THE LAW OF HOMICIDE IN NEW SOUTH WALES

Brief history

2.1 Current New South Wales law draws a statutory distinction between murder and manslaughter.¹ Although the exact division is slightly different, it reflects the traditional common law distinction which began to emerge sometime in the fifteenth century.

2.2 The earliest law of unlawful homicide covered all killings other than those caused in the enforcement of justice. This meant that even accidental killings or those committed in self-defence were unlawful, although a Royal Pardon was available in such cases. Sir Owen Dixon has described the state of the law of homicide in the fourteenth century in this way:

The distinction between murder and manslaughter has not yet emerged. All homicide is criminal unless it is justifiable as something akin to the execution of justice. Every killing is a felony involving loss of life or member, unless it is excusable as done per infortunium [by accident] or se defendendo [in self-defence]. These must be specially found, and when specially found do not entitle the prisoner to acquittal, but only to a pardon.²

2.3 The root of the murder/manslaughter distinction lay in the distinction between offences which attracted the benefit of clergy and those which did not. This benefit, which allowed the Church a right to try and sentence its own clergy, became available to anyone who could feign literacy by reciting a particular psalm. The Church would not pass a “judgment of blood” and thus the significance of claiming the benefit of clergy was that it shielded the claimant from capital punishment. The usual sentence imposed for a “clergyable” felony was a branding on the hand and imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year.³ This led to the situation that:

he who was convicted of felonious homicide might suffer death, or he might escape with branding and a short term of imprisonment. Whether the penalty in a particular case was one or the other depended, not on the circumstances of the killing, but solely upon the qualifications of the slayer.⁴

2.4 From the end of the fifteenth century to the middle of the sixteenth, a series of statutes were passed which denied the benefit of clergy to certain felonies. One such category comprised homicides committed with “malice aforethought”. The effect of these statutes was to impose a capital punishment on homicides committed with a particular type of mental state⁵ - these offences were called “murder”. Thus the legal significance of the mental state of “malice aforethought” was one that was reflected in terms of sentence - it meant that the felony could be punished by death. Homicide without the requisite malice - designated “manslaughter” - remained a “clergyable” offence. It has been said, therefore, that:

it was the general expansion of benefit of clergy, together with statutes that withdrew certain specific offences from its protecting influence, that drew the line between murder and manslaughter.⁶

2.5 Thus, from the beginning of the sixteenth century, the main concern of the law of homicide has been with attempting to draw this distinction and consequently with the nature of “malice aforethought”. It has been stressed that:

the difference between murder and manslaughter was not the difference between two distinct felonies, but the difference between two descriptions of the one felony. They were differentiated only because the consequences of a conviction had, by statute, ceased to be the same.⁷

The nature of murder and manslaughter as merely degrees of the one offence of homicide continues to be reflected in the fact that, despite the general common law rule that prevents conviction for one felony on the charge of another, the defendant can be convicted of manslaughter if he or she was indicted for murder.⁸

Categories of homicide: murder and manslaughter

2.6 In New South Wales, as at common law, unlawful homicide is divided into two categories: murder and manslaughter.⁹ The differences in law between murder and manslaughter are quite intricate and technical. They reflect the:

very gradual evolution ... from an almost exclusive concern with the external act which occasioned death to a primary concern with the mind of the man who did the act.¹⁰

Murder

2.7 In order for a charge of murder to be made out in New South Wales, the prosecution must prove that the defendant has caused the death of a human being and that, at the time the conduct occurred, the defendant acted with the requisite mental state. Under s 18(1)(a) of the Crimes Act, this mental state involves either:

• the intention to kill; or
• the intention to inflict grievous bodily harm. The relevant type of harm here is bodily harm of a “really serious kind”¹¹; or
• reckless indifference to human life. This has been held to mean having foresight of the probability of death resulting.¹² In New South Wales, foresight of the probability of grievous bodily harm or the possibility of death resulting is not sufficient to constitute murder.

2.8 In addition, a killing done in an attempt to commit or during or immediately after the commission of a crime punishable by imprisonment for life or 25 years will also constitute murder.¹³ This is a form of constructive murder known as “felony murder”. The range of relevant offences is now very small and includes offences such as wounding with intent to resist arrest and wounding during robbery.

