A. THE DISCUSSION PAPER

I. Introduction

9.1 In the Discussion Paper, The Structure of the Profession, we discussed in some detail the Queen’s Counsel system in this State and we made suggestions for change. For the most part, we do not repeat the discussion here, but we summarise the suggestions in later paragraphs. Before doing so, we do, however, make some preliminary comments.

9.2 In this State, with very few exceptions, the people appointed as Queen’s Counsel have been practising barristers. In general, people who have served the law with distinction in the academic field or in the paid service of government have not been appointed. Some barristers who are also politicians have been appointed but, in general, their appointments appear to have been on the basis of their service to the law rather than other forms of public service. No solicitor has been appointed in this State.

9.3 Two main reasons prompt junior barristers to apply for appointment as Queen’s Counsel. First, there is a desire for advancement. In general, Queen’s Counsel enjoy higher incomes and status than junior counsel, and many judicial appointments are made from their ranks. Secondly, there is a desire to change the nature of their work. In general, Queen’s Counsel conduct the heavier types of litigation and the more responsible advisory work; they devote their time to the preparation and conduct of relatively few cases and are thereby enabled to concentrate more intensively on each case. Part of this second reason calls for some explanation. A barristers work is divided between advocacy, advice in conference, and paper work. The last mentioned includes the drawing and settling of documents required for the purpose of litigation, the writing of legal opinions and the drafting of legal documents. For many junior barristers, this paperwork is laborious, demanding, and less remunerative than the work of advocacy. A Queen’s Counsel is required by rule of the Bar Association to refuse much of it, and hence some successful junior barristers apply for silk for the purpose of lessening the burden of their paperwork.

9.4 From the viewpoint of lay clients, a most important consequence of a barrister being appointed a Queen’s Counsel is that thereafter, for a large range of work, they cannot retain that barrister unless they retain a junior barrister as well. This “two-counsel” rule, as it is commonly called, is the subject of a combination of rules of the New South Wales Bar Association.

9.5 Until 1966, another rule of the Association (the “two-thirds” rule) had the effect that where two counsel were briefed, it was a breach of the rule for the junior counsel to charge less than two-thirds of the senior counsel’s fees. That rule was rescinded in 1966. Since then, the rule has been that in general the junior must not mark a fee more than two-thirds of his or her leader.

II. Outline of Suggestions

Appointment to the Rank of Queen’s Counsel

9.6 We suggested in the Discussion Paper:

(i) that the Queen’s Counsel system should continue for the time being, but not necessarily in its present form;

(ii) that a non-practising barrister and solicitor should be eligible for appointment as Queen’s Counsel honoris causa if he or she has served the law with distinction in the academic field, or in the field of government, commerce, industry or the like;

(iii) that a practising barrister and solicitor should be eligible for appointment as Queen’s Counsel, whether or not he or she practises in the stvle of a barrister, or as a sole practitioner, or in a firm;

(iv) that the qualities required for appointment as Queen’s Counsel should be outstanding integrity, competence, and deep learning in the law;

(v) that, in making appointments, preference might be given to people who practise as advocates but provision should also be made for people who are of outstanding eminence in other fields of practice.

The Two-Counsel Rule

9.7 As to the two-counsel rule, we suggested that the rule should be replaced by a rule to the effect of the following:

(i) as to non-contentious work, a Queen’s Counsel should have an unfettered choice of undertaking the work with or without a junior;

(ii) as to appearance as an advocate, a Queen’s Counsel should be entitled to accept instructions in any matter, with or without a junior, but where, in the opinion of the Queen’s Counsel, the use of two counsel in the matter is not justified, he or she should either:

• refrain from making it a condition of his or her acceptance of the instructions that a junior also be instructed; or
• decline to accept the instructions;

(iii) as to contentious written work (pleadings, and other documents necessary for the conduct of litigation) the rule should be the same as for advocacy, save that if a Queen’s Counsel has agreed to appear in a matter as an advocate without a junior, he or she ought to be entitled to do the associated written work without a junior, but if the Queen’s Counsel is to appear in the matter with a junior, then he or she ought not do the associated written work without the involvement of a junior.

(iv) a Queen’s Counsel should not be entitled to assume that a junior counsel is also to be instructed unless it is so stated at the time of delivery of his or her instructions. If a Queen’s Counsel agrees to appear without a junior and subsequently decides that the use of a junior would be justified, it should be open to the Queen’s Counsel and the instructing solicitor to agree that a junior should be instructed.

