4.1 We believe that the question posed by this reference is best answered by recommending reform of the law applicable to proceedings for the recovery of contract debts. The following reforms are desirable:

• the grant to Courts of Petty Sessions of a like power to that given to the Supreme Court and District Court in respect of discretionary awards of interest (discretionary interest);
• the extension of existing procedures for obtaining default judgments so as to allow default judgments which will include a sum for discretionary interest;
• clarification in relation to payment into court after action is brought to ensure that the defendant does not obtain the benefit of the costs provisions unless the sum paid into court includes the discretionary interest ultimately awarded, and to ensure that money paid into court is not taken out without an order of the court;
• the extension of existing jurisdiction of the courts and arbitrators so as to allow recovery of discretionary interest where payment of the debt is made after proceedings for recovery have been instituted, but before judgment is obtained.

These proposals are considered in more detail in the succeeding paragraphs.

Courts, Tribunals and Arbitrators - the Power to Award Interest

4.2 As mentioned earlier, power to award discretionary interest has been conferred only on the Supreme Court and the District Court. We believe that like power should be conferred erred on Courts of Petty Sessions, which presently have jurisdiction to hear and determine actions for the recovery of any debt, demand or damage, whether liquidated or unliquidated, or the detention of goods, in which the amount claimed is not more than $3,000, whether on a balance of account or after an admitted set- of f or otherwise.¹ Legislation has been passed, but not yet proclaimed, enlarging the jurisdictional limit of Courts of Petty Sessions to $5,000,² and we understand that consideration is being given to a further increase. By amendments to the District Court Act, 1973³ plaintiffs bringing proceedings in the District Court which could have been brought in Courts of Petty Sessions as a result of this increase in jurisdiction maybe disadvantaged as to recovery of costs.

4.3 We have been informed that the number of civil claims instituted in all Courts of Petty Sessions in the State during the calendar year 1981 was 215,486. Of these proceedings, some 195,857 were instituted by default summons for recovery of debt. During the same calendar year 75,285 default judgments were obtained, having a value slightly in excess of $46 million. judgments by such courts in contested proceedings, including proceedings for debt recovery, were given for a total sum of $6.25 million.

4.4 We see no reason in principle why a plaintiff seeking recovery of a debt in a Court of Petty Sessions should have any less right to recover interest than a plaintiff suing in the Supreme Court or District court. Such a plaintiff suffers the same loss by being out of his or her money as a plaintiff who is able to sue in the other courts. Further, in the case of small businesses, slow payment of debts is likely to present a substantial problem.

4.5 The needs of debtors in genuine difficulty are dealt with by provisions already contained in the Courts of Petty Sessions (Civil Claims) Act 1970 relating to judgment by confession or agreement⁴ and payment by instalments.⁵ We observe that interest is payable on judgment debts from the time when judgment is given or entered up,⁶ at the rate prescribed from time to time.

4.6 We have also given consideration to the question whether a discretionary power to award interest should be conferred on consumer claims tribunals, and on the Workers’ Compensation Commission. Although consumer claims falling within the jurisdiction of the consumer claims tribunals under the Consumer Claims Tribunals Act, 1974 arise out of contracts, the nature of those claims and the avenues of relief available have led us to conclude that they are outside the scope of our reference. Such claims usually assert the supply of defective goods or the provision of defective services and are analogous to claims for breach of contract rather than claims for recovery of contract debts. Further, the tribunals already have wide powers to make orders adjusting the rights of the consumer by way of compulsory payment of money, relief from payment of money, and work orders.⁷ In exercising its powers a tribunal is enjoined to make such an order as is in its opinion fair and equitable to all the parties to the proceeding before it.⁸ These considerations have led us to the preliminary view that there is no present need for a discretionary power to award interest. However, we should mention that we have not embarked upon public consultation or detailed consideration of these tribunals, as we consider their functions not to be included in our terms of reference.

4.7 We have reached a similar conclusion in relation to the Workers’ Compensation Commission. So far as it is concerned with making awards and orders for the payment of compensation the rights involved fall outside the terms of our reference. The question of interest upon moneys payable as compensation up to the date of the award or order is more appropriate for consideration in our reference on accident compensation Interest is payable on every award or order for the payment of compensation at the prescribed rate from the time when the award or order is entered up or made, or from the time when the money is payable (whichever is the later) until the money is paid. The remaining matters entrusted to the Workers’ Compensation Commission for decision or enforcement do not in our view raise the issue of discretionary interest. For example, orders or awards requiring money payments may be made for the purpose of adjusting rights between insurers and between employers and insurers. Such orders or awards may extend to premium adjustments where there has been a dispute as to the amount of premium payable, or where there has been an underestimate of wages in the declaration required of an employer. Orders or awards may also be made involving payments between insurers by way of contribution or by uninsured employers by way of indemnification of the uninsured liability scheme. These are all special cases.