Manslaughter

2.9 The crime of manslaughter is largely an accumulation of residual categories of homicide - that is, unlawful killings which fall short of the requirements for murder although the actus reus is, of course, the same. Manslaughter falls into two categories which reflect the ways in which it may be differentiated from murder. The first category is where the mental element is the same as that for murder, but the conviction is reduced to manslaughter by reason of certain mitigating factors involved in the commission of the offence which are thought to reduce the actor’s moral culpability. These factors are provocation, diminished responsibility and infanticide. This category of murder, known as “voluntary manslaughter”, deals with the partial defences and is discussed in detail in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.

2.10 The second category of manslaughter is comprised of unlawful killings where the mental element of the offence is insufficient to constitute murder. This category is known as “involuntary manslaughter” and involves two main sub-categories. The following have been held sufficient to constitute involuntary manslaughter:

• A killing resulting from an unlawful and dangerous act. In Wilson,¹⁴ the High Court held (by majority) that the act must, as well as being unlawful, be dangerous in the sense of involving an appreciable risk of serious injury. In the same case, the Court held that the category of “battery manslaughter” or manslaughter by the intentional infliction of some harm is not a category of involuntary manslaughter at common law.
• A killing resulting from criminal negligence. The essence of this type of manslaughter is a great falling short of the standard of care required of an ordinary person. The conduct must involve “such high risk that death or grievous bodily harm would follow that the doing of the act merited criminal punishment”.¹⁵ The types of conduct which may amount to criminal negligence have been said to be “infinitely variable”¹⁶ and it is not yet entirely clear what degree of risk is required.

Other unlawful killings

2.11 Finally, there are a number of situations in which an unlawful killing has occurred which does not amount to either murder or manslaughter. For example, s 52A of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) provides for a statutory offence of culpable driving where the death or grievous bodily harm of a person is caused by a car driven by an intoxicated person or driven at a speed or in a manner dangerous to the public. The offence was created because of the perception that juries were reluctant to convict of the more serious offence of manslaughter.¹⁷ The penalty for culpable driving causing death is five years imprisonment.

Sentencing for homicide

2.12 Until 1955 there was a mandatory death penalty for murder in New South Wales.¹⁸ This meant that following a conviction for murder, the trial judge had no choice but to impose the death penalty although it could be commuted by Executive Pardon. Between 1955 and 1982 the penalty for murder in this State was a mandatory life sentence. The consequence of this was that where a verdict of murder was returned by the jury, the judge was bound to impose a life sentence for murder. No distinction could be drawn between, for example, a revenge killing and a “mercy killing” and no mitigating factors such as age or mental condition could be taken into account. In practice, however, people sentenced to “life” did not actually remain in gaol for the term of their natural life and were released on parole after an average of about fourteen years.¹⁹

2.13 By way of contrast, the penalty for manslaughter was (and, historically, has always been) discretionary and the sentencing judge could impose any sentence up to life imprisonment which fitted the crime, taking into account any mitigating factors. In New South Wales, the maximum penalty for manslaughter is now 25 years.²⁰ In many ways this difference is the rationale for the partial defences to murder. In some circumstances - where the defendant lost self-control or where he or she suffered from some abnormality of mind - there was considered to be a reduced level of culpability which should be reflected in the punishment imposed. The partial defences operated to reduce the conviction from murder to manslaughter, thus allowing the sentencing judge a discretion to impose an appropriate sentence.

2.14 The Crimes (Homicide) Amendment Act 1982 (NSW) abolished the mandatory life sentence for murder and conferred a qualified discretion on the sentencing judge. It enabled the judge to impose a lesser sentence than life if it appeared that the defendant’s culpability was “significantly diminished by mitigating circumstances”.²¹ Although indeterminate “life” sentences were often imposed, prisoners could be released on parole after serving some portion of their sentence. This situation changed in 1989 when the Sentencing Act 1989 (NSW) came into effect. The core of that legislation requires the sentencer to impose a minimum period of imprisonment to which a one-third addition is normally (in the absence of “special circumstances”) added by way of a parole period.²² Under the new regime, remissions for good behaviour are abolished.

