Background

4.1 In Section V of this report we explain that the practical. effect of the Bill as framed is that commissioners would perform the same judicial functions as judges of the Commission, with some limitation as to the scope of their jurisdiction.

4.2 The Bill provides that a commissioner may exercise the functions of the court specified in Schedule 3 of the Court Bill,¹ although this is subject to any amendment of Schedule 3 by regulation.² When exercising any function of the court conferred by or under the Act, the commissioner is deemed to be the court.³

4.3 The jurisdiction specified in Schedule 3 includes:

• jurisdiction under section 9 of the Act, ( which covers weekly compensation for total incapacity) where the total amount of compensation involved does not, as at the date of the filing of the application for determination under that section, exceed $5,000 or other prescribed amount;
• jurisdiction under section 11(1) of the Act (which covers compensation for partial incapacity) where the worker is employed in some suitable employment or business;
• jurisdiction under section 15 of the Act (which relates to the redemption of liability under the Act by payment of a lump sum) ;
• jurisdiction under section 16 of the Act (which relates to lump sums for specified disabilities); and
• jurisdiction to make interim awards, to determine appeals from decisions of taxing officers, to make summary awards of compensation where no answer has been filed, and to hear interlocutory applications.

In addition to the jurisdiction specified under Schedule 3, a judge of the court may refer any matter to a commissioner for determination.⁴

4.4 The Bill provides for the Chief judge to be responsible for arranging the business of the court.⁵ However, there is an obvious omission which requires mention. Under the Bill, the Chief Judge is responsible for making arrangements as to the judge who is to exercise the court’s jurisdiction in particular matters or classes of matters.⁶ If there are to be commissioners it would be appropriate for the provision to include the power to arrange the business of the court as between judges and commissioners where they have concurrent jurisdiction.

4.5 The intention of the legislation is that the commissioners should have a jurisdiction concurrent with tile judges of the court in those matters specified in Schedule 3 together with such other matters as may be referred to them by a judge of the court on a case by case basis. There is only one exception to this, namely, in relation to pre-hearing conferences. The Bill provides that the Chief Judge may direct that a pre-hearing conference shall be arranged between the parties or their representatives to be presided over by a commissioner or a registrar as the Chief Judge thinks fit.⁷ In consequence, a judge has no jurisdiction to preside over a pre-hearing conference ordered pursuant to that provision. This would also appear to be an omission, and it should, in our view, be rectified.

Submissions

4.6 Most of the submissions support the idea of commissioners in principle, but, as will appear, there is no uniformity of view as to the jurisdiction they should have, or as to the manner in which that jurisdiction should be exercised. Some of the submissions which have been received challenge the appointment of commissioners as judicial officers performing the same role as judges. They favour a conciliation role, or an informal adjudication role, with either party having a right to relitigate the case if dissatisfied with the result. We explain in Section V of this report that this is not the effect of the Bill as framed and that alternative approaches to the resolution of disputed claims are beyond the scope of this report. Support for commissioners performing a role different from that prescribed for them by the Court Bill is not support for commissioners as proposed.

4.7 In his written submissions,⁸ the Chairman of the Workers’ Compensation Commission did not raise objection to the appointment of commissioners in principle, although he strenuously opposed the appointment of persons without legal. qualifications to such office. He suggested some limitations on their jurisdiction. He also suggested that the “results which the new proposals relating to Commissioners seem designed to achieve could better be achieved by an extension of the conciliation procedure already in the present Act.”⁹ We have since had the benefit of conferring with the Chairman and other judges of the Commission, from which it appears that there is serious opposition to the appointment of commissioners at all on grounds of practicality. We will deal with these arguments when we have reviewed the balance of the written submissions which concern this policy question.

