should be responsible for the investment and management of the funds generated by the Transport Accidents Scheme, to the extent that they are not required by the Corporation to meet its liabilities. We return to the question of the funding of the Scheme in Chapter 17, including whether the Scheme should operate on a fully funded basis (which would generate a very large fund for investment) or on a pay-as-you-go basis (which would not).

F. Liability to Taxation

15.54 Consideration will need to be given to the Corporation’s liability for Commonwealth taxes such as income tax, bank account debits tax, and sales tax; and for State duties and taxes including stamp duty, pay-roll tax, and land tax. We assume that in common with other statutory authorities, pay-roll tax and stamp duty on ordinary transactions would be payable, ⁴⁶ but special attention should be paid to the possible incidence of stamp duty for the coverage acquired in place of existing third party insurance. That form of insurance is presently liable to duty of 15 cents as a liability Policy. ⁴⁷ The coverage offered under the proposed Scheme, is of a different nature and in some respects resembles disability insurance, which would be dutiable at a higher rate. Since the Corporation will be a public authority constituted under a State Act and the Scheme is not intended to operate on a profit basis, no question of income tax should arise. ⁴⁸ We note, however, that the GIO has an obligation, effected as part of the general Commonwealth/State funding arrangements, to pay to the State Treasury the equivalent of Commonwealth income tax otherwise payable as a result of its operations. ⁴⁹ Exemption from the bank account debits tax is a matter for the Commonwealth. ⁵⁰

15.55 Exemption from financial institutions duty ⁵¹ would seem appropriate, as would exemption from land tax, ⁵² although we make no firm recommendations on these matters. Special consideration would need to be given to possible relief from sales tax if the Corporation supplies aids and appliances other than by way of sale. ⁵³

VI. POLICY REVIEW

15.56 This Report discusses a number of ways in which the policy objectives of the Scheme can be encouraged. These include specifying in the governing legislation the benefits available to injured accident victims, including automatic indexation; ⁵⁴ imposing positive statutory duties such as the duty of the Corporation to provide benefits to eligible claimants, allowing the Corporation to be free from Ministerial direction and control, and establishing a full appeal system. Despite these measures, further provision should be made for independent assessment of the policies and administrative practices adopted by the Corporation.

15.57 There are three major reasons for a continuing assessment of this kind.

• First-the Corporation inevitably will face important questions of interpretation, administrative policy and the exercise of discretionary judgment. These are of critical importance to the Scheme and should be reviewed by an external body not embroiled in day-to-day administrative tasks. The purpose of the review should be to determine whether the Corporation’s decisions promote the objectives of the Scheme.
• Secondly, as has been previously emphasised, the Corporation’s primary concern should not be to conserve resources but to ensure that claimants receive their statutory entitlements. Nonetheless, the reality is that the interests of the Corporation and of claimants will not always coincide. If the Corporation were effectively the sole or even the major source of policy advice to Government and to Parliament, there is a danger that it might adopt an unduly conservative approach to administration for financial reasons. An independent policy review body would do much to counter such a tendency.
• Thirdly, the appeal procedures recommended in Chapter 16, although important, should not be regarded as the principal means of reviewing policy decisions of the Corporation. If undue reliance is placed on the mechanism of appeal, the effect will be to reduce the quality and flexibility of the decision-making process within the Corporation Moreover, there will be important policy questions that are not suitable for determination by appeal tribunals or which simply do not reach those tribunals because of the sporadic nature of appeals.