2.15 Also in 1989, s 19A of the Crimes Act replaced the former s 19.²³ The new section provided that a person sentenced to life for murder is to remain in gaol for the term of his or her natural life. It also gave judges a wider sentencing discretion for murder, removing the need to find that the defendant’s culpability was affected by mitigating circumstances before a sentence of life could be displaced. It also should be noted that it is now possible for prisoners sentenced to an indeterminate life sentence before 1989 to apply to the Supreme Court to be resentenced for a determinate period.²⁴ The purpose of this procedure is to attempt to approximate the situation of prisoners sentenced under the former law to those sentenced under s 19A.

2.16 The effect of these reforms is that there is now a discretionary sentence for murder, with the maximum penalty being life imprisonment. A sentence of life imprisonment means that the prisoner will spend the rest of his or her natural life in gaol. In practice, such sentences are extremely rare and are reserved for the “worst cases” of murder. There is also, as there has always been, a discretionary sentence for manslaughter. As mentioned above, the maximum penalty for that offence is now 25 years.

REFORMING THE LAW OF HOMICIDE IN NEW SOUTH WALES

Introduction

2.17 It is sometimes suggested that, because there is a discretionary penalty for murder in New South Wales, the partial defences have become redundant. This is because the original principal rationale - to allow flexibility in sentencing - has disappeared. The major argument in favour of retention of the partial defences is that the word “murder” carries powerfully condemnatory connotations and that the effect of “labelling” as a murderer a person who kills under circumstances of diminished responsibility or provocation or who commits infanticide cannot be discounted. It is said that the community does recognise differing levels of culpability for unlawful killings and is acutely aware of the difference between a murderer and a manslaughterer. It is therefore inadequate to reflect this difference purely in terms of sentence.²⁵

2.18 There are three ways to deal with this question of “labelling”. The first is a suggestion that the argument itself is less than compelling:

• It may been noted, for example, that an intentional killing, albeit one committed under provocation or in circumstances where the defence of diminished responsibility is applicable, is indeed “murder”.
• The issue of labelling may well be a sidetrack with few practical consequences. It can be argued that the distinction is not well understood by the public and is not regarded by the community as being important.
• It is also probably true that the public will attach their own labels, regardless of the legal classification. Thus it has been noted that while the offence of “rape” has been replaced with a number of graded offences of sexual assault, the community still refers to those convicted of sexual assault as “rapists”.
• The argument that there is something “special” about homicide because it has uniquely irreversible consequences and that it is therefore imperative that the moral condemnation associated with the word “murder” be retained, is not compelling. While our society does place a very high value on human life, if the condemnation attaches because of the fact of death, then it attaches to the word “killer” or “homicide offender” as much as it does to the word “murderer”.
• Finally it may be argued that the time and expense involved in running complicated defences simply to avoid the stigma of a murder conviction is unwarranted.

2.19 The second way to deal with the “labelling” argument is by the introduction of a verdict of “murder with extenuating circumstances” to deal with cases which would now reduce murder to manslaughter. Thus a defendant who now would be convicted of manslaughter because he or she killed under provocation would be convicted of “murder with extenuating circumstances” and sentenced under s 19A of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW).

One category of homicide?

2.20 The final alternative is the introduction of a new overall category of “culpable homicide” or “unlawful homicide”. It would then be possible to differentiate between different types of killing and different levels of culpability in terms of sentence without the stigma of a “murder” conviction. The issue was raised by Lord Kilbrandon in Hyam v DPP in this oft-quoted passage:

It is not so easy to feel satisfaction at the doubts and difficulties which seem to surround the crime of murder and the distinguishing from it of the crime of manslaughter. There is something wrong when crimes of such gravity, and I will say of such familiarity, call for the display of so formidable a degree of forensic and judicial learning ... I believe this is to show that a more radical look at the problem is called for ... There does not appear to be any good reason why the crimes of murder and manslaughter should not both be abolished, and the single crime of unlawful homicide substituted; one case will differ from another in gravity, and that can be taken care of by variation of sentences downwards from life imprisonment.²⁶

2.21 In 1976, the New Zealand Criminal Law Reform Committee²⁷ recommended that there be a single offence of unlawful homicide to cover what is now murder and manslaughter by reason of provocation²⁸ and that provocation be only relevant with respect to sentence. It also recommended that “constructive manslaughter” (or involuntary manslaughter, including unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter and criminal negligence) be abolished and replaced with general offences proscribing conduct intended to cause grievous bodily harm or some lesser injury or conduct likely to cause such harm or done with a reckless disregard for the safety of the public. These offences would be committed regardless of whether death (or, indeed, any harm) resulted from the conduct. Only the potential harm of the defendant’s conduct would be relevant.

