This paper was written by Peter Zahra, SC
from a paper prepared by Christopher O’Donnell, In-House Counsel, Commonwealth DPP
Outline of Law Prior to Evidence Act 1995
Grounds for exclusion of disputed confessions
At common law Australian courts recognised three grounds for the exclusion of otherwise admissible out of court confessional evidence:
1. Voluntariness - Confessions were inadmissible unless the prosecution satisfied the judge on the balance of probabilities that the confession was made voluntarily by the accused. This ground of exclusion was non-discretionary. If, after considering the evidence, the trial judge was satisfied that the confession was involuntary, it was excluded without the judge having to go on to discretionary considerations. The common law voluntariness rule has been abolished by the Evidence Act 1995 and replaced by provisions which focus on misconduct and reliability. The new provisions (sections 84 and 85 of the Evidence Act 1995) still require the non-discretionary exclusion of confessions to which they apply.
These three grounds of exclusion are to be distinguished from the issue of whether or not the confession was in fact made by the accused, which is a question of fact for the jury to determine. An assumption that the confession was made underlies voir dire hearings on each of the three grounds. An accused is not precluded from asserting that a confession was fabricated by earlier, unsuccessful assertions on the voir dire, that it was involuntary or unfairly or improperly obtained: R v MacPherson  147 CLR 512. Presumably, attempts to have a confession excluded by sections 84, 85, 90 or 138 of the Evidence Act 1995 will similarly not preclude a later assertion that the confession was fabricated.
Onus of proof
2. Unfairness to the accused - A voluntary confession could have been excluded by the trial judge in the exercise of his or her discretion if the accused established (on the balance of probabilities) that it was unfair, for a substantial reason, to the particular accused for the confession to be used in evidence against him or her because of the circumstances in which it was made (sometimes called the Lee discretion). This discretion has been enacted in terms by section 90 of the Evidence Act 1995. Confessions not affected by sections 84 and 85 might still be excluded on this discretionary basis.
3. Public policy - A voluntary confession could have been excluded by the trial judge in the exercise of his or her discretion if the accused established (on the balance of probabilities) that it was illegally or improperly obtained (sometimes called the Ireland discretion). This discretion has been modified by section 138 of the Evidence Act 1995. Confessions not affected by sections 84 and 85 might still be excluded on this basis.
Generally speaking, the onus of proving the admissibility of the contested piece of evidence will rest upon the party seeking to have it admitted. In the case of confessional evidence the position is more complicated. At common law the onus of proving that a confession was made voluntarily by the accused rested upon the prosecution. If the prosecution met this burden (or if there was no contest about this) the onus of persuading the trial judge to exercise his or her discretion to exclude the confession, either on the basis that it would be unfair to the accused to admit it (the Lee or fairness discretion) or on the basis that it would be contrary to public policy to do so (the Ireland or public policy discretion), rested upon the accused.
Practical issues about whether or not the accused has given evidence in support of allegations against police became important in this context. Muirhead J analysed this situation in Collins v R (1980) 31 ALR 257 @ 277 as follows:
If, however, there was nothing to suggest that the confession was involuntary, the presumption was that it was voluntary and the onus was discharged: R v MacPherson (supra) @ 519 per Gibbs CJ & Wilson J.
Standard of proof
“It was not that his Honour, in the absence of evidence from the appellants, was entitled to draw an inference in favour of the Crown along the principles of Jones v Dunkel  101 CLR 298. But he was left with the evidence of the Crown, which bore the onus, and no competing direct evidence on the issues going to voluntariness save for some evidence relating to the “rehearsal” activities of the morning of 1 January which he considered and rejected as unreliable. The failure to call or give evidence ...in R v Bodsworth  2 NSWR 132 @ 141]... was referred to as “of considerable importance”.”
