PROVISIONAL PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
1. The period between the consent being given and the making of the adoption order should be more closely regulated by law; but the form of regulation should be flexible enough to facilitate the making of sound decisions in the wide variety of situations that adoption can involve.
2. There should be a preliminary hearing, which would occur early in the adoption planning process, and result in court orders authorising the arrangements which are intended to lead to adoption.
3. The adoption hearing should occur after a period during which all necessary arrangements, assessments and probationary periods have been completed, and the court should be asked to make the order of adoption.
4. The preliminary hearing should be required in all forms of adoption. The issues arising will to some extent vary from one form of adoption to another.
5. The adoption hearing should be similar to adoption hearings under the existing law. The court should have available to it the materials filed at the preliminary hearing, together with further information relating to events since that hearing. The judge who dealt with the preliminary hearing should also deal with the adoption hearing.
6. The court at the preliminary hearing should have a discretion to dispense with the need for a later adoption hearing and proceed to make final orders, if satisfied, in the particular circumstances of the case, that it would be in the interest of the child to do so.
7. Adoption jurisdiction should continue to be exercised by the Supreme Court.
POINTS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION
There should be mechanisms designed to ensure that in all cases the court is able to form an independent view of what the child’s welfare requires, and that, at least where children wish it, their voice will be heard. The Commission is also concerned that such measures should not impose unfair responsibilities on children, and that they should be cost-effective. It would welcome comment on what mechanisms would best meet these concerns.
PRELIMINARY MATTERS
The prohibition on informal or private adoption placements
5.1 Chapter 4 of this Paper considered one of the basic features of the Act, namely the prohibition of private placements for adoption. Except in the case of adoptions by parents and relatives and foster parents, adoptions are to be arranged only by the Department of Community Services or an authorised agency. For the reasons given in Chapter 4, the Commission’s provisional view is that this feature of the Act should be retained.
Legal responsibility for the child prior to the adoption order
5.2 A second basic feature of the present law is that once all necessary parental consents have been given (or dispensed with by court order), legal responsibility for the child is automatically transferred to the Director-General. (In practice, this means that the powers are given to officers of the Department of Community Services, because the Director-General delegates his or her powers to departmental officers.) This is as a result of s 34 of the Act, which provides, in substance, that on the giving of consent the Director-General is the sole guardian of the child. The Director-General normally retains such guardianship until the adoption order is made.1 It follows that the signing of consent has two quite distinct consequences. The first and most obvious is that it enables an adoption order to be made, normally after the revocation period of 30 days has elapsed. This aspect, and the general question of consent, will be considered in more detail in Chapter 7. The second consequence of giving consent is to transfer guardianship of the child to the Director-General, and this is the subject of the present discussion.
5.3 The practical result of the transfer of guardianship upon the signing of consents is that what happens to the child between the giving of consent and the making of the adoption order becomes a matter for the Director-General to decide. He or she has the legal power to determine, for example, whether the child remains with a birth parent, or is placed with temporary foster parents, or is placed with the proposed adoptive parents. As guardian, the Director-General can make decisions on such matters as whether there will be any sharing of information between the two families, or any contact between the child and a birth parent.
5.4 The legislation provides no rules or guidelines as to how the Director-General is to exercise his or her powers as guardian. The only form of supervision appears to be a provision that if the Director-General has remained guardian for one year, he or she must make a written report to the Court, which may, if it thinks fit, make orders for the care and control of the child; it may also order that the child remain under the Director-General’s guardianship for another year.2
5.5 The existing law, clearly enough, is highly convenient for the Department of Community Services. It means that departmental staff can control the arrangements for the child according to their prevailing policies, until the adoption order is made. Departmental officers can deal swiftly with any matters that arise during this period; not only matters relating to the placement of the child, but also problems such as a need to arrange for medical treatment. Despite these important practical advantages for the administration of adoption, there are reasons to reconsider the existing legal framework for the period between the giving of consent and the making of an adoption order.
5.6 In contrast to the wide powers of the Department, neither the child, the birth parents and/or adoptive parents have any significant legal powers during this period. From a legal point of view, when birth parents sign consent forms they place the child almost entirely in the control of the Department, their only real power being the power to revoke consent within the 30 day period. It may well be that as a matter of practice the Department exercises its power in a way that takes account of the wishes of the individuals involved, but there is no legal guarantee that this will happen.