4.8 Similarly, we have not considered it appropriate in this reference to examine the question of discretionary interest in relation to specialised courts and tribunals such as the Land and Environment Court, Mining Wardens Courts, and the Industrial Commission of New South Wales.

4.9 We have referred to the power of arbitrators to award interest and note that provision is included in the Commercial Arbitration Bill, 1982 to allow for the award of interest up to the making of an award.⁹ The relevant provision is modelled on section 94 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 with certain differences. The power is subject to intention to the contrary expressed in the arbitration agreement and is also subject to a ceiling rate, namely the rate at which interest is payable on a judgment debt of the Supreme Court. These qualifications do not cause us concern. However, if our recommendations are accepted in relation to those cases where payment is made between commencement of recovery proceedings and judgment and provisions are introduced by way of amendment or otherwise to allow interest in such cases, then we believe similar provisions should apply to proceedings before arbitrators where payment is made after commencement of the arbitration and before award. We so recommend.

Default judgments and Liquidated Demands Where a Claim for Interest is Made

4.10 A plaintiff in the Supreme Court making a claim against a defendant for a liquidated demand, but no other claim, may by note in the statement of claim require the defendant to verify the defence.¹⁰ Where a plaintiff by the originating process claims a liquidated sum and makes no claim of any other kind, the defendant may obtain a stay of further proceedings where, within the time limited for appearance, the defendant pays to the plaintiff the amount claimed and the prescribed amount for costs, and files notice of that payment.¹¹

4.11 The rules of the Supreme Court provide that a claim for a liquidated demand together with interest, is a claim for a liquidated demand whether or not the claim includes interest accruing "after the date of the claim", or whether or not a rate of interest is specified.¹² The rules further provide that in the event of a defendant defaulting in entering an appearance, filing a defence, or verifying a defence, where required to do so, the plaintiff may enter judgment according to the nature of the claim.¹³

4.12 In the case of a claim for a liquidated demand only, the rules¹⁴ provide that the plaintiff may enter judgment against the defendant for a sum not exceeding the sum claimed in the statement of claim on that demand and for costs. If the claim includes interest at an unspecified rate, the rules provide that interest accruing after (but not before) the date of filing the statement of claim to the date of entry of judgment shall for the purpose of judgment be reckoned at a specified rate.¹⁵

4.13 The rules of the Supreme Court relating to claims for liquidated demands specify procedures whereby a defendant may obtain a stay of proceedings on payment of the sum claimed within the time limited for appearance, and whereby a plaintiff may sign default judgment.¹⁶ It was held in 1980 in Dalgety Futures Pty. Limited v. Poretsky¹⁷ that these rules are incapable of accommodating the situation in which there is, in addition to a demand for a liquidated sum, a claim for interest under section 94. In other words, a claim for interest under section 94 is not a claim for a liquidated sum but a claim for "damages in the nature of interest".¹⁸ A plaintiff in such a case cannot endorse the statement of claim with a notice advising the manner in which a defendant may obtain a stay or with a notice requiring verification of the defence.¹⁹ Further, it is not possible for the plaintiff to obtain a default judgment nor is it possible for the defendant to obtain a stay by making payment to the plaintiff within the time limited for appearance.

4.14 The decision in Dalgety Futures Pty. Limited v. Poretsky considerably limits the utility of the rules mentioned in the preceding paragraph, which were designed to permit prompt disposal of debt recovery proceedings. However, even if it was possible to obtain a default judgment on the basis that by reason of Part 1 rule 8(4) a claim for interest under section 94 was to be treated as a claim for a liquidated sum, the rules as presently worded would not appear to allow recovery of interest in respect of any period prior to the filing of the statement of claim.²⁰ Further the rules do not afford any clear assessment procedure in respect of the period between the filing of the statement of claim and the entry of default judgment.