At common law the standard of proof on the issue of admissibility on the voir dire was the civil standard of the balance of probabilities, whether the onus rested upon the prosecution or the defence. So, for example, in the case of confessions, the prosecution had to prove on the balance of probabilities that the confession was voluntary. Once the confession was shown to be admissible, an accused person who asserted that the confession was improperly or unfairly obtained, or should be excluded on grounds of public policy bore the burden of proving facts, on the balance of probabilities, that would justify an exercise of the discretion in his or her favour: R v MacPherson (supra) @ 519 per Gibbs CJ & Wilson J. In Wendo v R  109 CLR 559 the High Court rejected an argument that the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt applied to the issue of the voluntariness of confessions.
When was a confession voluntary?
It is, to a certain extent, academic to discuss the voluntariness rule now, given its abolition by the Evidence Act 1995. However, a consideration of this background adds to an understanding of the new provisions. Dixon J’s judgement in McDermott v R  76 CLR 501 @ 511 contains the leading and most often cited definition of a voluntary confession at common law:
This was formulated and extended in New South Wales by section 410 of the Crimes Act 1900, which provided as follows:
“At common law a confessional statement made out of court by an accused person may not be admitted in evidence against him upon his trial for the crime to which it relates unless it is shown to have been voluntarily made. This means substantially that it has been made in the exercise of his free choice. If he speaks because he is overborne, his confessional statement cannot be received in evidence and it does not matter by what means he has been overborne. If his statement is the result of duress, intimidation, persistent importunity, or sustained or undue insistence or pressure, it cannot be voluntary. But it is also a definite rule of the common law that a confessional statement cannot be voluntary if it is preceded by an inducement held out by a person in authority and the inducement has not been removed before the statement is made ... The expression “person in authority” includes officers of police and the like, the prosecutor, and others concerned in preferring the charge. An inducement may take the form of some fear of prejudice or hope of advantage exercised or held out by the person in authority ...”
Section 410 was omitted from the Crimes Act 1900 by the Evidence (Consequential and Other Provisions) Act 1995. It is now replaced by sections 84 and 85 of the Evidence Act 1995, which are referred to in more detail below. Section 410 did not derogate from the common law. In fact, it extended the common law rule to include untrue representations made to the accused person as well as threats and promises held out to him by persons in authority: McDermott v R (supra) @ 512 per Dixon J.
In R v Lee  82 CLR 133 @ 146 the High Court said that the typical case of a non-voluntary statement was the case of the statement induced by a threat or promise by a person in authority. But it is clear that a fear of prejudice or a hope of advantage exercised or held out by a person in authority is not an exhaustive statement of factors which, by overbearing the will, render inadmissible the confession thus obtained. A conscious desire on the part of police to overbear the will of the confessor is not necessary. Neither is impropriety on the part of the police. A useful statement of the real issues was made by Brennan J as a judge of the Federal Court in Collins v R (supra) @ 307 and is worth quoting at length:
(1) No confession, admissions, or statement shall be received in evidence against an accused person if it has been induced:
(a) by any untrue representation made to him by the prosecutor, or by some person in authority; or
(b) by any threat or promise, held out to him by the prosecutor, or some person in authority.
(2) Every confession, admission or statement made after any such representation or threat or promise shall be deemed to have been induced thereby, unless the contrary be shown.
(3) Provided that no confession, admission, or statement by the accused shall be rejected by reason of his having been told, by a person in authority, that whatever he should say might be given in evidence for or against him.
Such a careful assessment is exactly what the High Court gave to the circumstances under consideration in Hawkins v R  124 ALR 366. That case involved a consideration of whether an untrue representation made to the accused by a police officer rendered his subsequent confession inadmissible by virtue of section 410 of the Crimes Act 1900. The accused was apprehended on 3 January 1990 by police investigating a sexual assault on a 15 month old girl on 23-24 December 1989. He was arrested in relation to other matters and, at the police station, consented to a sample of his blood being taken for testing and comparison with blood samples from a hair found on the child and believed to be from her attacker. He signed a record of interview that day which contained no admissions and remained in police custody at the police station until 18 January 1990, despite the remand warrant commanding police to transfer him to Long Bay. Throughout this time he remained the prime suspect.