15.58 Several submissions suggested that an independent committee or board should be established to oversee the activities of the Corporation and to guide its policies generally or in particular areas. The Handicapped and Disabled Person’s association, for example, called for

... a committee or overseeing body of disabled people employed by the scheme to advise and monitor such areas as rehabilitation and aid/equipment supply. ⁵⁵

The Nambucca Welfare Committee contended that there

... should be a continuing independent review committee to monitor policy guidelines of the Accident Compensation Corporation ... This committee should include representatives from disabled groups whose membership comprises persons incapacitated in transport accidents. ⁵⁶

15.59 For reasons already given we agree that an independent body should be established to report on the operation of the Transport Accidents Scheme. This task should include monitoring the activities of the Corporation including its policy guidelines, administrative policies and interpretations of the governing legislation. The independent body, which could be called the Accident Compensation Policy Review Committee, should also have power to recommend legislative amendments in order to overcome defects in or to improve the Scheme. It should have power to report to the Minister whenever there is reason to do so, but should be under a duty to report annually to Parliament The Committee should be concerned with the overall conduct of the Scheme and should not intervene in individual cases. However, its responsibilities would include proposing changes in the practices of the Corporation and for this purpose it should have power to comment on the handling of particular cases and decisions reached in them. Consequently, the Committee should have power to examine files and to require the Corporation to provide information on general policy and practice and on the processing of individual claims. The Committee should be constituted by part-time members, but should be served by a small full-time secretariat. Its membership should be drawn both from experts in the field of accident compensation and from groups with a special interest in the field, such as disabled people, rehabilitation workers, the trade union movement. employers, motorists, public transport authorities and the insurance industry.

15.60 We recommend that the legislation should establish an independent body to be known as the Accident Compensation Policy Review Committee. The Committee should be under a duty to report annually to Parliament on the operations of the Scheme and should be empowered to recommend changes to legislation and to the practices of the Corporation. The Committee should be empowered to require the Corporation to provide information relating to the Scheme and to the processing and determination of individual claims.

15.61 The Corporation may wish to comment on reports of the Policy Review Committee and should be free to do so, whether in annual reports or otherwise. In some circumstances it may be appropriate for the Corporation to be required to comment, such as on occasions when the Policy Review Committee points to what it sees as serious defects in administration. Accordingly, we recommend that the Minister should have power to require the Corporation to respond in writing to a report of the Policy Review Committee within a specified period.

VII. SUMMARY

Principles

15.62 The quality of administration of the Transport Accidents Scheme will be of fundamental importance in determining whether the objectives of the Scheme will be realised. Administration of the Scheme should be based on five principles:

• the principle of entitlement, under which the Scheme is administered so as to ensure that claimants receive the benefits to which they have a statutory right;
• the principle of independence from the Government of the day;
• the principle of flexibility, allowing the scheme to provide a wide range of benefits and to respond to the circumstances of individual claimants;
• the principle of high quality decision-making, requiring well-trained and well-educated officers to have the necessary authority to determine claims; and
• the principle of speed in decision-making and in providing compensation.

Administrative Functions

15.63 The Scheme should be administered by an independent statutory authority known as the Accident Compensation Corporation of New South Wales. The Corporation’s functions should include:

• promoting the Scheme, and disseminating information about the Scheme to people claiming or entitled to benefits;
• formulating policy for the purpose of administration and giving advice to Government;
• assessing claims and continuing entitlements to benefits, paying monetary compensation and providing other benefits;
• coordinating the delivery of services to transport accident victims;
• undertaking research; and
• promoting accident prevention and safety.

Management

15.64 The overall responsibility for the management of the Corporation should be that of a Board. Day-to-day administration of the Scheme should be entrusted to a full-time Chief Executive. To the maximum extent practicable, the administration of the Scheme, including the determination of claims, should be decentralised.

Accountability

15.65 TheCorporationshouldbesubjecttocloseexternalscrutinyandbemadeaccountable in several ways.

• It should be required to report annually to Parliament and to submit its accounts for audit by the Auditor-General.
• The policies and practices of the Corporation should be kept under review by an independent Policy Review Committee reporting directly to Parliament.
• Claimants should have a full right of appeal to an independent tribunal against adverse decisions of the Corporation (Chapter 16).