5.7 A second consequence of the existing law is that the Court’s effectiveness is potentially undermined. Under the existing provisions, it would be possible for a child to be placed with proposed adopters immediately after consent has been given, but the adoption application delayed for up to one year without any form of external scrutiny. If an application was made towards the end of that period, the child might be so settled that the placement would be difficult to challenge. In the result, the court would be presented with something of a fait accompli. At the other extreme, the adoption application could be made very shortly after, or even before, the child has been placed with the proposed adopters. Similar flexibility applies to applications to dispense with consent. These could be made separately, before any adoption placement has been arranged, or at the time the adoption application comes before the court.
5.8 The law therefore gives the Director-General enormous power, and provides very little guidance as to the timing or sequence of the various steps associated with adoption applications. This extensive power is at the expense of the rights of the individuals involved, and, as one submission pointed out, creates the possibility, depending on what decisions are taken by the adoption authorities, that the Court will be little more than a “rubber stamp”.3 A contrast may be drawn with the child welfare area, in which there is considerable legal regulation of the power of the Department, which can intervene only if the child is “in need of care”, and must comply with a set of rules relating to such matters as the time within which the child must be brought before the Court.4
5.9 It may well be that the Department’s practice has avoided many of the potential difficulties arising from the present law. However it is one of the tasks of the present review to bring the law more into line with good practice. The Commission’s provisional view is that the period between the consent being given and the making of the adoption order should be more closely regulated by law; but the form of regulation should be flexible enough to facilitate the making of sound decisions in the wide variety of situations that adoption can involve. The following proposal is directed to this end. For present purposes we shall assume that the Supreme Court will retain jurisdiction in adoption; the question whether this should be so is discussed later in this Chapter.
A TWO-STAGE PROCESS
Legal regulation
5.10 The Commission’s tentative view is that the desired objectives of flexibility and legal regulation might be met by a two-stage court process. The first stage we shall call the “preliminary hearing”, and the second the “adoption hearing”. The preliminary hearing would occur early in the adoption planning process, and result in court orders authorising the arrangements which are intended to lead to adoption. We envisage that there would be a rule requiring a preliminary hearing within, say, one month after the giving of any necessary parental consents. Where consents have not been given, a preliminary hearing would be necessary to obtain orders dispensing with them. The adoption hearing would occur after a period during which all necessary arrangements, assessments and probationary periods have been completed, and the court would be asked to make the order of adoption. Any change in the regime established by the orders made at the preliminary hearing, prior to the adoption hearing, would require the authorisation of the court.
The preliminary hearing
5.11 The purpose of the preliminary hearing is to provide legal authority for the arrangements leading to the proposed adoption. Guardianship of the child will not be automatically transferred to the Director-General when consent is given for the adoption. Instead, the Court will have power at the preliminary hearing to make whatever orders are appropriate for the particular case. Such orders may include, for example:
- that custody of the child should be transferred to identified temporary foster parents for a prescribed period;
- that the child should be placed in the custody of the proposed adopters;
- that the birth parents, or other members of the birth family, should be provided with information or photographs, or should be allowed to visit the child;
- that until the adoption hearing the child should be known by certain names;
- that certain persons should be restrained from interfering with or contacting the child;
- that guardianship of the child should be transferred to the Director-General (or to other persons);
- that certain persons should be made parties to the process (eg by having the right to be served with documents, and to be heard in the adoption hearing, and to be involved in any further hearings prior to the adoption hearing); and
- that the consent of certain persons should be dispensed with.
5.12 It is envisaged that in the vast majority of cases the court will approve arrangements that have been previously worked out among the parties. There will be no need for a full hearing in such cases. An important role for the court, however, would be to ensure that the necessary people had been appropriately involved in the proceedings, and, for example, that any consents given by the parents or the child were freely given after appropriate counselling. If the court was not satisfied about such matters, it could, for example, adjourn the hearing while the unresolved issues were considered. Provision should be made for the independent representation of the child.