We also suggested that, for the purposes of the rule, “junior” should include a person who practises in the style in which barristers now practise or a person who practises in any other style, whether as a partner in a firm, as a sole practitioner, or as an employed practitioner. Nothing in our suggestions with respect to the two-counsel rule was intended to have the effect that the “cab-rank” rule should oblige a Queen’s Counsel to appear without a junior counsel.

The Two-Thirds Rule

9.8 In addition, we outlined possible approaches to the matter of the fees which should be charged by junior counsel in cases where they appear with senior counsel.

A Different View

9.9 In Part 11 of the Discussion Paper, The Structure of the Profession, one of us, Mr Conacher, expressed reservations about some of the suggestions made in Part I of the Paper. In short, he said:

(i) that only practising barristers should be eligible for appointment as Queen’s Counsel; and

(ii) that, though he did not join in the suggestions with respect to the two-counsel rule, an attempt should be made to see whether further exceptions to the rule could be formulated so as to escape the occasional wastefulness of the present arrangements. ¹

III. Responses to the Discussion Paper

The Bar Association

9.10 In its reply to our Discussion Paper, the Bar Association said:

“The Bar is ... disappointed with the way the majority’s Report deals with Queen’s Counsel. To date, this title is synonymous in the public’s mind with eminence as a barrister. To use the title to honour solicitors or academics would take away the significance that it now has. This is not acknowledged as an objective. The Bar has no objection to senior solicitors or academics being given some special title, indeed, the title ‘Professor’ already fits the bill for the latter. If solicitors and academics want honorific titles, they should develop their own. Moreover, care must be taken to see that the position of silk is not eroded by unthinking tinkering with the two counsel rule. There may, perhaps, be some room for redefining the exceptions to the rule -this can be safely left to the joint working committee of the Bar and Law Society -but beyond this one is in danger of jeopardizing the Queen’s Counsel system which, as even the majority report suggests, works well.” ¹

The Law Society

9.11 The submission of the Law Society with respect to our Discussion Paper was to the effect of the following-.

(i) that, at the present time, the Society has no objection to the system of appointment of some barristers as Queen’s Counsel out of the ranks of eminent practising advocates;

(ii) that eligibility for appointment as Queen’s Counsel should be confined to practising barristers;

(iii) that it should be left to the instructing solicitor, his or her client, and the Queen’s Counsel concerned to determine in the particular circumstances of each case whether two or more counsel are in fact required; and

(iv) that a decision to retain junior counsel with a Queen’s Counsel should not be made for a client by an internal rule of the profession. ¹

Other Responses

9.12 The suggestions with respect to Queen’s Counsel evoked very few other responses from individuals or organisations. Newspaper comments, however, generally supported the suggestions made in Part I concerning the “two-counsel rule”.

Professional Attitudes Generally

9.13 Although the Bar Association, the Law Society, and some individual practitioners and judges, are opposed to many of the suggestions about Queen’s Counsel made in Part I of our Discussion Paper, it is, we think, necessary to note that the profession does not speak with one voice on these matters. As we said in that Part, Mr Justice Hutley of the Court of Appeal has spoken critically of the practice of confining the rank of Queen’s Counsel to persons in active practice. ¹ In England, the report of the Royal Commission on Legal Services (“the Benson Commission”) said that it could see no serious objection to the continuation of the practice in that Country of appointing some non-practising barristers as “QC honoris causa” for distinguished service to the law. ²

9.14 In the context of the two-counsel rule, the profession is clearly divided. As noted already, the Bar Association concedes that “there may, perhaps, be some room for redefining the exceptions to the rule”. This view is shared by at least Mr Conacher and Mr justice Needham of our Supreme Court. ¹ On the other hand, the Law Society wants the rule to be abolished. Two judges of the Court of Appeal, Mr Justice Glass and Mr Justice Samuels, have also spoken in favour of abolition. ² In England, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission recommended in 1976 that the two-counsel rule in that country be abolished and this was done in 1977. In 1979, the Benson Commission recommended that steps be taken to ensure that the abolition of the rule is observed. ³

B. THE ISSUES

1. Introduction

9.15 The main issues with respect to the Queen’s Counsel system in this State can be grouped under three heads, namely:

(i) the class of eligible appointees;

(ii) the two-counsel rule; and

(iii) the fees payable to junior counsel in two-counsel cases.