4.8 The Legal Panel for the Labor Council of New South Wales¹⁰ supported the concept of appointing commissioners as a means of dealing with delays in the hearing of cases, at a cost which would be less than appointing additional judges. It also favoured the adoption of an informal approach before commissioners provided the findings did not operate as an estoppel, and would not limit subsequent proceedings in the court, if either party was dissatisfied with the decision of a commissioner. The panel criticised the way in which Schedule 3 of the Court Bill defined the jurisdiction of commissioners by reference to sections of the Act, an approach which it regarded as fundamentally misguided. They contended that it was illogical to include within the jurisdiction of commissioners section 11(1) claims for partial incapacity where the worker was employed in suitable employment, but to exclude from their jurisdiction section 11(2) cases where the worker was not provided with suitable employment. Although the apparent purpose of Schedule 3 is to limit the jurisdiction of commissioners to less important or complex cases, it could not be said that section 11(2) applications are inherently more complex than section 11(1) applications and should therefore be excluded from the jurisdiction of commissioners. If criteria of the kind envisaged by Schedule 3 were to be preserved, then the jurisdiction should be limited to closed period claims (that is, claims in relation to the period before the worker recovered and returned to work), and claims for medical, hospital and rehabilitation expenses. The submission implied that if commissioners were to be legally qualified there would be less objection to an unlimited jurisdiction. In particular, the panel submitted that redemption applications should not be heard by a commissioner unless he was legally qualified and had long experience in the jurisdiction.

4.9 The Insurance Council of Australia Ltd. in its submission¹¹ criticised the concept of a $5,000 jurisdictional Limit on the determination by commissioners of claims for weekly compensation for total incapacity. It referred to this approach as impractical.

4.10 In its submission, the Federated Municipal & Shire Council Employees’ Union of Australia¹² recognised the need for speedy, informal adjudications while preserving the right of the worker to the usual kind of determination before a judge in the event of the claimant being dissatisfied with the result. It supported any measures which would achieve speedy determination of claims provided those measures did not unfavourably affect the workers’ present entitlements. In relation to small claims it was recognised that benefits of expedition might outweigh a right of appeal.

4.11 If His Honour Judge Manser, in his written submission¹³ saw no objection in principle to the appointment of legally qualified commissioners. However, he recommended that there be excluded from the commissioners’ jurisdiction:

• claims for weekly compensation pursuant to sections 9 and 11(1); and
• redemption of weekly payments pursuant to section 15.

4.12 Mr. Goss, Registrar of the Commission, in his submission¹⁴ suggested a re-organisation of Schedule 3 as follows:

• claims for medical, hospital and rehabilitation expenses should be within the jurisdiction of commissioners;
• the $5,000 limit should be a general limit which would encompass the whole claim;
• applications for redemption of weekly payments and applications for lump sum payments for certain disabilities should have no monetary limit; and
• commissioners should have jurisdiction to hear a claim which exceeds $5,000 where the parties to the claim consent.

4.13 The New South Wales Bar Association in its submission¹⁵ saw no objection to a confined jurisdiction for commissioners encompassing, for example, certain consent orders, procedural matters and small closed period claims in which the only issue was incapacity. The Bar Association criticised the wide jurisdiction for commissioners in Schedule 3 of the Bill, pointing out that the great majority of claims for total incapacity pursuant to section 9 of the Act would fall within a monetary limit of $5,000 at the date of filing the application. The Bar Association also referred to the jurisdictional problems which would arise in the event that a commissioner found partial incapacity in lieu of total incapacity, and was then precluded from making an award pursuant to section 11(2) of the Act, on the basis that there had been a failure to provide suitable employment for a partially incapacitated worker.

4.14 Mr. M.J. Joseph, Barrister, said in his submission¹⁶ that there was a place for a lower tier judicial officer such as a master of the Supreme Court, but suggested that the creation of such a position raised problems in relation to the definition of jurisdiction. He criticised the definition of jurisdiction contained in Schedule 3 of the Act, giving detailed reasons for rejecting the assumption, implicit in the Schedule, that jurisdiction so defined identified less important classes of cases. He recommended the deletion of claims for weekly compensation and section 15 redemptions from the Schedule.

4.15 The Compensation Department of the Labor Council of New South Wales¹⁷ affirmed its support for the concept of commissioners as an aid in reducing delays. The Council favoured the use of commissioners as a means of providing an informal adjudication with an unrestricted right of appeal to a judge, where the proceedings would be heard afresh, if either party was dissatisfied with the result. The submission noted, however, that the proposed legislation as framed provides for proceedings before a commissioner to be heard and determined in the same manner as proceedings before a judge. The council thus expressed reservations about the extent of the jurisdiction given to a commissioner. It suggested, as an alternative to a right to bring proceedings afresh before a judge, that the jurisdiction of commissioners might be limited to:

• claims for medical, hospital and rehabilitation expenses;
• claims for weekly payments not in excess of $1,000; and
• claims for a lump sum for specified disabilities pursuant to section 16,

provided that such decisions would not raise an issue estoppel between the parties.