4.15 We recommend that the rules of the Supreme Court be amended in four respects.

• The first amendment should ensure that the inclusion of a claim for interest under section 94 does not preclude a plaintiff from requiring a defendant to verify his or her defence.
• Secondly, the rules should ensure that the inclusion of such an interest claim does not preclude a defendant from obtaining a stay by making payment of the debt and interest claimed within the time limited for appearance, or preclude a plaintiff from endorsing the statement of claim with a note to that effect. Consequential amendment of the rules such as Part 7 rule 1(5) and Part 16 rule 1(3) would be required to ensure that the interest claim is clearly particularised and readily calculable.
• Thirdly, the rules should be altered to allow a default judgment to be obtained where there is a claim for interest under section 94 together with a claim for a liquidated demand. The plaintiff should be required to specify in the statement of claim the portion of the claim on which interest is claimed, the date from which it is claimed, and the rate. Further, the plaintiff should be required to include in an affidavit any special facts relied upon in support of the claim for interest.

  In our view, the amount payable for interest should be assessed by the Registrar at the time when the default judgment is filed or processed." Provided the defendant is given notice of the claim and the basis of assessment sought, we see no injustice in having that assessment made at the time of entry of the default judgment For the case where the defendant wishes to assert that the claim is excessive or that interest should not be awarded we propose a procedure whereby a notice of dispute as to interest and affidavits in support be filed. In the affidavits the defendant would state any facts relevant to the exercise of the discretion.

  We believe that the Registrar and the courts would be aided in the exercise of the statutory discretion by the issue from time to time of practice notes specifying the rate of interest to be awarded up to judgment, subject to evidence justifying a different rate. Such practice notes would declare the rate generally to be applied. In special cases, for good cause shown a different rate could be applied. Normally we would not expect any material to be placed before the Registrar, either by the plaintiff or by the defendant, opposing the award of interest or seeking interest other than at the rate declared by practice note from the date the moneys became due. Further, in those cases where the plaintiff, in the statement of claim, foreshadows a claim for interest at a rate in excess of the general rate and has filed an affidavit in support, without any response from the defendant we would not anticipate any need for a formal hearing. In those cases where a defendant files a notice of dispute and affidavits, the matter would be appropriate for determination by the Registrar personally, or by referral to the Master.

• Fourthly, the rules should be amended to ensure that it is possible to obtain a default judgment which will include interest not only from the date of filing the statement of claim, but for the whole or any part of the period between the date when the cause of action arose and the date when the default judgment takes effect Section 94 already contemplates such a power. Assuming that as a result of our recommendations it becomes possible for a default judgment to be obtained where interest under section 94 is claimed, the provisions of Part 17 rule 4(2), as presently framed, would not accommodate a calculation of interest in respect of a period prior to the date of the filing of the statement of claim.

4.16 Similarly, in relation to the District Court and Courts of Petty Sessions, amendments should be made to ensure that it is possible to obtain a default judgment which will include interest in respect of the period preceding the commencement of proceedings. It would again be necessary to require the plaintiff to give particulars of the claim for interest, in the statement of liquidated claim or other originating process, and to provide similar machinery for determining a general rate of interest, and for resolving disputes as to interest.

4.17 The rules of the District Court do not include the provision which appears in the Supreme Court rules extending the definition of a claim for a liquidated demand to include such a claim together with interest. Nor do they include any provision entitling a plaintiff, by notice, to require verification or any provision comparable to those contained in Supreme Court Rules Part 17 rule 4(2), or in Part 7 rule 4.

4.18 However, the District Court Act 1973 does contain a provision²² requiring a defendant to an action commenced by a statement of liquidated claim to verify the grounds of defence. Further, the Act permits a plaintiff in such an action to have a default judgment entered against the defendant where there is a failure to file verified grounds of defence within the time prescribed.²³ Judgment is entered for the amount which is shown in a filed statement²⁴ to be the amount due to the plaintiff in respect of the cause of action for which the action was commenced, or the amount specified in the statement of claim (whichever is the less), and the prescribed costs. These provisions do not appear to permit a default judgment for interest under section 83A District Court Act 1973 and we understand that it is not the practice to allow a plaintiff to obtain a default judgment for such interest.