5.13 Such a hearing would have a number of potential advantages. It would involve judicial scrutiny at an early stage, and in cases where the adoption was not seen to be in the child’s interests, it would provide an opportunity to take other steps which would better promote the child’s welfare. In cases where the adoption plan is pursued - no doubt the majority - the hearing could have several benefits: it could involve orders which give appropriate security to the people having the child’s care, whether they are foster parents or the intending adopters; they would know that the orders made by the Court would remain in place unless set aside; and they would have the opportunity to participate in any proceedings seeking to change the arrangements. Further, the process itself would provide all parties with the opportunity to explain and clarify their position, and know that they had been given a fair hearing.
5.14 It is intended that this preliminary hearing would be required in all forms of adoption. The issues arising would to some extent vary from one form of adoption to another. In the case of infants, the focus would normally be on whether full and free consent had been given, the extent to which it is proposed that the adoption be “open”, and the suitability of the proposed adopters with regards to meeting the needs of the particular child. In the case of wards, the issues would often include a consideration of the child’s wishes and understanding of the proposal, and a comparison of the likely benefits of the various alternatives, such as foster care and adoption. In the case of special needs, the suitability of the proposed adopters to provide for the child’s particular special needs will be important, and also, perhaps, questions about possible financial or other support. In the case of inter-country adoptions, and local adoptions involving racial or ethnic issues, questions of cultural continuity would be of special concern.
5.15 The Commission has considered whether the preliminary hearing should be required only in some adoption applications. Its present view, however, is that in all cases there are important issues involving the legal status of the child and the child’s relationship with various family members, and that it is impossible to identify categories of adoption where there would be no need for a preliminary hearing. In particular, it would be wrong to confine preliminary hearings to contested matters, since it is especially important in uncontested cases that an independent body such as the court examines, at an early stage, whether the proposed arrangements are desirable. It is not only in contested matters that the needs of the child must be properly represented in the decision-making process.
The adoption hearing
5.16 The adoption hearing would be similar to adoption hearings under the existing law. The court would have available to it the materials filed at the preliminary hearing, together with further information relating to events since that hearing. The judge who dealt with the preliminary hearing should also deal with the adoption hearing. The court could deal with applications to dispense with consent which had not been determined at the preliminary hearing, and could, if there was fresh evidence, reconsider any dispensing orders made at the preliminary hearing.
Dispensing with two hearings in some cases
5.17 Although it does not seem possible to identify categories of cases where two hearings are not required, there might well be individual cases where having two hearings would involve unnecessary expense. The Commission therefore proposes that the Court at the preliminary hearing should have a discretion to dispense with the need for a later adoption hearing and proceed to make final orders, if satisfied, in the particular circumstances of the case, that it would be in the interests of the child to do so.
Independent representation at court hearings
5.18 The court’s role is to bring an independent and impartial approach to the decisions relating to the child. In contested cases, it will give the relevant parties the opportunity to be heard, and make a decision. Its role is more problematical in uncontested cases, especially at the preliminary hearing. Where agreement has been reached, in the absence of anyone raising possible difficulties or presenting contrary views, there is always a danger that approval by a court will involve very limited scrutiny. It is important that the court process involves substantial, not token, scrutiny.
5.19 It seems necessary, therefore, that some person or body quite unconnected with the adoption be available to draw the court’s attention to any difficulties, and to ensure that the court has examined all other alternatives.
5.20 A closely related issue, the subject of a number of submissions, is the representation of the children. As noted above, most submissions agreed with the position that the interests of the child should be the paramount consideration when devising adoption law and policy. The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides:
Article 12
1. States parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.
2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law.
5.21 Children’s rights to be heard in legal proceedings have been increasingly recognised in recent times. In criminal cases, there have been a number of reforms intended to increase the participation of child witnesses, especially in cases where they are alleged to have been the victims of abuse. In child welfare law, there are a number of provisions designed to ensure that children have a right to be heard, and they are usually represented, at least in metropolitan areas, through the legal aid system.
5.22 The Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) contains provisions to the effect that the wishes of children should be taken into account by the Court and given such weight as is appropriate in the light of their maturity and other circumstances. It also provides that children should not be required to express wishes. The Court can appoint a separate representative for the child. Such appointments are not uncommon, and are often made where child abuse is alleged, but they are funded through the legal aid system and are limited by resource considerations. In Family Court matters, children’s wishes are often conveyed to the Court in various ways, and most importantly through “family reports” normally prepared by members of the Court’s counselling staff.