4.16 In a second and lengthier submission¹⁸ the Labor Council of New South Wales said that it had anticipated that the appointment of commissioners would be designed to make proceedings more simple and thereby achieve a speedier hearing. It had expected that commissioners would have a function similar to that of Conciliation Commissioners under the Industrial Arbitration Act, 1940, rather than being judicial officers exercising a function similar to that of a judge and subject to the same limitations as a judge. The Council recommended medication of Schedule 3 of the Court Bill so as to restrict commissioners’ jurisdiction to:

• closed period claims for total incapacity of up to four weeks and not involving more than $1,000;
• closed period claims for partial incapacity to a limit of $1,000;
• medical, hospital and rehabilitation expenses to a limit of $1,000;
• section 16 claims for lump sums for specified disabilities without limit;
• interlocutory applications; and
• consent orders and certain minor matters.

4.17 The New South Wales Society of Labor Lawyers¹⁹ approved in principle the appointment of commissioners to relieve judges of some of the less difficult work, but criticised the definition of jurisdiction contained in Schedule 3 of the Court Bill. In particular, the Society criticised the definition in relation to the limit of $5,000 for claims for total incapacity, in relation to claims pursuant to section 11(1) of the Act for partial incapacity, in relation to redemption applications pursuant to section 15 of the Act, and in relation to section 16 lump sums. The Society did not make any specific recommendation as to how the jurisdiction of commissioners should be defined. In conference with us, the Society recommended that any disputed claim for compensation should be capable of being brought before a commissioner for speedy determination upon whatever materials were available, but without any issue estoppel arising, and with an unfettered right to relitigate the case in the usual way.

4.18 We have reviewed these submissions in detail in order to show the extent of divergence of opinion as to the jurisdiction or function which should be given to commissioners. It is implicit in many of the submissions that the concept of appointing commissioners would be opposed if they were to have a jurisdiction or function significantly different from that envisaged by the party making the submission. We cannot therefore interpret the submissions as a general support for the appointment of commissioners irrespective of what was decided about their jurisdiction or function. Indeed, the contrary would seem to be the case.

4.19 We now come to the views expressed to us in conference by judges of the Commission. The Chairman of the Workers’ Compensation Commission, with the support of the judges with whom we have conferred, is opposed to the appointment of commissioners at all, on practical grounds.

• First, it is said that there is no present need to increase the number of judicial officers since the backlog in cases is being reduced by current listing procedures. In this respect it is said that the average period between a request for listing and a hearing date is currently 35 hearing weeks. It is hoped to reduce this to 26 hearing weeks by the end of 1983.
• Secondly, it is said that any attempt to define the jurisdiction of commissioners would be unsatisfactory.
• Thirdly, it is said that at present all members of the Commission can determine any kind of case without differences between them as to the jurisdiction they can exercise. As a consequence work can be passed between them subject only to the demands of their own lists. If commissioners were to be appointed this could not be done so readily or efficiently. Further, commissioners could not be sent on country circuits because there would be cases listed for those sittings outside their jurisdiction. It was said that this could cause serious problems if there were to be more than one or two commissioners.

Issues Involved

4.20 In considering whether commissioners should be appointed with a judicial function we have taken into account the following issues:

• problems in definition of jurisdiction;
• composition of the court;
• savings of hearing time; and
• savings of costs.

Definition of Jurisdiction

4.21 The perceived difficulties stem from the attempt to define the jurisdiction of commissioners on the basis of distinctions between more and less complex or important matters. Several submissions suggest that Schedule 3 does not limit the jurisdiction of commissioners to less complex or important cases because it includes claims arising under section 9 of the Act (even to a limit of $5,000 at the time of filing the application), claims under section 11(1) of the Act (notwithstanding the qualification that the worker is in employment), and applications for redemption of liability pursuant to section 15 of the Act.

4.22 Claims under section 9 to the limit specified would, we are informed, include a very large proportion of claims under that section. Claims falling within section 11(1), even as qualified, would in turn comprise a significant proportion of the claims for weekly compensation. We agree that the issues which arise in claims for weekly compensation which are subject to the limitations specified in Schedule 3, are no different from the issues which would arise in the balance of claims for weekly compensation, with the sole exception of the operation of section 11(2) of the Act (which deems partial incapacity to be total incapacity if suitable employment is not provided). This last qualification makes no significant difference to the relative complexity or importance of claims for weekly compensation which would come within the jurisdiction of commissioners as specified in the Schedule.