4.19 In the case of a judgment by confession the District Court Act, 1973²⁵ permits a defendant before judgment to sign a statement confessing to the amount, or part of the amount of the claim of the plaintiff. The Act does not make clear what is to be done in such a case in respect of any claim for interest under section 83A. We believe the section should be amended to make it clear that the confession extends to the interest claim in an amount either to be assessed by the Registrar or acknowledged by the defendant as payable. Where particulars of the plaintiff’s claim for interest are included in the statement of Claim, it will be a simple matter for the defendant to make the necessary calculation.

4.20 In relation to Courts of Petty Sessions, the provisions for default judgments are also contained in the Act rather than in the rules of court. The use of a default summons instead of an ordinary summons in an action for recovery of "a debt or liquidated demand" is permitted.²⁶ Where a defendant to an action commenced by default summons does not file a verified notice of defence within 14 days after service of the summons, the plaintiff may apply to have default judgment entered.²⁷ The entry of judgment is made by the Registrar for the amount specified in the statement verified and filed by the plaintiff as being the amount due to the plaintiff in respect of the cause of action for which the default summons was filed, together with costs as prescribed.²⁸

4.21 Although it has been held that the duty of the Registrar in Courts of Petty Sessions to enter judgment is purely administrative,²⁹ we do not see any difficulty in amending the Act so as to confer discretionary powers on that officer to award interest in respect of the period up to judgment.

4.22 The provisions of section 28 of the Courts of Petty Sessions (Civil Claims) Act 1970 relating to judgments by confession, should be amended in the same way as we have recommended for the District Court.

Payment into Court After Action Brought (Including Defence of Tender)

4.23 After an action is commenced money maybe brought into court by a defendant in two ways. First the payment in may be accompanied by a defence of tender before action. Secondly, the payment in may be made as an offer of settlement in accordance with the rules, without there having been any offer before action.

4.24 The subject of tender before action and the defence of tender call for no reform.³⁰ If the defence of tender fails section 94 would still be available to a plaintiff. if the defence succeeds there would be no merit in the plaintiff s favour for an award of interest in respect of the period after tender. We have already given our reasons for not making recommendations in relation to the period prior to tender.³¹ In passing, we repeat that there is a possible lacuna in the Supreme Court Rules in relation to the payment into court of money in association with a defence of tender. For reasons already stated it may be desirable to consider an amendment to Part 22 rule 12 so as to require a defendant to obtain the leave of the court before being able to take out of court money paid into court in association with a defence of tender.

4.25 The second way in which moneys maybe brought into court has been discussed by us earlier.³² In the case of the Supreme Court, the rules appear to deal adequately with the subject. However, in the case of the District Court some doubt exists as to whether or not the defendant can bring monies into court to meet a claim for interest under section 83A District Court Act, 1973 or whether such interest should be taken into account in determining whether the amount paid in is greater than the amount recovered. We recommend that the rules of the District Court be amended so as to remove any doubt and so as to bring them in line with the Supreme Court Rules.

4.26 In the case of Courts of Petty Sessions there are no provisions allowing the payment of money into court Accordingly, we make no recommendations on this subject for those courts. However, if their limits of jurisdiction are expanded as mentioned in paragraph 4.2 above, then a strong case for allowing payment into court will exist.

Payment After Action Brought Otherwise than by Payment into Court

4.27 Payment of a debt maybe made by the defendant to the plaintiff after proceedings have been instituted, without any monies having been brought into court. In such cases the plaintiff maybe confronted with a debtor who has ignored demands for payment, and who has waited until the last moment before judgment. Such a debtor maybe aware that there is no defence to the claim. Further, the debtor may be advised that there is no point in using the procedures for payment into court as a means of inducing a compromise for less than the full amount of the debt.

4.28 As the law currently stands, a plaintiff receiving such a payment or an offer of payment without any interest is in a quandary. If the money is accepted it will not be possible for the plaintiff to obtain judgment for the debt. Since the present provisions conferring discretionary jurisdiction to award interest depend on the obtaining of a judgment it follows that interest cannot presently be recovered under those provisions unless a judgment is obtained.

4.29 If the plaintiff refuses to accept the payment for the reason that he or she wishes to recover interest then the consequences may be inconvenient or worse. First, there is likely to be delay and cost to the plaintiff while the matter is set down for hearing. Secondly, there will be uncertainty about the recovery of interest because a defendant pleading payment or tender after action would have an arguable case that interest should not run at least from the date of the attempted payment. Thirdly, there is the risk that the defendants financial position will have deteriorated by the time the matter is determined, so that recovery may be frustrated.