We consider these issues in the three following sections of this chapter. We do not consider the question whether the Queen’s Counsel system should be abolished. in this context, we recommend that the question should not be examined until other recommendations made in this Report are considered and, if implemented, their effects are evaluated.

II. Class of Eligible Appointees

9.16 For the purposes of this discussion we assume the implementation of the recommendation made earlier in this Report that separate admission should be abolished. Accordingly, we are speaking of people who have been admitted as barristers and solicitors, not as barristers or as solicitors.

9.17 The Bar Association says that, to date, the title of Queen’s Counsel is “synonymous in the public’s mind with eminence as a barrister”. ¹ In saying this the Association is clearly referring only to eminence as a practising barrister and it is equally clear that the Association would confine the class of eligible appointees to the people who comprise the small group of eminent practising barristers. The Law Society speaks in somewhat similar terms when it says that “the eminence that now attaches to the rank of Queen’s Counsel has been generated by those who have practised as advocates and therefore eligibility for the rank should be confined to practising barristers”. On this view, it seems that if the most eminent advocate in the State were a person practising in the style in which solicitors now practise, the Society would deny him or her eligibility for appointment as Queen’s Counsel.

9.18 Neither the Bar Association nor the Law Society has given detailed reasons for confining eligibility to practising barristers. On the other hand, Mr Conacher did so in Part II of The Structure of the Profession. His reasons are these:

(a) The rank gives to those within it a high standing both in the profession and in the community as a whole.

(b) The high standing has been earned by the barristers bearing that rank and those that have gone before them, and they have earned it by eminence in practice as barristers.

(c) The rank is not a mere rank of honour. It carries important practical consequences in the shape of risk of failure, limitation of work and higher fees. In this I believe it stands alone amongst ranks and dignities in the gift of the Crown.

(d) If a solicitor is appointed a Queen’s Counsel, what will be the practical consequences? I do not find any in chapter 8 [of Part I of The Structure of the Profession]. It would be an empty title, but drawing on the high reputation gained by those for whom it had substantial practical consequences.

(e) The position is the same for lawyers, whether barristers or solicitors, who have gained eminence in government service, in the academic world or elsewhere outside ordinary legal practice. An empty title drawing on the reputation gained by others.

For these reasons, the rank would not cast the same reputation on its bearers as it does today. The reputation would be spread more thinly to cover others who had taken no risk and for whom there were no practical consequences. In that sense the rank would be degraded. That would be so however eminent in their own fields the new class of appointees might be.” ¹

9.19 We do not consider that enlarging the class of eligible appointees is likely to degrade the rank of Queen’s Counsel. Whether this happened or did not happen, would depend on the number, and the quality, of the people appointed to the rank. If great numbers of less than eminent people were appointed, the rank would certainly be degraded. On the other hand, we think it unrealistic to suggest that the Executive Council would make so many, or so many unsuitable, appointments, that this would happen.

9.20 Likewise, we do not consider that the appointment of a person practising in the style of a solicitor would be without practical consequences. This is not the case in South Australia where some Queen’s Counsel are partners in firms of barristers and solicitors. These Queen’s Counsel do not, for example, accept instructions from a lay client without the intervention of another practitioner, except where the lay client is already a client of the firm and the work is work which a Queen’s Counsel might properly undertake. We do not say that a rule of this kind should be adopted here for Queen’s Counsel who are subject to governance by the Law Society Council. Rules, or conventions, appropriate to this State can be expected to develop in due course. We would expect moreover, that these Queen’s Counsel would not undertake work inappropriate to their new status. Also, we would expect that some fee scales would be amended to provide for higher fees for work done by them. These matters are, of course, now hypothetical. But we believe that it is highly unlikely that the appointment as Queen’s Counsel of a person practising in the style of a solicitor would be without practical consequences.

9.21 We are influenced by the fact that appointment as Queen’s Counsel in this State is not now confined to practising barristers who are eminent advocates. Appointment as Queen’s Counsel is sometimes made of practising barristers who are less than eminent advocates but who have nonetheless attained eminence for their deep learning in particular fields of law. We see no compelling reasons why a person with eminence of this kind should not be eligible for appointment as Queen’s Counsel, whether he or she practises in the style in which barristers now practise, or in any other style. This is particularly so if, as we have assumed in this chapter, in future all practitioners will be admitted as barristers and solicitors.