2.22 In 1989 these recommendations were incorporated into the draft Crimes Bill. The Bill was subjected to a great deal of criticism and was eventually sent for further consultation. In 1991 the Crimes Consultative Committee published its report.²⁹ It recommended that the traditional murder terminology be retained instead of the phrase “culpable homicide” but thought that the abolition of provocation as a partial defence was the correct approach. However, the Committee felt that the endangerment provisions were not appropriately applied to conduct causing death and recommended a revised manslaughter provision under the rubric of “culpable homicide”. In addition, an offence of negligently causing death was recommended. These recommendations in effect reinstate the murder/manslaughter distinction, with conduct that was formerly provocation now amounting to murder. It was also recommended that the mandatory life sentence for murder be abolished.

Implementation of one category of homicide

2.23 Although the abolition of the murder/manslaughter distinction has often been suggested, there is a dearth of material exploring how this might actually work in practice. While it is expected that a greater number of people would plead guilty to “unlawful homicide” and proceed directly to sentence, homicide trials would still be run, for example, in the following circumstances:

• Where the defendant alleges that one of the elements of the actus reus of the offence is not present. Thus, for example, the defendant might argue that he or she did not do the act or omission leading to the death at all (in the case of alibi) or that the act or omission did not cause the death.
• Where the defendant alleges that he or she did the act or omission leading to the death accidentally or that his or her act was not voluntary.
• Where the killing was alleged to be justifiable; that is, where the defences of self-defence or duress are applicable.
• Where the defendant pleads not guilty (that is, he or she should be excused from criminal liability) on the basis of mental illness.

2.24 One problem is to work out what the relevant mental element for “unlawful homicide” would be; that is, what the jury would have to find in order to convict a defendant of this offence. Detailed consideration of the precise drafting of such an offence is unnecessary at this stage, but a number of preliminary suggestions may be made:

1. The mens rea for the new offence of “unlawful homicide” could be defined to include all of the current mental elements for both murder and involuntary manslaughter. Given the fact that one of the problems with the retention of the current distinction is the highly technical nature of these elements and the unclear lines between them, this is not a compelling option. If the jury had to be instructed to consider whether the mental state of the defendant came within one of the many existing categories, little would have been saved in terms of time and cost and trials would not be significantly simplified.
2. “Unlawful homicide” could be defined negatively. For example, it could be said that any killing of a human being caused by the voluntary act of the defendant and committed with some state of mind above a threshold level of, for example, criminal negligence, would be unlawful homicide. (Exculpatory defences such as self-defence would still be available.)
3. “Unlawful homicide” could be defined positively after a reconsideration of the current elements of murder and manslaughter. This is similar to suggestion 1 above, except that it provides the opportunity to rethink the boundaries of the offence of “unlawful homicide” without regard to the existing categories which developed in the common law of murder and manslaughter. For example, thought might be given to whether culpable negligence should be included within this offence, or should constitute a separate offence, or perhaps be aggregated with other existing offences (such as culpable driving).
4. The approach suggested by the New Zealand Criminal Law Reform Committee could be adopted. This would involve abolishing the partial defences and incorporating what is now murder and the category of voluntary manslaughter into one category of “unlawful homicide”. The category of involuntary manslaughter would be abolished and replaced with general endangerment provisions in which the actual harm caused would be irrelevant to liability.

OPTION FOR REFORM

Threshold Option: Abolish the murder/manslaughter distinction in favour of one overall category of unlawful homicide.

This option is theoretically a “threshold” one: if it is favoured there is no actual need to consider the substantive elements of the partial defences. It must, however, be stressed again that even if the Threshold Option is preferred, the Commission remains interested in hearing views on provocation, diminished responsibility and infanticide in order to formulate recommendations regarding these partial defences in the event that the Threshold Option is not recommended.