4.30 Considerations of justice suggest that a plaintiff who is offered payment or who receives payment after action has been commenced without interest should be able to accept it without prejudicing a claim for discretionary interest and without the uncertainties described above. The plaintiff will have been kept out of moneys to which he or she was entitled, and will have suffered loss. The position of the defendant would also be strengthened, for by making the payment he or she could confidently expect that interest would cease to run from that moment. The amount in issue would be confined to the period between the accrual of the cause of action and the date of payment. At present such a defendant does not know with certainty whether payment would carry that consequence, the assessment of interest being entirely discretionary.

4.31 An alteration of the law to give the courts a discretion to award interest in such cases would not affect the power of the parties to agree upon an accord and satisfaction at the time of payment it could suit the parties to negotiate a compromise as to interest at that time. For the plaintiff there could be the advantage of early finality and certainty as to the amount recovered. For the defendant there could be the advantage of an opportunity for a final discharge. For each party, there would be the possibility of lessening costs.

4.32 To allow recovery of interest in these circumstances appears to be consistent with the intention of the existing discretionary interest provisions. These provisions presuppose the commencement of proceedings by the plaintiff to recover the principal debt. Once that step has been taken the right of the plaintiff to recover interest and the liability of the defendant to pay interest should not depend on the plaintiff obtaining formal judgment for the debt. In our view there is no justification for a difference between the plaintiff who obtains judgment after a hearing and the plaintiff who after commencing proceedings either receives payment of the debt or obtains default judgment without a hearing.

4.33 We note that the problem of payment has been overcome in Victoria. In that State section 78 of the Supreme Court Act 1958 introduced in 1962, provides as follows:

Upon all debts or sums certain hereafter recovered in any action the judge at the hearing shall upon application unless good cause is shown to the contrary allow interest to the creditor at a rate not exceeding eight per cent per annum from the time when such debt or sum was payable.

In Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works v. Bevelon Investments Pty Ltd.³³ it was held that a debt or liquidated amount paid to the plaintiff after the issue of a writ is "recovered in the action" even though judgment is not thereafter entered. The reasoning in that case is not applicable to section 94 of the Supreme Court Act, 1970 having regard to the different wording of the sections. However, we are reinforced in our conclusion as to the desirability of the reform proposed by the fact that it has been implemented in Victoria without apparent criticism. A provision to similar effect is contained in section 34 of the Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas.), although the time from which interest is calculated is the time when the debt or sum certain "recovered" in the action was payable if payable by virtue of a written instrument at a date or time certain. Otherwise, it is payable from the time when written demand of payment is made giving notice that interest would be claimed. We have given consideration to whether the necessary reform could be made to the legislation in force in New South Wales along the lines of the Victorian or Tasmanian legislation. In the result we have concluded that it is preferable to envisage the enactment of provisions specifically directed to the problem. Amendment of section 94 of the Supreme Court Act, 1970 by means of provisions which would result in wording similar to section 78 of the Supreme Court Act 1958 (Vic.) would have two disadvantages. The first is that such an amendment would presuppose that the New South Wales Supreme Court would agree with the decision in Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works v. Bevelon Investments Pty Ltd. The second is that those practising members of the profession who may not be aware of that decision may not fully appreciate the intention of the amendment. In our view, the best way to achieve the recommended reform is to amend section 94 by using provisions in or to the effect of those in Appendix 1.

4.34 We also recommend that the necessary reforms be effected by amending section 83A of the District Court Act 1973 and by placing corresponding provisions in the Courts of Petty Sessions (Civil Claims) Act, 1970.

Debts Paid Before Action Brought

4.35 The principle upon which our recommendations are based is that justice requires the fair compensation of a person (creditor) who has not been paid money at the time when payment should have been made. In other words, the creditor has been unreasonably or unfairly kept out of his or her money.³⁴ It could be said to follow as a matter of logic that the discretionary power to award interest which we have recommended should extend to interest on debts paid before action brought. However, we do not recommend that this extension be made or provided for in the amendments proposed at this stage. If the extension were to be made, it could be said to amount to introducing, in the context of procedural reform, a general substantive requirement that debts should carry interest. We have already discussed this in Chapter 3 where we concluded that the introduction of a general rule should not be recommended in this report.³⁵ We believe that the discretion given to the courts to award interest on debts should be confined to debts that have not been paid before the commencement of proceedings. Once proceedings have been commenced, that power should, however, extend to allow recovery of interest in respect of periods prior to commencement.