During a voir dire at the trial the relevant police officer gave evidence that the only reason he knew for the accused’s custody was to await the results of the blood tests so the accused could be further questioned. Without the blood test the police officer had no further expectation that the accused would give further information to the police. When the test results arrived on 17 January 1990 the police officer became aware that they showed that the accused’s blood group was the same as that of the sample, but also the same as 37 or 38% of the general population. By his own admission the police officer was aware that the test results did not positively or conclusively connect the accused with the crime.
At 9.30 pm, the police officer saw the accused in his cell where he told the accused the tests showed he was of the same blood group as the offender. He asked the accused if he understood that and the accused lowered his head and said “yes”. The police officer then said “I want you to think about this matter and I will be back shortly to talk to you”. He did not tell the accused that the blood group was common to 37 to 38% of the population. During a record of interview which commenced shortly afterwards at 11.05 pm and finished at 4.00 am, and which included a visit to the scene of the alleged crime, the accused confessed and signed a record of interview containing full admissions.
In analysing whether the confession was voluntary the High Court @ 370 accepted the definition of the words “untrue representation” in R v Connors  20 NSWLR 438 as meaning a representation which is wilfully untrue, made with the object of inducting a confession. But the Court noted that the purpose of section 410 was to protect the individual who is induced to make a confession by an untrue representation made by a person in authority and that in determining what is an untrue representation it was not confined to looking at the words alone, dissociated from their context. A representation could be made by words, acts or conduct or a combination thereof. The content of the words spoken depended on their context. That context included the situation the police officer and the accused were in when the words were spoken and the relationship which existed between them up to that time. On that, the Court said @ 371:
“The ultimate question is whether the will of the person making the confession has been overborne, or whether he confessed in the exercise of his free choice. If the will has been overborne by pressure or by inducement of the relevant kind it does not matter that the police have not consciously sought to overbear the will. A finding that there has been an attempt to overbear by persons in authority is neither determinative of, nor an essential prerequisite to, a finding that the will of the person making the confession was overborne...”
“A confession is not held to be involuntary merely because the confessionalist is by nature or temperament predisposed to confess and is furnished with an opportunity to do so: it is the effect of an external factor ... upon the will which determines admissibility. “Voluntary” does not mean “volunteered”, but “made in the exercise of a free choice to speak or be silent”. So the admissibility of the confessions as a matter of law (as distinct from discretion ...) is not to be determined by reference to the propriety or otherwise of the conduct of the police officers in the case, but by reference to the effect of their conduct in all the circumstances upon the will of the confessionalist. The conduct of police before and during an interrogation fashions the circumstances in which confessions are made and it is necessary to refer to those circumstances in determining whether a confession is voluntary. The principle, focusing upon the will of the person confessing, must be applied according to the age, background and psychological condition of each confessionalist and the circumstances in which the confession is made. Voluntariness is not an issue to be determined by reference to some hypothetical standard: it requires a careful assessment of the effect of the actual circumstances of a case upon the will of a particular accused.”
The Court held that these facts supported the conclusion by Priestly JA in the Court of Appeal that the police officer
“Critical to that relationship were the facts that the appellant had been in custody for 14 days and that the police were holding him knowing that, in the absence of the results of the blood test, it was unlikely that he would make a statement but hoping that he would make a statement if he were left to consider the results of the test once they became available. Critical also was the fact that Detective Griffin knew that a record of interview was essential before the appellant could be charged. Without an admission of guilt, there was, at that time, insufficient evidence to support the laying of a charge against the appellant.”
They also supported the conclusion that the accused was induced by the statement by the police officer to confess because he thought the results of the blood tests implicated him in the commission of the offences under investigation. In reaching this conclusion the Court said it was relevant to consider the intention of the police officer who, it could be inferred from the evidence, intended and hoped that the accused would understand what he said about the blood test results as a representation that they implicated the accused:
“intended, without using words which, viewed in isolation, were untrue, to represent to the appellant that the result of the blood tests was a significant matter pointing to the guilt of the appellant in connection with the offences for which he was charged.”