4.23 Applications for approval of redemptions pursuant to section 15 of the Act, it is argued, involve assessment of the worker’s prospects of recovering or retaining weekly compensation and therefore require in many cases, a close examination of the issues which would arise in a disputed claim. They also involve an important supervisory function in relation to the value to the worker of the rights being redeemed. We agree, and conclude that section 15 does not identify a less complex or less important aspect of the jurisdiction of the Commission.

4.24 Accordingly, we are satisfied that Schedule 3 as framed is not effective to confine the jurisdiction of commissioners to less complex or less important cases. It is not possible, in our view, to achieve this objective, by granting jurisdiction by reference to particular provisions of the Act. A line between cases which are free of any degree of complexity and those with some potential for complexity cannot be drawn consistently or logically in this way. We are also satisfied that no limitation by amount would achieve the objective since similar issues tend to arise irrespective of the amount at stake. Indeed, we were informed by one practitioner, with a very large applicants’ practice, that it was common for small claims to be litigated in order to preserve rights for the future. In order to limit the jurisdiction of commissioners to less complex or less important matters it could be necessary to exclude jurisdiction in relation to weekly compensation and section 15 redemptions altogether.

4.25 If commissioners are to be appointed with a judicial function then the alternatives are as follows.

• The grant of unlimited jurisdiction co-extensive with that of the judges, subject only to the power of the Chief Judge to arrange the business of the court with a view to assigning only simple cases, on a case by case basis, to commissioners, and with a view to ensuring that cases of unusual difficulty or importance are always heard by judges.
• The grant of a limited jurisdiction excluding, for example, claims for weekly compensation and section15 redemptions.

Each of these alternatives presents its own problems.

4.26 There are serious problems arising from the grant of unlimited jurisdiction. Pursuant to his power to arrange the business of the court, the Chief Judge could endeavour to ensure that cases of more than usual complexity were not allocated to the commissioners. It would, however, be exceedingly difficult to predict consistently those cases which would not give rise to a particularly difficult question of law or fact.

4.27 The alternative of a limited jurisdiction (excluding, for example, claims for weekly compensation and section 15 redemptions) raises the question of whether there would then be sufficient work to occupy even one commissioner full-time. The judges say that there would not be sufficient work and we will review their reasons for this conclusion.

4.28 The listing arrangements need to be mentioned in this context. There is at present a Listing Committee, composed of certain of the judges of the Commission, which formulates listing procedures and monitors their application. The system requires specific steps to be taken to ensure that cases are ready for trial when they come into the list for hearing. There is a callover system to supervise these requirements, and there is a rotating duty judge who deals with listing matters on a day to day basis. The judges believe that the present listing system is working well but consider that its effectiveness is dependent upon supervision by someone with the authority and status of a judge. Accordingly, they would be strongly opposed to a transfer of this function to a commissioner or lesser judicial officer.

4.29 Under the duty judge arrangements, there is always one judge fully occupied, or almost fully occupied, with interlocutory applications, section 15 redemptions and the supervision of the listing procedures. It is largely in this area that work would have to be found to occupy a commissioner if the alternative of a very limited jurisdiction were adopted. We are informed that if redemptions and listing matters were removed from a duty judge’s daily list, there would be substantially less than half a day’s work for one commissioner left.

4.30 The analogy of masters in the Supreme Court is said to be inappropriate. The nature of that jurisdiction is such that there is sufficient interlocutory work, and readily definable less complex work, such as motor vehicle cases, to occupy several masters effectively. This is an element in the argument with which we agree.

4.31 There are several elements in the argument as a whole that we are not in a position to evaluate within the scope of an interim report. They involve practical considerations which would require an in-depth study of the current operations of the Commission, including a survey of the work distribution. In the absence of such information we are unable to determine whether a jurisdiction for commissioners could be suitably defined, so as not to disrupt the workings of the court, and at the same time ensure that even one commissioner would be kept fully occupied. These matters are beyond the scope of an interim report where time does not permit a detailed review of existing arrangements. Nonetheless, we accept that there is a very serious question whether sufficient work could consistently be reserved for a commissioner with a suitable jurisdictional limit.