1. Submissions W23, pp.25-26; W24, p.33; W28, p.16-1 and W81, p.5.

2. Submission W85, p.2.

3. GWR Palmer, “What Happened to the Woodhouse Report” [1981] New Zealand Law Journal 561, at p.567.

4. The quotation is part of a summary of the comments made by Mr BD Inglis, QC, former chairman of the Accident Compensation Corporation in discussion at a conference on Accident Compensation. One of the conference papers, by GWR Palmer, is published at [1981] New Zealand Law Journal 561, and the summary of Mr Inglis’ comments follows at p.572.

5. TG Ison, “Workers’ Compensation-The Canadian Experience”, paper delivered at the conference entitied “Workers Compensation-New Directions?”, South Australian Ministry of Labour (Adelaide, May 1984), p.15.

6. New Zealand Woodhouse Report, p. 19, para.2.

7. Australian Woodhouse Report, vol.1, para.8.

8. joint Standing Committee of the Parliament of New South Wales on Road Safety.

9. See D. Herbert, Road Safety in the Seventies: Lessons for the Eighties (Traffic Accident Research Unit. Research Report 4/80,1980); N. Skinner, M. Henderson and D. Herbert, Compulsory Wearing of Seat belts-A Feasibility Study (Traffic Accident Research Unit, Research Report 6/70, 1970).

10. Joint Standing Committee on Road Safety, Alcohol, other Drugs and Road Safety (First Report, 1982).

11. Australian Woodhouse Report, vol.1, para.317.

12. Id., paras.314-315.

13. National Rehabilitation and Compensation Bill 1977 (Cth.), cll.7, 8, and part VIII.

14. Compensation (Commonwealth Government Employees) Act 1971 (Cth.), s.9.

15. Motor Accidents (Compensation) Act 1979 (N.T), s.6: Territory Insurance Office Act 1979 (NT), s.5.

16. Motor Accidents (Liabilities and Compensation) Act 197 3 (Tas.). ss.4, 30.

17. See generally, Workers’ Compensation Act 1926, part IV, division 2, as amended by the Workers’ Compensation (Amendment) Act, 1984, schedule 6. As to commencement of this legislation, see para.2.42.

18. Workers’ Compensation Act, 1926, S. 31(2)(3), as amended by the Workers’ Compensation (Amendment) Act, 1984, schedule 6.

19. Motor Accidents Act 197 3 (Vic.), ss.5, 6.

20. Accident Compensation Act 1982 (NZ), s.4(1).

21. Id., s.4(2).

22. Submission S51, p.1.

23. Submission W17, pp.3-4.

24. Submission W52, pp.1, 21-22: see also letter from N.R.M.A. Insurance Ltd., dated 15 November 1983.

25. Submission W71, p.8.

26. Accident Compensation Act 1982 (NZ), s.10(1).

27. Motor Accidents Act 1973 (Vic.). s.86: Motor Accidents (Liabilities and Compensation) Act 1971 (Tas.), s.9.

28. State Bank Act 1981, s.9(2). Cf. Water Resources Commission Act, 1976, s.4(2)(f); Maritime Services Act, 19;5, s.3(1A): Metropolitan Water, Sewerage and Drainage Act, 1924, s.7(2), Electricity Commission Act, 1950. s.7; and Transport Authorities Act, 1980, s.11(c) which refers to the state Rail Authority of New South Wales and s.33(1)(c) which refers to the Urban Transit Authority of New South Wales.

29. One model is the Government Insurance Act, 1927, ss.3B, 3BB.

30. Accident Compensation Act 1982 (N.Z.), s.4(2), (3).

31. Motor Accidents (Liabilities and Compensation) Act 197 3 (Tas.), s.4. The Victorian Board is constituted of three part-time members, who are appointed for terms up to five years: Motor Accidents Act 1973 (Vic.). s.6.

32. Cf. Government Insurance Act. 1927. schedule 2, c11.11.12, which regulate the office of the Director. See also schedule 3 regulating meetings of the Board.