Brennan J in Collins v R (supra) @ 309-10 gives some other examples of factors which have been found to overbear the will of a confessionalist, although he doubts whether the first two would today be decided the same way:
“That was the message which Detective Griffin intended to convey to the appellant by the words which he used and it was the message which the appellant received.” (@372)
In R v Beere  Qd R 370 Gibbs J said @ 372
“You had better tell the truth” or “It is better for you to tell the truth” - Jarvis (1867) LR 1 CCR 96;
“If you don’t tell me you may get yourself into trouble and it will be worse for you” - R v Coley (1868) 10 Cox CC 536;
Context, it seems, is everything, and it is for this reason that much attention is paid to the customary caution given by police officers, which is designed to remove any pressure or inducement of the relevant kind, which might otherwise affect the confessionalist’s will. Whether a caution has this effect is a question of fact. A confession made in ignorance of the right to silence is not, for that reason alone, involuntary: R v Azar (1991) 56 A Crim R 414.
The absence of a caution is really of relevance to the exercise of the discretion to exclude a confession because it would be unfair to the accused to admit it or on the grounds of public policy. There is now, of course, a requirement under Part 1C of the Crimes Act 1914 on the part of police investigating Commonwealth offences to caution suspects which is considered below. Section 139 of the Evidence Act 1995 is also relevant. It deems evidence of a statement made or act done by an arrested person to have been obtained improperly if the person is not first cautioned. It is considered below.
Admissions - Evidence Act 1995
“It has long been held that statements to an accused person that it would be better for him to tell the truth, or that a statement made would be for his benefit, are inducements having the effect of rendering a subsequent confession involuntary.”
Section 84 of the Evidence Act 1995, which, with section 85, replaces the voluntariness rule, includes a provision which requires the party against whom admissions are sought to be led to raise an issue about whether the admission was influenced by violence, oppression, inhuman or degrading conduct or threats thereof before the provision excluding admissions so obtained is triggered: subsection 84(2). It is uncertain whether this provision will require judges to accede to and rule on challenges to confessions based upon voluntariness whenever made (even in cases of “fishing expeditions”) or only where the accused raises a real question of admissibility by adducing some evidence. As mentioned above, this provision is also different to the approach taken by the High Court in R v MacPherson (supra) in cases involving an unrepresented accused where the Court held that the judge had to hold a voir dire where it appeared there was a real question as to the voluntariness of a confession, even if the accused had not sought one.
Section 90 of the Evidence Act 1995 simply enacts the common law Lee discretion. The Evidence Act 1995 is silent about where the burden of establishing grounds for the exercise of this statutory discretion lies. However, the Australian Law Reform Commission in Volume 1 of its 1985 Interim Report stated @ paragraph 46 that areas of the law of evidence which the new uniform law would not deal with included the substantive law of evidence including the legal and evidential burden of proof. Therefore, the burden will continue to be on the accused to establish sufficient grounds for the court to exercise this discretion.
The Australian Law Reform Commission did not adopt the same attitude towards the onus of proof applicable to the statutory public policy discretion in section 138 of the Evidence Act 1995. On this subject, the Commission stated @ paragraph 964 of its 1985 Interim Report as follows:
Onus of proof
On first analysis, the importance of accurate fact-finding to the trial process would suggest that the onus should be on the party seeking the exclusion of reliable evidence. The existing Bunning v Cross discretion is an exclusionary one - the onus is on the accused to prove the misconduct and justify exclusion. But the policy considerations supporting non-admission of the evidence suggest that, once the misconduct is established, the burden should rest on the prosecution to persuade the court that the evidence should be admitted. After all, the evidence has been procured in breach of the law or some established standard of conduct. Those who infringe the law should be required to justify their actions and thus bear the onus of persuading the judge not to exclude the evidence so obtained. (Emphasis added.)