9.22 To this point, we have spoken of eligibility in the context of practitioners. We turn now to non-practitioners and to the notion of appointment as Queen’s Counsel honoris causa. We refer, in particular, to academic lawyers and to lawyers who use their legal knowledge and skills not in the practice of the law but in the course of their work for government, industry, commerce, and the like. If these people give distinguished service to the law, we think it right that they should not be denied public recognition of their service. The English concept of “QC honoris catisa” seems to us to be an appropriate form of recognition, and we adopt, in the context of New South Wales, the following words of the Benson Commission:

“In every year one or two people are appointed QC honoris causa. They are not practitioners, but have served the law with distinction, either in the public service or academic field, and are honoured accordingly by appointment to the rank of QC Because such appointments serve no practical purpose, practitioners sometimes call the QC honoris causa an ‘artificial silk’. But this does not indicate any serious objections to their appointment and we can see none. Organisations representing barristers in commerce, finance and industry suggested to us that more such appointments should be made from amongst their number. It is best that a professional appointment of this kind should be confined, as a general rule, to the purposes of practice, but we can see no reason why appointments honoris causa should be confined to one class or another. We observe only that, if such appointments are to be made, it should be for distinguished service to the law and not to any other field of endeavour. It may well be that barristers employed in commerce, finance and industry perform distinguished service for those purposes rather than for the purposes of the law. If this be so, their merit should be recognised in some other way. But if in the course of his work a salaried barrister performs distinguished service to the law, we see no reason why it should not be recognised by appointment to the rank of QC.” ¹

Recommendation

9.23 In short, we recommend as follows:

(1) For appointment as Queen’s Counsel, a practising barrister and solicitor should have at least the qualities of outstanding integrity and competence, and a deep learning in the law.

(2) Given these qualities, a practising barrister and solicitor should be eligible for appointment as Queen’s Counsel, whether or not he or she practises in the style in which barristers now practise or in some other style, and whether or not he or she practises as a sole practitioner or in a partnership of practitioners.

(3) In making appointments as Queen’s Counsel, special regard might be given to practising barristers and solicitors who are eminent advocates. This special regard should not, however, preclude the appointment as Queen’s Counsel of practising barristers and solicitors who are eminent in other fields of practice.

(4) A non-practising barrister and solicitor should be eligible for appointment as Queen’s Counsel honoris causa if he or she has served the law with distinction either in the academic field or in the field of public service, whether as a public servant or not.

III. The Two-Counsel Rule

9.24 Arguments for and against abolition of the existing two-counsel rule were given in Part I of The Structure of the Profession and it was suggested there that a new rule should be substituted for the existing rule. In considering the arguments for abolition of the existing,, rule, we commented on, amongst other things:

(i) its anti-competitive effect: it prevents competition between Queen’s Counsel and junior counsel in certain areas of work, for example, the drafting and settling of pleadings, and it prevents competition between Queen’s Counsel in the sense that, if it were not for the rule, some Queen’s counsel might well be prepared to appear without a junior and thereby gain a competitive advantage over other Queen’s Counsel who are not prepared to do the same;

(ii) its inappropriateness in many cases: there are many types of cases where it may be appropriate to instruct a Queen’s Counsel but inappropriate or unnecessary also to instruct a junior counsel, for example, quantum appeals in the Court of Appeal and appeals involving a pure question of law on which there is little authority which requires analysis.

In considering the arguments against abolition of the rule, we rejected, amongst other things, arguments based on:

(i) the threat that abolition would pose to the continued existence of the two-tier system of counsel;

(ii) the adverse effects on the training of junior barristers which would flow from abolition of the rule; and

(iii) the additional costs to litigants which might also flow from abolition of the rule.