4.36 We repeat that if after consultation and consideration of the changes to substantive law which would be required, it was felt that a general scheme for statutory interest is desirable, the proposals we have made could serve as a foundation.

4.37 There are other reasons for not extending the discretionary powers of courts so that after payment of a debt proceedings could be commenced by the creditor solely to recover interest. One is that in the absence of a scheme for statutory interest, a debtor making a payment after the date on which the debt became due and payable would not know whether the creditor desired, or was entitled to, interest. The debtor could not make payment with certainty that the liability was discharged. Difficulties could arise in relation to the principles governing discharge by payment and by performance, and also in relation to accord and satisfaction for a prudent debtor will wish to secure a complete discharge when making payment. Debtors untrained in the law would be ignorant of such matters and would be vulnerable to unexpected claims for interest, possibly well after the event.

FOOTNOTES

1. Courts of Petty Sessions (Civil Claims) Act, 1970, s.12.

2. Courts of Petty Sessions (Civil Claims) Amendment Act. 1982 (Act No.42 of 1982).

3. District Court (Amendment) Act- 1982 (Act No.41 of 1982).

4. Courts of Petty Sessions (Civil Claims) Act. 1970, s.28.

5. Courts of Petty Sessions (Civil Claims) Act 1970, s.40.

6. Courts of Petty Sessions (Civil Claims) Act 1970. s.39.

7. Consumer Claims Tribunals Act 1974, s.23.

8. Consumer Claims Tribunals Act. 1974. s.23(2).

9. Commercial Arbitration Bill, 1982. cl.27.

10. Supreme Court Rule & Pt 15 r.23.

11. Supreme Court Rules. Pt 7 r.4.

12. Supreme Court Rules, Pt 1 r.8(4). and see Pt 7 r.4(2) and Pt 17 r.4(2).

13. Supreme Court Rules. Pt 17 r.3(a).

14. Supreme Court Rules, Pt 17 r.4(I).

15. Supreme Court Rules. Pt 17 r.4(2)).

16. Supreme Court Rules, Pt 7 r.4. and Pt 17.

17. Dalgety Futures Pty. Limited v. Poretsky 1198012 N.S.W.L.R. 646.

18. Ibid., at p.650.

19. Ibid., at p.648.

20. See rules referred to in note 12 above, and para.4.12 above.

21. We have considered two other possible procedures. but neither is satisfactory. the first is to follow the approach taken in respect of claims for interest under s.3 of the United Kingdom Act of 1934. The English practice is to enter final judgment (by default) for the debt and interlocutory judgment for interest The assessment of interest is referred to the Master(Alex Lawrie Factors Limited v. Modern Injection Moulds Ltd. 1198113 All E.R. 658). In Gardner Steel Ltd. v. Sheffield Brothers (Profiles) Ltd. [197811 W.L.R. 916, this practice was described as cumbrous and expensive and attributable to the conservatism of the profession The second possible approach is to leave the plaintiff to seek summary judgment under Pt 13 of the rules. Cf the practice in Queensland: A.N.I Australia Pty Ltd. v. Hannay [19811 Qd.R. 598. Under those rules where a plaintiff proves the facts on which the claim or part is based, and proves that the defendant has no defence(or no defence except as to the amount of damages claimed), the court may direct the entry of judgment We do not favour any solution automatically involving a separate hearing as this must increase costs and cause delay.

22. District Court Act 1973, s.56(2).

23. District Court Act 1973, s.58 and District Court Rules, Pt 13 r.l.

24. See District Court Act. 1973, s.58(1) (d) and District Court Rules. Pt 30 r.l.

25. District Court Act 1973, s.60.

26. Courts of Petty Sessions (Civil Claims) Act. 1970. s.24.

27. Courts of Petty Sessions (Civil Claims) Act 1970, ss.25 and 27(1).

28. Courts of Petty Sessions (Civil Claims) Act 1970, s.27(1).

29. Beale v. Brady: ex p. Beale (1888) 4 W.N. 180.

30. See paras 2.16-2.18 above.

31. See para.2.18 above.

32. See paras 2.19-2.21 above.

33. [19771 V.R. 473.

34. See D. O'Connor, “Interest on Awards of Damages for Personal Injury and Death” (1982) 56 A.L.J. 456, at pp.458-459.

35. See paras 3.10 and 3.11 above.