This clearly supports the argument that the Evidence Act 1995, though not explicitly changing the common law position regarding the onus in this context, has done so implicitly, the onus now being on the accused to establish misconduct and then shifting to the prosecution or other tendering party to justify inclusion.
The civil standard of proof for questions of admissibility of evidence has been maintained in the Evidence Act 1995 in section 142, which provides as follows:
This provision applies to the new provisions in sections 84 and 85 of the Evidence Act 1995 and to the fairness and public policy discretion provisions in sections 90 and 138 respectively.
Abolition of the voluntariness test in the Evidence Act 1995 and replacement provisions
Because the common law voluntariness rule is not reproduced in any of the provisions of the Evidence Act 1995 it no longer has any application and is effectively abolished (see section 56). A combination of provisions replace the common law rule. Principally these are sections 84 and 85, which provide as follows:
These provisions are broader, in some respect, than the common law test or section 410 of the Crimes Act 1900, although specific reference to confessions induced by untrue representations has been transferred to the statutory public policy discretion formulated in section 138 (see below). Section 84 focuses on types of misconduct, be it violent, oppressive, degrading or inhuman conduct influencing the admission and the making of the admission. It would seem that the conduct need not be conduct of a person in authority, and need not amount to a threat, promise or untrue representation by such a person provided it satisfies this test. Section 85 focuses on any circumstances surrounding the making of an admission which may affect its reliability and truthfulness. The test in subsection 85(2) is a move away from whether the admission was made voluntarily to the likelihood of its truth being adversely affected. How these provisions will be interpreted by the courts is yet to be seen. They do not affect Part 1C of the Crimes Act 1914, as section 8 of the Evidence Act 1995 provides that the act does not affect the operation of the provisions of any other act.
Interpretation of concepts in s.84 and s.85
84 (I) Evidence of an admission is not admissible unless the court is satisfied that the admission, and the making of the admission, were not influenced by:
(2) Subsection (1) only applies if the party against whom evidence of the admission is adduced has raised in the proceeding an issue about whether the admission or its making were so influenced.
85 (1) This section applies only in a criminal proceeding and only to evidence of an admission made by a defendant:
(a) in the course of official questioning; or
(b) as a result of an act of another person who is capable of influencing the decision whether a prosecution of the defendant should be brought or should be continued.
(2) Evidence of the admission is not admissible unless the circumstances in which the admission was made were such as to make it unlikely that the truth of the admission was adversely affected.
(3) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account for the purposes of subsection (2), it is to take into account:
The interpretation of the various concepts in section 84 and section 85 of the Evidence Act will raise a number of questions. Only limited assistance can be gained from an examination of the Act as some of the major concepts are not defined. Iain Dennis, in an article “The Admissibility of Confessions under Sections 84 and 85 of the Evidence Act 1995: An English Perspective” 1996 Sydney Law Review, Vol.18, p.34, notes that whilst the Australian Law Reform Commission did not make it clear to what extent (if at all) the drafting of sections 84 and 85 drew on comparable provisions in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (UK) (generally known as PACE), the English rules for the admissibility of confessions are:
The following is an outline of the comparisons made by Dennis of section 84 and section 85 with the PACE legislation:
“... sufficiently striking to be more than coincidental, particularly in relation to section 84. Section 85 differs in a number of respects from the equivalent English provision, but here too there are significant resemblances.”
Section 76(2) of the PACE legislation states
A. Issues of interpretation: the truth of the confession
Section 84 of the Evidence Act 1995 does not contain such a provision in expressed terms, but it seems safe to assume that it is implied. The ALRC explained that extreme forms of physical coercion and prohibited methods of obtaining a confession not simply because the confession may be untruthful. They are prohibited:
Discretions to Exclude
“that a confession procured in one of the prohibited ways is inadmissible ‘notwithstanding that it may be true’. Thus, even if the accused admits in a later police interview that an earlier coerced confession was true, the first confession remains inadmissible.”