Some arguments for one category of homicide³⁰

2.25 Historical argument. There is no logical reason why the historical line between murder and manslaughter should continue to be drawn. The current distinction arose in the context of the specific “device” of the benefit of clergy and was clearly concerned with the need to make a differentiation in terms of penalty. In a jurisdiction with a discretionary sentence for both murder and manslaughter this distinction is no longer necessary as different levels of culpability are already given effect to in terms of sentence.

2.26 The criminal law should make distinctions on the basis of logic, reason and fairness: the existence of an entrenched, historical distinction is not sufficient. The sentencing process can make finer and more appropriate distinctions.

2.27 Difficulty of making murder/manslaughter distinction. The line between murder and manslaughter is often extremely difficult to draw. For example, a person who causes death and foresees that his or her act will probably cause death will be guilty of murder while a person who foresees that his or her act will possibly cause death will be guilty of manslaughter. This is a highly technical distinction since the line between possibility and probability may be very fine and the distinction may well not be reflected in differences in the actual culpability of the two acts.

2.28 The existing categories of murder and manslaughter represent a clumsy way to assign moral culpability and involve significant overlaps and anomalies. For example, euthanasia or “mercy killing” may amount to murder at law, while killing in a jealous rage may well amount to manslaughter at law, yet these results probably would not accord with generally accepted social understandings about moral responsibility.

2.29 The argument that it is important to retain the moral condemnation of the word “murder” (see below) would have force if it were a straightforward matter to decide to whom the condemnatory label of “murderer” was to be applied. This has, however, proved exceedingly difficult to do - there is no bright moral or legal line between a murderer and a manslaughterer. To make the distinction, a complex, time consuming and expensive jury trial is required. In this context it might be worth dropping the term “murder” from our legal vocabulary.

2.30 Time and cost savings. There will be more guilty pleas (in those cases in which the defendant would have contested murder but pleaded guilty to manslaughter) and this will save considerable time and expense as matters now being decided in the trial context would be decided at the sentencing stage.

Some arguments against one category of homicide³¹

2.31 Retention of label of “murderer”. It is important to retain the moral condemnation that is associated with the label “murderer”. In 1982 when the New South Wales Government rejected the amalgamation of the categories it was stated in Parliament that:

The unlawful homicide approach was rejected precisely because it would have removed from the statute books an ancient and powerful word, widely understood by the public, carrying the strongest possible overtones of moral condemnation. In our culture, to described someone as a murderer is to employ the most bitterly and effectively stigmatizing epithet available in our language. To remove that term from the law would be to risk possible public misapprehension, and to invite criticism - rightly or wrongly - that the moral force of the law was being lessened.³²

2.32 Historical argument. There is a well established historical distinction, stemming from at least the fifteenth century for a difference between murder and manslaughter. The distinction is now firmly entrenched in the common law. Whatever the original rationale for the distinction, the terms “murder” and “manslaughter” have not only become part of the law of this State but form part of the community’s understanding of the crime of homicide. To abolish the distinction would result in a gap between the law and the community’s perception of it. This is unacceptable in relation to a crime as fundamental as homicide.

2.33 The role of the jury. The present law involves the jury in making decisions relating to levels of culpability and a move towards a single category of homicide would shift this role to the sentencer, that is, the trial judge. This is an incursion upon the jury’s traditional function. The question that the community must answer is whether we want the jury, as our representatives, to draw the distinction between murder and manslaughter or whether we are content to pass the task on to the sentencing judge.

2.34 The inadequacy of the sentencing process. The shift away from the jury places a great deal of faith in the complex, difficult and highly discretionary sentencing process.³³ The fact finding mission that a sentencing judge undertakes is less rigorous than one in the context of a trial and, in particular, does not incorporate those protections that are given to the accused at trial. A trial is a far more open process and one in which community values are able to be reflected. This may be particularly important in domestic homicides where it is crucial that the killing is adequately placed in context. It might be added that a move towards sentencing also places a great deal of faith in the ability of the judiciary to make value judgments on questions of degree, credibility and reasonableness, especially where issues of race and gender are involved. As the Victorian Law Reform Commission has recently pointed out:

It may be that judges are as, or more, susceptible to gender and ethnicity bias as juries. At least the sexes are more evenly represented in juries than they are on the Supreme Court.³⁴

2.35 Because appellate courts are usually reluctant to interfere with the findings of fact of a sentencing judge, issues which are now relevant to the partial defences would be less open to appellate scrutiny if they became relevant only in the sentencing arena.