5.23 By contrast, the Adoption of Children Act 1965 makes no provision for children’s wishes to be taken into account or for their separate representation. It does however include a provision that children over 12 years of age are normally required to consent to their own adoption.5 Further, the Act contains the remarkable provision that where the child is over 12 and the application is by persons who have brought up the child for five years before the application, the child’s consent is the only consent required.6 The question of consent is discussed in Chapter 7.
Views in submissions
5.24 Centacare and Barnardos indicated in their submissions that there should be greater opportunity for children to actively participate in court proceedings relating to adoption.7 The contrary view has been presented by the Country Women’s Association.8 The former have argued that the presence of the child in court at the time the adoption order is made is of special significance to the child, providing a ceremony by which the transfer of family membership and the commitment of the parties is recorded. This submission does not touch upon the more substantive issue of the involvement of the child in the selection of adoptive parents.
5.25 Several submissions identified the need for provisions relating to the input of the child to be maintained, or expanded. Centacare (Adoption Services), for example, recommended:
...that the child must always be consulted to ascertain their view on the intended adoption, commensurate with age and level of understanding, and from the age of 12 consultation with the child should be explicitly included in the legislation.9
5.26 The submission went so far as to suggest that the child be vested with a right to veto any adoption which he or she wished not to proceed. Separate representation should be made available to the child and that, in contested matters, such representation should be compulsory. The NSW Committee on Adoption have submitted that the child should have the status of a party to the adoption upon reaching the age of 14 years, while younger children should be represented by a guardian ad litem.10 It added that where a child of 12 years or older dissented from an adoption order of which he or she was the subject, the Court should require very good reasons for proceeding against those wishes.11
5.27 The issues raised are both familiar and difficult. On the one hand it is arguable that the child is in the best position to determine questions about his or her best interests. It would seem difficult to argue that in a process in which, theoretically, the child’s interests are paramount, the child was placed with unwanted adoptive parents simply because his or her views were not considered relevant or important. However, it is also arguable that a child, particularly a young child, may be ill-equipped emotionally and/or intellectually to make such decisions for his or herself. Further, it may be unfair to children to impose such a choice on them. This aspect underlies the provision of the Family Law Act preventing children from being required to express wishes, and the practice of the Family Court normally to refuse to allow children to be required to give evidence. There is also a danger that if children play a significant role in the decision-making process, they might be subjected to pressures from various family members to exercise their powers in particular ways, and so influence the decision in favour of a particular adult.
A new approach
5.28 What should the new adoption legislation provide in this area? One familiar approach is to give the court a discretionary power to appoint a representative for the child,12 but such appointments would be unlikely to be made in uncontested cases, and it is precisely in these cases that independent scrutiny is required.
5.29 A second approach is to appoint some person or body in a role analogous to that of counsel assisting a commission of inquiry. It is not necessary that such a person be a lawyer, but it is important that the person be truly independent. A social worker employed by another adoption agency would perhaps be inappropriate, because of the danger that he or she would tend to accept the assumptions of the agency involved. Ideally, perhaps the person should have a knowledge of adoption issues but would not have an association with adoption workers or agencies that was so close as to inhibit the person from making a truly independent contribution. It is a difficult question whether such a person should be regarded as the child’s representative.13 While the child’s welfare is the paramount consideration, the law should also ensure, for example, that birth parents’ consent is fully informed, and that necessary notice of the proceedings has been given to people concerned in the child’s life. It may be that the purpose to be served is somewhat wider than is suggested by the notion of a child’s representative.
5.30 A further issue is to what extent the person should feel obliged to present arguments in accordance with what the child wants, as distinct from what the person feels would be in the child’s interests.14
5.31 Another possible approach, which could be used in addition to or instead of separate representation, would be for an independent person to prepare a report for the Court, and that report would include material on the child’s wishes, feelings and perceptions.
5.32 The Commission’s present view is that there should be mechanisms designed to ensure that in all cases the Court is able to assist in forming an independent view of what the child’s welfare requires, and that, at least where children wish it, their voice will be heard. The Commission is also concerned that such measures should not impose unfair responsibilities on children, and that they should be cost-effective. It would welcome comment on what mechanisms would best meet these concerns.
WHICH COURT OR BODY?