The difference between the Lee discretion and the Ireland discretion
The interplay between the issue of voluntariness, the two discretions and the provisions of Part 1C of the Crimes Act 1014 was complex and the interplay between the equivalent provisions of the Evidence Act 1995 will continue to be so. A failure to caution, for example, though not rendering a confession involuntary, sometimes lead to the discretionary rejection on the basis of unfairness to the accused: R v Azar (supra), and definitely causes problems in situations to which Part 1C applies. Under the Evidence Act 1995 admissions obtained without prior caution are deemed to have been obtained improperly.
Improper and unlawful police conduct leading to a confession was relevant to both discretions. In the case of the Lee discretion the focus was on the effect of that conduct on the reliability of the confession and whether, as a result, it would be unfair to the accused to admit the confession. Under the provisions of the Evidence Act 1995 this focus on reliability has been shifted somewhat to the sphere of mandatory exclusion in section 85. In the case of the Ireland discretion the focus was on broader questions of public policy as the court sought to resolve the conflict between the desirable goal of bringing to conviction the wrongdoer and the undesirable effect of curial approval, or even encouragement being given to the unlawful conduct of those whose task it is to enforce the law: Bunning v Cross [1977-8] 141 CLR 54 per Stephen & Aickin JJ @ 74; Foster v R (supra) per Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey & Gaudron JJ @ 7. Whereas fairness to the accused was paramount in the exercise of the Lee discretion it was secondary in the exercise of the Ireland discretion, as Stephen and Aickin JJ pointed out in Bunning v Cross (supra) @ 74-5:
“This being the aim of the discretionary process called for by Ireland it follows that it by no means takes as its central point the question of unfairness to the accused. It is, to the contrary, concerned with broader questions of high public policy, unfairness to the accused being only one factor which, if present, will play its part in the whole process of consideration.”
It was for this reason that Stephen and Aickin JJ said in Bunning v Cross (supra) that the Ireland discretion would apply principally to real evidence, as opposed to confessional evidence, and why the High Court later said in Cleland v R  151 CLR 1 that it would only be in an exceptional case that a voluntary confession which it would not be unfair to the accused to admit could be rejected on the grounds of public policy. Such rejection was possible, as the later High Court decisions of Pollard v R  176 CLR 177 and Foster v R (supra) clearly show. These are considered further below. But the Lee discretion was the more pertinent to confessional evidence, given that the reliability of confessional evidence is more likely to be effected by unlawful or improper police conduct than the reliability of real evidence. Dawson J’s analysis in Cleland v R (supra) @ 32 of Stephen and Aickin JJ’s judgement in Bunning v Cross (supra) is illuminating on this point:
“Stephen and Aickin JJ express the view that the discretionary process which they discuss will have a limited operation in relation to confessional evidence, being principally applicable to what they call real evidence: evidence possessing physical characteristics which speak for themselves in some objective fashion. They point out that in many cases calling for the exercise of this discretion fairness will play no part. By this, it seems, they must mean that there can be no unfairness to the accused in the sense that the evidence, although obtained improperly or illegally and hence in some, if not most, cases unfairly, will not, once obtained, be unreliable or untrustworthy in the same way as confessional statements obtained unfairly are reliable or untrustworthy. It is, as Stephen and Aickin JJ point out, largely meaningless in many cases, when speaking of real evidence, to describe the evidence as fair or unfair. The blood-stained knife or the capsule containing a drug each establishes its own physical characteristics by its existence however fair or unfair the means employed in procuring it. The means by which confessional evidence is obtained, on the other hand, are regarded as affecting the quality of the evidence to the extent that it may be unsafe to leave it to the jury, and for that reason it may be necessary to exclude it entirely.”
Brennan J in Collins v R (supra) @ 315 also adverted to reliability when he answered his partly rhetorical question “why is it unfair to use a voluntary confession?” The answer he said lay in the risk that a confession was involuntary where the police conduct has a grave tendency to unfairness but does not amount to sufficient evidence to show that the confessionalist’s will was overborne. The discretion exists to protect such an accused.