4.32 We add that the proposed legislation implicitly acknowledges the difficulty of the question of whether there should be commissioners at all. In particular, this is indicated by the detailed provisions in relation to appeals. It is unusual that there should be two separate avenues of appeal from a low ranking judicial officer, one direct to a superior court on questions of law, and another to a judge of the same jurisdiction on questions of law and fact. This has led to an intricate provision in relation to stays of proceedings in the case of an appeal from a commissioner to a judge.²⁰ The provision is designed to ensure that if a claim for compensation comes before a commissioner rather than a judge, a worker will not stiffer postponement of any award of compensation which may be made, pending an appeal by the employer to a judge of the court. Such intricacies are symptomatic of the difficulty of devising a concurrent jurisdiction as between judges and commissioners which is consistent with the interests of workers and the efficiency of the proposed court.

Composition of the Court

4.33 A serious question arises as to whether it is appropriate at all that there should be a lower tier of judicial officers exercising a jurisdiction concurrent with that of the judges of the court. From the standpoint of the judges, their status would be reduced by lower ranking judicial officers discharging the same functions as themselves. So far as the commissioners were concerned, they would be receiving lesser emoluments and enjoying lesser status whilst being expected to discharge much the same functions as the judges. One can readily perceive that such a situation would be likely to affect the morale of the court and consequently its efficiency. The repercussions of such a situation could very readily negate any saving in costs which might be expected from the appointment of a lower tier of judicial officers.

Savings of Hearing Time

4.34 Unless a sufficient volume of work could be found for commissioners, it is unlikely that their appointment would bring about any significant reduction in listing delays. While it is true that informal procedures might hasten the hearing of individual cases, there are problems involved in the introduction of informality which we mention below. In any event, the duration of individual hearings is not normally a problem of any significance in the Commission, and we doubt that it contributes in any measure to listing delays. Savings of listing time might also be illusory if there were to be a substantial number of appeals from decisions of commissioners. It might also be illusory if arrangements for the transfer of work between judicial officers of the court, or for the disposal of country lists, became disrupted by difficulties in the allocation of work.

Savings of Costs

4.35 Commissioners would certainly be less expensive to maintain than judges in terms of salary, staff, chambers, and courtroom or conference room accommodation. The salary envisaged for a commissioner would be approximately two-thirds of that payable to a judge and other information supplied to us suggests that the overall cost proportion would be in that order. Whether commissioners would be less expensive than judges in practice is, however, not so clear.

• First, the saving in the cost of maintaining a commissioner in lieu of a judge may be eroded by appeals from a commissioner to a judge of the court. Later in this report we advise revision of this avenue of appeal which could substantially negate this difficulty.
• Secondly, the use of commissioners would save costs only if they were kept occupied. This would depend on what they are empowered to do.
• Thirdly, the office of commissioner would be unlikely to attract persons of the same calibre as judges. They may not have the same capacity for work as judges and more appeals may be generated.

4.36 The cost efficiency of appointing commissioners rather than judges to do some of the work which the judges now carry out has not been established at this stage to our satisfaction. The success of the proposal depends on the allocation of jurisdiction to the commissioners which is extensive enough to keep them supplied with work and restricted enough to meet the legitimate interests of those who, for a variety of reasons, argue that commissioners should have a limited jurisdiction. The legislation as framed fails to achieve this synthesis to a sufficient degree of satisfaction. In this jurisdiction, unlike the Supreme Court, there is no obvious basis upon which to allocate to a lower tier of judicial officers a significant segment of work which is, with any degree of confidence, identifiably less complex or important or which may be considered suitable by any other criteria. No solution has been suggested in the submissions which would be generally acceptable. The apparent agreement that there should be commissioners with a limited jurisdiction or different function in order to save cost or reduce delays, masks the implication that there should not be commissioners at all unless the question of their jurisdiction or function is satisfactorily resolved. We doubt that this question is capable of immediate resolution to the general satisfaction of those who have a legitimate interest in the efficient operation of the jurisdiction.