9.25 The substance of our suggested new rule is stated in paragraph 9.6 above. It does not conform with the view of either the Bar Association or the Law Society. Contrary to the wishes of the Law Society, the question whether two counsel should be retained in a particular case would not be left entirely to agreement between the client, the solicitor, and the senior counsel; the question would still be governed by a professional rule. And, contrary to the wishes of the Bar Association, the rule would not say, in effect, that Queen’s Counsel may not appear without a junior counsel except in specified circumstances. The most significant change would be in the application of the new rule to a Queen’s Counsel’s appearance as an advocate. In short, if, in the opinion of the Queen’s Counsel, the use of two counsel was not justified, he or she should appear without a junior or decline to appear at all. In addition, the Queen’s Counsel would not be entitled to assume that a junior counsel would also be instructed.

9.26 We have reconsidered our suggested new rule in the light of the submissions we have received. It is, however, still our view that the advantage of the existing rule to the personal interests of the junior and senior Bar are far greater than the advantages to the public, and that its overall disadvantages outweigh its advantages. We still believe that a new rule should be substituted for the existing rule.

9.27 In saying this, we are not overlooking the suggestions made by Mr Conacher, the Bar Association, and others, that an attempt should be made to see whether further exceptions to the rule can be formulated. The Bar Association, for example, sees this task as being one for a joint working committee of the Bar and Law Society. As we have mentioned earlier, such a committee was established after the publication of our Discussion Paper, The Structure of the Profession. But, in our view, the rule has more disadvantages than advantages, and grafting some more exceptions on to it will not remedy its failings.

Recommendation

9.28 We recommend as follows:

(1) A new “two-counsel” rule should be adopted.

(2) In its application to appearances as an advocate, the rule should be that a Queen’s Counsel may accept instructions in any matter with or without a junior but where, in the opinion of the Queen’s Counsel, the use of two counsel in the matter is not justified, he or she should either:


(i) refrain from making it a condition of his or her acceptance of the instruction that a junior be instructed; or

(ii) decline to accept the instructions.


(3) In its application to contentious written work (pleadings, and other documents necessary for the conduct of litigation), the rule should, subject to one qualification, be the same as the rule stated in (2) above. The qualification is that if a Queen’s Counsel has agreed to appear in a matter as an advocate without a junior, he or she ought to be able to do the associated written work without a junior. If, however, the Queen’s Counsel is to appear in the matter with a junior, he or she ought not to do the associated written work without the involvement of the junior.

(4) In its application to non-contentious work, the rule should be that a Queen’s Counsel has an unfettered choice of undertaking the work with or without a junior.

(5) A Queen’s Counsel should not be entitled to assume that a junior counsel is also to be instructed unless it is so stated at the time of the delivery of the instructions to the Queen’s Counsel.

(6) For the purposes of this recommendation, “junior” includes a person who practises in the style in which barristers now practise, or a person who practises in some other style, whether in a partnership or otherwise. The identity and style of practice of the junior should be a matter for the client and the instructing practitioner. The junior could be also the instructing practitioner.

(7) Nothing in this recommendation is intended to have the effect that the “cab-rank” rule should oblige a Queen’s Counsel to appear without a junior.

“Junior Counsel”

9.29 As sub-paragraph (6) of the preceding paragraph indicates, where, in this context, we use the expression “junior counsel” we do not intend it to apply only to a person who practises in the manner in which barristers now practise. We mean that a junior may be a person who practises in the style in which barristers now practise or a person who practises in some other style, whether in a firm or elsewhere. In our view, the identity and style of practice of the junior should be a matter for the client and the instructing practitioner subject, of course, to the junior being appropriately qualified to appear in the forum in question. The junior could also be the instructing practitioner.

9.30 This view of “junior counsel” is not novel. In a submission to us, the Western Australian Bar Association said:

“In this State the junior is, as often as not, Counsel provided by the instructing Solicitor’s firm, and as often as not is the instructing Solicitor.

If one accepts the proposition that, generally speaking, a case sufficiently important to warrant the engagement of Queen’s Counsel warrants the use of two Counsel, and that in any event, the presence of a representative of the instructing Solicitor is necessary, one can see that the lay client’s interests are often best served by the instructing Solicitor acting as junior, a clerk being available as “runner” should one be required. The advantages are that the instructing solicitor acting as junior has a good knowledge of the case, has been involved in getting it up for trial, and generally speaking, in this State, is or should be a competent advocate. The complaint that a junior is often an expensive and non-productive luxury is thereby avoided, the Solicitor’s presence being necessary in any event. When a junior from the independent Bar is in fact engaged to assist Senior Counsel it is the decision of the Solicitor, acting in the best interests of his client, that he be so engaged, and the obvious conclusion is that the complexity and characteristics of the particular action require an independent junior. In practice, a junior from the Independent Bar is only engaged where it is considered by the Solicitor to be necessary...” ¹

The position in South Australia seems to be much the same as in Western Australia. Our survey in 1978 of the South Australian profession showed that in 95% of the occasions when two counsel appeared in the Supreme Court in 1977, the instructing practitioner, or a person from the same practice, acted as junior counsel.