Judicial definition of the Lee discretion
What then is unfairness? This will depend upon the circumstances, including the exigencies of the particular investigation. There is no magic formula and no definitive list of circumstances which alone, or collectively, will amount to unfairness. As Brennan also said in Collins v R (supra) @ 314:
“Unfairness is not so much to be found as a fact but judged as a value”
In R v Lee (supra) @ 154 the full High Court approved of a statement by Street J in R v Jeffries (1947) 47 SR (NSW) @ 311 as the best “exposition of the whole matter”:
“It is a question of degree in each case, and it is for the presiding Judge to determine, in the light of all the circumstances, whether the statements or admissions of the accused have been extracted from him under conditions which render it unjust to allow his own words to be given in evidence against him.”
In McDermott v R (supra) Latham CJ @ 507 gave the examples of irresponsibility on the part of the accused to understand and appreciate the effect of questions and answers as situations where a confession would be obtained unfairly. A failure by the police to comply with the Judges Rules as modified and restated in the NSW police Commissioner’s Guidelines relating to police questioning (see Watson & Purnell para 1187) may weigh heavily in determining whether a confession has been unfairly obtained. But a breach alone will not establish unfairness as the rules and guidelines have no legal status: McDermott v R (supra) per Latham CJ @ 507, Dixon J @ 517; R v Lee (supra) @ 154; Collins v R (supra) @ 314 per Brennan j. As Brennan J said in the last-mentioned decision @ 314:
“...the concept which governs the exercise of the discretion is unfairness, not contravention of the rules.”
At common law unsigned records of interview were normally rejected in the exercise of the fairness discretion, but oral evidence of their contents could be given: Driscoll v R  137 CLR 517; Stephens v R  139 CLR 315. This is now, of course, subject to the provisions of Part 1C of the Crimes Act 1914 and section 424A of the Crimes Act 1900, which are considered in more detail below. Section 86 of the Evidence Act 1995 is also applicable. It does not apply to audio or video-taped confessions. It renders inadmissible a document prepared by an investigating official to prove the content of an oral admission made by a defendant to the official in response to a question or representation unless the defendant has acknowledged that the document is a true record of the question, representation or response by signing, initialling or otherwise marking the document. By virtue of section 8 of the Evidence Act 1995 section 86 does not affect the provisions of Part 1C of the Crimes Act 1914 or section 424A of the Crimes Act 1900.
In Williams v R  161 CLR 278 @ 286 Gibbs CJ suggested that a confession made whilst a suspect was unlawfully detained would not necessarily be unfairly obtained for that reason alone. The relevance and effect of a failure to comply with the statutory requirements for investigating Commonwealth offences under part 1C of the Crimes Act 1914 is considered below.
The decision of the High court in Foster v R (supra) is an instructive example of a confession held to be inadmissible both on grounds of unfairness to the accused personally and for reasons of public policy. The accused in that case was charged with maliciously setting fire to Narooma High School on the New South Wales south coast. The only evidence of the accused’s involvement in the fire was a seven line typed confession signed by the accused while in police custody at Narooma Police station. This confession was made less than an hour after the accused was arrested by a team of eight police officers. It was common ground that during that hour the appellant was told by the principal interviewing officer that statements of his two co-accused directly implicated him as the fire-starter, even though they did not. It was also common ground at the appeal that the appellant’s arrest and detention were solely for the purpose of interrogation and therefore unlawful.