2.36 The “unlawful homicide” approach could lead to higher sentences. This is because there would be no “tariff” for murder and manslaughter and thus no “peg” on which to justify a lower sentence.³⁵

1. Section 18(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) sets out the requirements for murder and s 18(1)(b) provides that every punishable homicide other than murder is manslaughter.

2. Sir Owen Dixon “The Development of the Law of Homicide” (1935) 9 Australian Law Journal Supplement 64 at 65.

3. R Perkins “A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought” (1934) Yale Law Journal 537 at 541.

4. Perkins at 541-2.

5. Dixon at 66.

6. Perkins at 542.

7. Dixon at 66. Emphasis added.

8. B Fisse Howard’s Criminal Law (5th ed, Law Book Company, 1990) at 79ff.

9. In some jurisdictions, notably some States of the United States, these categories are further subdivided into degrees of seriousness.

10. Dixon at 64.

11. Pemble (1971) 124 CLR 107. Section 4 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) defines the term to include “any permanent or serious disfiguring of the person”.

12. Crabbe (1985) 156 CLR 464.

13. Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 18(1)(a).

14. (1992) 174 CLR 313.

15. Nydam [1977] VR 430.

16. Fisse at 114.

17. See Buttsworth [1983] 1 NSWLR 658, per O’Brien CJ of Cr D for a discussion of the history and nature of the offence. See also Andrews v DPP [1937] AC 576.

18. Section 19 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) was amended by the Crimes (Amendment) Act 1955 (NSW) to remove the mandatory death penalty for murder.

19. A Freiberg and D Biles The Meaning of Life: A Study of Life Sentences in Australia (Australian Institute of Criminology, 1975) at 53.

20. Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 24. The maximum penalty was reduced from life imprisonment by the Crimes (Life Sentences) Amendment Act 1989 (NSW).

21. Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 19. See D Brown, D Farrier, D Neal and D Weisbrot Criminal Laws (The Federation Press, 1990) at 658 regarding the judicial construction of this provision and subsequent developments.

22. Sentencing Act 1989 (NSW) s 5.

23. Crimes (Life Sentences) Amendment Act 1989 (NSW).

24. Sentencing Act 1989 (NSW) s 13A.

25. This view has been put to the Commission a number of times in preliminary consultations: Legal Aid Commission Oral Submission (8 July 1993); Dr W Barclay Oral Submission (8 July 1993); Professor S Yeo Oral Submission (16 June 1993); M Sides QC, Acting Senior Public Defender Submission (18 May 1993).

26. [1974] 2 WLR 607 at 640.

27. New Zealand Criminal Law Reform Committee Report on Culpable Homicide (1976). For a discussion of the Committee’s recommendations, see G Orchard “Culpable Homicide - Parts I and II” [1977] The New Zealand Law Journal 411, 447.

28. New Zealand does not have a defence of diminished responsibility.

29. Crimes Consultative Committee Crimes Bill 1989: Report of the Crimes Consultative Committee (1991).

30. See New Zealand Criminal Law Reform Committee Report on Culpable Homicide (1976); K Milte, A Bartholomew and F Galbally “Abolition of the Crime of Murder and of Mental Condition Defences” (1975) 49 Australian Law Journal 160.

31. Note that the following reports have rejected the unlawful homicide approach: Victoria. Law Reform Commission. Homicide (Report 40, 1991); House of Lords Select Committee on Murder and Life Imprisonment Report (1989).

32. Then Attorney General Frank Walker, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) 11 March 1982 at 2483. Note, however, that the crime of “rape” has been abolished in favour of categories of “sexual assault”, see D Weisbrot “Homicide Law Reform in New South Wales” (1982) 6 Criminal Law Journal 248 at 250.

33. Victoria. Law Reform Commission. Homicide (Discussion Paper 13, 1988) at para 108. See also S Norrish QC Oral Submission (30 June 1993); Professor S Yeo Oral Submission (16 June 1993).

34. VLRC Report 40 at para 170.

35. Legal Aid Commission Oral Submission (8 July 1993).