Summary

4.37 The role of commissioners has not, in our view, been sufficiently worked out. In the original proposals and discussions, commissioners were conceived as conciliators along the model of the Conciliation Commissioners under the Industrial Arbitration Act, 1940. This concept was supported in some of the submissions, but is not incorporated in the legislation. The Bill creates quasi-judges, who are to be members of the court having a jurisdiction which is largely concurrent with that of the judges. The legislation also provides for conciliators and arbitrators. The former are to carry out conciliation function imposed on the Board under the Amendment Bill,²¹ while the latter may be appointed under the Court Bill.²²

4.38 No clear guidance has been given as to the manner in which the roles of these three kinds of officers should be integrated. There is no doubt that each would be capable of fulfilling some of the objectives of the relaxation of formality and expedition of proceedings which have support in the submissions. However, until the integration of their functions is clarified, and guidelines provided for the roles they are to perform, the operation of the legislation is unclear. Certainly, we are unable, at this stage, to see a requirement for all three kinds of officer in addition to judges. Serious questions therefore arise as to the proper role of commissioners, and of the extent to which conciliation and arbitration and the encouragement of informal resolution of disputes should be the function of the court or the Board. In our view, these matters should be resolved before the legislation proceeds.

4.39 Serious questions arise as to whether there is any role for commissioners as quasi-judges. The difficulties we have identified include the following:

• it is not possible in advance to distinguish simple from complex matters, or unimportant from important matters;
• if an unlimited jurisdiction is given, there are doubts as to the competence of commissioners to determine the issues correctly, and problems with the proposed appeal provisions; and
• if a limited jurisdiction is given, there may be insufficient work for commissioners, and problems with the efficient listing of the court’s business.

4.40 In our view, no role has been established, at this stage, for commissioners as quasi-judges. If it is thought that the potential for savings in cost or for reduction in delays are such as to warrant the appointment of commissioners, we recommend that a study be undertaken to determine what work would be suitable for a lower tier of judicial officers sufficient to keep at least one commissioner occupied. Such a study would involve an examination of each kind of case heard by the judges, of their various court functions, of the time occupied by each category of work, and of the extent to which a transfer of such work to a commissioner would be consistent with the maintenance of efficiency in the jurisdiction.

4.41 If commissioners are to be retained as quasi-judges without any inquiry being made, the preferable course, not without difficulty, would be to allow the Chief Judge to allocate work to them, on a case by case basis, with the intention of excluding all cases having any degree of complexity or long-term implications for the worker.

4.42 We have not been able to assess the value of commissioners as conciliators, or the future role of conciliators acting under the auspices of the Board. There is a strong body of support for a conciliation role, and for the encouragement of this function. We can see substantial advantages in conciliation, although we are aware of comments that the existing conciliation function of the Commission²³ has been little exercised, and is largely ineffective. If there is to be effective conciliation, it may be that the proper course is actively to develop the Board’s role in this respect. We are not in a position to make final judgment on this question, but we do recommend that careful consideration be given to restructuring the role of commissioners, and to re-examining conciliation generally.

4.43 Finally, we observe that while the possibility of reference to arbitration is mentioned in the Court Bill, no provision is made for the manner in which arbitrators are to be appointed or to proceed, or in relation to the kinds of matter which should be referred to arbitration. Arbitration may be a useful tool, for example, in resolving disputes between insurers, and we do not believe that the legislation should be left at large in this way. Decisions are necessary as to the circumstances in which arbitration is to be used, and as to the procedural aspects involved. We are not in a position to resolve these questions at this stage since they need to be considered in the light of the whole machinery for determination of disputes arising under the Act. We do, however, draw attention to the provisions relating to arbitration in the District Court²⁴ from which assistance may be gained.

FOOTNOTES

1. Court Bill, cl.25(l).

2. Court Bill, cl.25(3).

3. Court Bill, cl.25(2).

4. Court Bill, cl.16(l).

5. Court Bill, cl.21.

6. Court Bill, cl.21(a).

7. Court Bill, cl.31(l)(d).

8. Schedule: Items 18, 19

9. Schedule: Item 19, p.8.

10. Schedule: Item 22.

11. Schedule: Item 20.

12. Schedule: Item 25.

13. Schedule: Item 26.

14. Schedule: Item 28.

15. Schedule: Item 30.

16. Schedule: Item 31.

17. Schedule: Item 34.

19. Schedule: Item 35.

19. Schedule: item 33.

20. Court Bill, cl.39.

21. Amendment Bill, Schedule 6, Item (2).

22. Court Bill, cl.31.

23. The Act, s.39(b).

24. See District Court Act, 1973, ss.63, 63A; District Court Rules, Part 51; and Arbitration (Civil Actions) Act, 1983.