IV. The Fees of junior Counsel when Appearing with Senior Counsel

9.31 As noted in paragraph 9.5, until 1966, the effect of the then relevant rule of the Bar Association was that it was a breach of the rule for a junior to charge less than two-thirds of the fee charged by his or her senior; since 1966, the effect of the present rule in the case of an unmarked brief, is that the junior must not, in general, charge more than two-thirds. In practice, according to taxing officers to whom we have spoken, the effect of the present rule seems to be little different from that of its predecessor.

9.32 There is, we believe, little need to demonstrate the undesirability of a practice with respect to unmarked briefs that one person receives a fixed proportion of another person’s fee, whatever the eminence of the other person, whatever the size of the fee, whether the first person assumes much or little responsibility, and whether the first person does a great deal of work, little work, or, perhaps, no work.

9.33 The convenience and ease of the proportional approach are clearly recognisable, but these considerations do not justify its general undesirability. The question is how best to formulate an appropriate rule. Possible approaches include the following:

(a) to amend the rule for the purpose of making it more specific: it might provide, for example, that where two counsel are instructed and the junior receives an unmarked brief, the junior shall mark such fee as he or she considers proper and reasonable having regard to:

(i) the work and responsibility which he or she foresees as being involved in the brief;

(ii) his or her standing at the Bar; and

(iii) all other circumstances except the standing of the senior counsel;


(b) to provide by rule of court that a tee marked by junior counsel in the circumstances outlined in (a) above may, on the application of the instructing practitioner, be taxed in the same manner as a solicitor and client bill may now be taxed; ¹ or

(c) to encourage the Law Society and Bar Association to embark upon a campaign of encouraging instructing practitioners to mark or agree junior’s fees in two-counsel cases and to encourage the Society to provide instructing practitioners, with advice and assistance in relation to such fees.

Approaches of this kind are not, of course, mutually exclusive.

9.34 The particular question of fees for junior counsel when appearing with senior counsel is part of the general question of legal costs and fees. It would, tor example, be difficult to justify adopting the second or third approaches outlined above, solely in relation to junior’s fees in two-counsel cases. Nonetheless the second approach has been considered in more detail earlier in this Report, ¹ and, if so minded, the Law Society and the Bar Association could pursue the third approach at any time.

Recommendation

9.35 We favour adoption of the first approach and we recommend as follows:

(1) Where two counsel are instructed and the junior receives an unmarked brief, the junior should mark such fee as he or she considers proper and reasonable having regard to:

(i) the work and responsibility which he or she foresees as being involved in the brief;

(ii) his or her standing as a practitioner; and

(iii) all other circumstances, except the standing of the senior counsel.


(2) The Law Society Council and the Bar Council should consider taking further steps to encourage instructing practitioners to mark or agree junior’s fees in two-counsel cases and to provide them with advice and assistance for that purpose.

Para.
9.9	1 See, generally, The Structure of the Profession, Part II, para. 12.5.
9.10	submission No.401 (“Reply to the Law Reform Commission’s paper on the Structure of the Profession”), pp.8-9.
9.11	1. Submission No.402 (“The Structure of the Profession”), pp.41-45.
9.13	1. The Structure of the Profession, Part I, p.258: and Submission No.90, p.18.
9.14	1. Mr Justice Needham, Submission No.33, p.3.
	2. Mr Justice Glass, Submission No.72, p.2; Mr Justice Samuels, Submission No.113, p.12.
	3. (1979, Cmnd.7648), para.33.86.
9.17	1. See para.9.10.
	2. Submission No.402, (“The Structure of the Profession”), pp.41-42.
9.18	1. The Structure of the Profession, Part II, para.12.5.
9.22	1. (1979, Cmnd.7648), para.33.92.
9.30	1. Submission No.146, p.6.
9.33	1. See paras.6.65-6.73.
9.34	1. Id.