5.33 In 1976, the McLelland Committee recommended that jurisdiction in adoption be exercised by a tribunal rather than the Supreme Court.15 It argued that this conclusion flowed from an acceptance of the premise that no person has a right to another person’s child, and the consequent need to assess applicants’ suitability for children. It wrote that the court was “no longer the ideal forum for determining adoption issues” because a multi-disciplinary approach was required because “judgments of social issues with their behavioural nuances are best freed from the adversary system”, and because:
the wider implications of adoption lend themselves to a continual up-dating of adoption practice. It is, therefore, appropriate that those involved in the practice of adoption should also be involved in the decision-making process, not only in relation to individual cases but also in the determination and the refinement of criteria.
5.34 An amending bill was subsequently presented to Parliament. It would have given adoption jurisdiction to a tribunal, but would not have given the tribunal the policy-setting role envisaged by the McLelland Committee. While there was considerable support at the time for a tribunal, the specific terms of the bill received a mixed press, and it never became law.16
5.35 The creation of a tribunal was strongly supported by the submission of the NSW Committee on Adoption (COA).17 The Submission makes the following comments about the Supreme Court:
5.36 The proposed tribunal would be presided over by a legal practitioner and including members of other relevant professions. Like the McLelland Committee in 1976, the COA recommends giving the tribunal a wider role than the Supreme Court has now:
The functions of the Tribunal would be to
i oversight (sic) consent taking and placement decisions.
ii make placement orders approving the placement of a child for the purposes of adoption prior to the making of an adoption order.
iii consider dispensation of parental consent prior to selection of suitable adoptive parents and make freeing orders
iv make final orders of adoption
v consider and determine appeals against refusal by the Director-General or the Principal Officer of a private adoption agency to approve applications for suitability to adopt
vi consider and determine appeals against revocation by the Director-General of the licence of a private adoption agency
vii provide general monitoring of adoption practice in both private agencies and in the Department of Community Services
viii dispense with the need for 2 hearings in some circumstances.
5.37 The COA submission also recommends that the tribunal would employ independent caseworkers who would makes assessments and reports on various matters. These include the extent to which the birth parent(s) had been offered appropriate information, and had freely consented, and (where appropriate) the wishes of the child.
5.38 Some of the COA proposals, such as the legal representation of the child, and the idea of an early hearing to authorise the placement, could be implemented without substituting a tribunal for the Court.
5.39 The question whether a tribunal should replace the Supreme Court raises a number of important issues, mentioned in the following paragraphs, on which the Commission would welcome comments.
Advantages of a tribunal
5.40 There might well be advantages in having orders made by a body with expertise in adoption. However, while different views may be taken of the merits of particular decisions, the Commission is not aware of any evidence to support the suggestion that a tribunal would be more likely than the Court to consider the issues from the perspective of the child, at least where the same procedures, such as having the child represented, were involved.
5.41 The Commission would appreciate further comment on the desirability of combining policy-making and adjudication in one body. It is desirable, of course, that the best available professional advice be used in developing adoption practice and policy, but this could perhaps be achieved in other ways than by giving jurisdiction to a tribunal. Under the present system, through departmental staff and staff of adoption agencies, and through the NSW Committee on Adoption, practice is developed under the influence of professional and expert opinion, and it is not obvious that the results would necessarily be better if there were to be a tribunal.
Disadvantages of a tribunal
5.42 While a tribunal might have the advantage of expertise, it might have disadvantages too. Specialist tribunals may lack the independence of courts, and may be subjected to pressure to conform to the prevailing wisdom, or the wishes of the government of the day. They may also be more vulnerable than a court to the criticism that they embrace a particular theory or approach in areas where there are competing theories. Adoption involves wide-ranging consequences for all those involved, and a very significant alteration of the legal status of individuals. Courts, while lacking specific expertise, are characterised by independence and a preoccupation with procedural fairness. It is arguable that these are important qualities in adoption, and that the most satisfactory system is one in which the final decisions are made by such bodies, having the benefit of expertise in the form of reports and evidence from adoption agencies.
The Commission’s view
5.43 The question whether jurisdiction in adoption should be exercised by a court or a tribunal turns partly on a more general question of assessing the relative importance of independence and expertise. It cannot be said that either view has clearly prevailed in New South Wales. Although power to alter people’s legal status is generally reserved for courts, in some areas, such as guardianship, special tribunals have been established. There appears to be no satisfactory evidence about the relative performance of courts and tribunals in adoption. The Commission’s provisional view is that there is no obviously “correct” answer to the choice between a court and a tribunal. There are arguments each way.