33. Cf. Motor Accidents Act 1973 (Vic.), s.6-Motor Accidents (Liabilities and Compensation) Act 1973 (Tas), s.4(2): and Territory Insurance Office Act 1979 (NT), s.10, under which the Chief Executive officer is not a Board member.

34. Cf. Electricity Commission Act, 1950. s.64; Metropolitan Water, Sewage and Drainage Act. 1924. s.26 and Transport Authorities Act, 1980, s,47. Staff of the Victorian Motor Accidents Board are not subject to the provisions of the Public Service Act 1958 (Vic); Motor Accidents Act 1973 (Vic.), s.10(3).

35. GIO, Annual Report 1982-1983, p.19.

36. This Review. conducted under the chairmanship of Dr P Wilenski, delivered an Interim Report, Directions for Change (1977). and a Further Report, Unfinished Agenda (1982).

37. Review of New South Wales Government Administration, Unfinished Agenda (1982), pp.54-56.

38. Public Service Act 1979, ss.124-125. See also Public Service Board of New South Wales, Report for the Year Ended 30 June 1983, appendix C. In the background to the guidelines presented by the of New South Wales Government Administration, it was noted that three-quarters of all State Government employees were in statutory authorities outside the Public Service (para.1.1).

39. J L Fahy, Accident Compensation Coverage (7th ed. 1983), pp.11-12.

40. See T G Ison, note 5 above, p.14.

41. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Persons and Dwellings in Local Government Areas and Urban Centres in New South Wales 1981. Cat. No.2401.0, pp.33-39.

42. Health Commission of New South Wales, Tenth Annual Report 1981/82. pp.37-54. See also Background Paper by Dr. J. Voss on rehabilitation facilities, prepared with the assistance of Professor R. Jones, for the New South Wales Law Reform Commission, dated 20 July 1983.

43. Submission W17, pp.3-4.

44. Motor Accidents Act 1973 (Vic.), ss.60, 65.

45. See Motor Accidents Board, Annual Report for Year ended 30 June 1981, (Victoria 1982), p.4.

46. For example. State pay-roll tax is generally payable by State authorities although s.10 of the Pay-Roll Tax Act, 1971, provides that exemption may be granted to some statutory bodies. There is no general exemption in the Stamp Duties Act, 1920, for State authorities, and express provision is contained in s.10A(2) of the Government Insurance Act 1927, applying the Stamp Duties Act, 1920, to policies of insurance issued by the GIO in the same manner and to the same extent as they apply to policies of insurance issued by other insurers.

47. Stamp Duties Act 1920, schedule 2. Under s.88 D of the Stamp Duties Act, 1920, responsibility is imposed on the GIO to furnish returns and pay duty on third party motor vehicle policies.

48. Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth.). s.23(d); see also Renmark Hotel Incorporated v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1949) 79 CLR 10, at p.16.

49. Government Insurance Act 1927, s.10A(1).

50. Bank Accounts Debits Tax Administration Act 1982 (Cth.), s.3(1).

51. Stamp Duties Act 1920, s.98U(1)(c). as inserted by the Stamp Duties (Financial Institutions Duty) Amendment Act, 1982.

52. The Land Tax Management Act,1956, contains provision for exemption in respect of lands owned by certain public authorities: ss.10(1), 3(1): see also ss.10B, 10D.

51. Regard will need to be paid to the Sales Tax (Exemptions and Classifications) Act 1935-1973 (Cth.), s.5(1) and schedule 1. item 74.

54. W Clayton, “Compensation in New Zealand”, paper delivered at a conference entitled “The Compensation of Motor Accident Victims in Victoria-A Model for Australia?”, Law Institute of Victoria (Melbourne, October 1983), pp.2.11-13; J R Wilson, “Accident Compensation-a Union Viewpoint” [1983] New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations 113, at pp.117-118. See also Submission W9. pp.8-9.

55. Submission W14, p.1.

56. Submission W83, p.2.