5.44 Finally, it is possible that the respective merits of the Court and a tribunal may depend on the nature of the proceedings. For example, it might be desirable for a tribunal to deal with uncontested cases - the vast majority - but for the Supreme Court to deal with contested cases. Another approach attempting to combine the best of both systems would be to provide for an appeal, by way of full rehearing, to the Supreme Court; such an appeal could be instituted by any of the parties, or by the child’s representative.
5.45 Assuming that jurisdiction is to be exercised by a court, it would be possible to provide in the legislation for such jurisdiction to be exercised by the Family Court of Australia, or by the Supreme Court, or by the children’s court. Investing the Family Court of Australia with adoption jurisdiction would involve State-federal issues which are discussed elsewhere.18 Although some jurisdictions have allowed inferior courts to exercise jurisdiction in adoption,19 the Commission has received no submission suggesting that this approach should be followed in New South Wales, and is inclined at this stage to recommend that adoption jurisdiction should continue to be exercised by the Supreme Court.
APPEALS AND REVIEW
5.46 In the Issues Paper, we raised questions about the most appropriate forms for appeals and review in adoption. Centacare has submitted that the individual adoption agencies should provide a system of appeal for those prospective adoptive parents who are unsuccessful in their application.20 Further, the Department of Community Services ‘Appeals and Complaints Mechanism’ was in an appropriate position to be the final stage in the appeal process.21 If the proposals in this Chapter are accepted, these issues will become less urgent, since much of the decision-making power will be transferred from the Department to the Court, especially in the preliminary hearing. In relation to questions that arise between the giving of consent and the final disposition of the case, the individuals involved will be able to have their say, both at the preliminary hearing and at the final hearing. There will be an appeal from the judge to the Court of Appeal, on usual principles. Those principles, very briefly stated, are that the Court of Appeal will set aside an appeal from a judge exercising discretionary powers where there has been some clear error of fact or law; the Court of Appeal does not allow an appeal merely because, had it been hearing the original proceedings, the appeal judges would have preferred a different result.
FOOTNOTES
1. The Director-General’s guardianship may also cease where consent is revoked, where the court makes an order, where the Director-General decides to place the child in the care of a parent or other person, where the Director-General relinquishes guardianship, and where the child becomes a ward under the Children (Care and Protection) Act 1987: s 34(5).
2. Adoption of Children Act 1965 (NSW) s 34(3) and (4).
3. The New South Wales Committee on Adoption Submission (9 September, 1993), at 30.
4. Children (Care and Protection) Act NSW (1987).
5. Section 33.
6. Section 26(4A).
7. Barnardos Australia Submission (6 September 1993) at 12.
8. Country Women’s Association of New South Wales Submission (23 June 1993) at 2.
9. Centacare (Adoption Services) Submission (31 August 1993) at 13.
10. NSW Committee on Adoption Inc Submission (9 September 1993) at 40.
11. NSW Committee on Adoption Inc Submission (9 September 1993) at 40.
12. As in the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 65.
13. This was recommended in the Western Australian Review, Adoption Legislative Review Committee, A New Approach to Adoption: Final Report, (February 1991), recommendation 15 at 22.
14. This is a familiar and difficult issue in relation to Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 65. See, for example, Family Law Council, Representation of Children in Family Law Proceedings (AGPS, 1989); In the Marriage of Bennett (1991) 14 Fam LR 397; Separate Representative v JHE and GAW (1993) 16 Fam LR 485.
15. Adoption Legislation: Report of the Review Committee (Department of Youth, Ethnic and Community Affairs, Sydney, 1976), at 9-11.
16. Review of Adoption Policy and Practice, NSW, Report (Marshall Report), 1984, at 134-5; R Chisholm, “The end of Uniformity: New Adoption Laws for NSW” 5(2) Legal Service Bulletin 1980 at 49-50.
17. New South Wales Committee on Adoption Submission (9 September, 1993), at 30-33.
18. See below, Chapter 14.
19. See, for example, Adoption Act 1984 (Vic) s 6 (County Court).
20. Centacare (Adoption Services) Submission (31 August 1993) at 14.
21. Centacare (Adoption Service) Submission) (31 August 1993) at 140.