The appellant’s challenge to the admissibility of the confession on the basis that it was involuntary or that it should be excluded in the exercise of the court’s discretion were rejected by the trial judge and he was convicted on the evidence of the confession. On appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal his conviction was upheld. The High Court held that the trial judge’s discretion had miscarried and that the confession should, in the circumstances, have been excluded on the basis that its reception was unfair to the appellant. The factors which led to this unfairness were as follows:
· the appellant was unlawfully arrested by police by being ordered into the caged section of a police truck;
· he was then unlawfully detained in custody at Narooma police station;
· he was allowed no opportunity to contact a lawyer;
· he was given no choice about whether he would participate in an interview with police or where any such interview would take place;
· he was deprived of the presence of any non-police witness and placed in “the special position of vulnerability...to fabrication” of a confessional statement to which reference was made in the judgement of the majority of the Court in McKinney v R  171 CLR 468 @ 478: “his detention deprived him of the possibility of any corroboration of a denial of the making of all or part of the alleged confessional statement...”;
· because video or audio facilities were either not available or not utilised, his detention also effectively precluded any non-police corroboration of his account of the nature and content of the police questioning which led to his eventual signing of the statement;
· the police infringement of the appellant’s rights was both serious and reckless;
· the unlawful arrest and detention of the appellant had been for the purpose of questioning him in an environment from which he had no opportunity of withdrawing: thus the chief interviewing officer candidly admitted a t the committal that his intention, effectively, was to break the appellant down until he told him something he believed;
· when the appellant’s mother arrived at the police station the appellant was not told of her presence and she was told to wait until the interview finished before seeing her son;
· there was a real question about whether any of the admissions the appellant made were voluntary.
The question of whether the Lee discretion should have been exercised to exclude the confession had to be answered by reference to “the conduct of the police and all the circumstances of the case”: per Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ @ 10 citing R v Lee (supra) @ 154. The majority held that having regard to the nature and effect of the police infringements of the appellant’s rights and to the other circumstances referred to the case plainly called for the trial judge’s discretion to be exercised to exclude the confession on the ground that to admit it would be unfair to the appellant.
Statutory formulation of the Lee discretion in the Evidence Act 1995
The Lee discretion as it existed at common law has been adopted in terms in section 90 of the Evidence Act 1995, which provides as follows:
In a criminal proceeding, the court may refuse to admit evidence of an admission, or refuse to admit the evidence to prove a particular fact, if:
The principles in the decided cases on the common law discretion will be equally applicable to this statutory formulation of the discretion.
Judicial definition of the Ireland discretion
The Ireland discretion at common law was often described as a discretion to exclude unlawfully obtained evidence, as though only illegal conduct would suffice to invoke it (see, for example, the majority in Foster v R (supra) @ 7-8). However, the discretion extended beyond unlawfully obtained evidence. Barwick CJ’s often-cited statement of the test in R v Ireland (supra) @ 335 refers confusingly to unlawfulness or unfairness:
“Whenever such unlawfulness or unfairness appears, the judge has a discretion to reject the evidence. He must consider its exercise. In the exercise of it the competing public requirements must be considered and weighed against each other. On the one hand there is the public need to bring to conviction those who commit criminal offences. On the other hand is the public interest in the protection of the individual from unlawful and unfair treatment. Convictions obtained by the aid of unlawful or unfair acts may be obtained at too high a price. Hence the judicial discretion.”
Later cases such as Cleland v R (supra) refer to unlawful or improper conduct and the nomenclature recently settled at that (e.g. Ridgeway v R  129 ALR 41).
In Cleland v R (supra) the majority of Gibbs, CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ put it beyond any doubt that the Ireland discretion was applicable to confessional evidence but they restricted its application in that sphere by agreeing 9 with Brennan J in Collins v R (supra) @ 317 that it would only be in a very exceptional case that a voluntary confession which it would not be unfair to the accused to admit could be rejected on the ground of the public interest. Such cases can and do exist, however. Foster v R (supra) is an example. In that case the majority said @ 10 that while it was unnecessary to consider the Ireland discretion in that case because the Lee discretion operated to exclude the confession, the circumstances of the case were such that:
“...the evidence should also have been excluded on the ground that the seriousness of the unlawful conduct on the part of the police was such that considerations of public policy precluded its reception. In that regard the case manifests “the real evil” at which the discretion to exclude unlawfully obtained evidence on public policy grounds is directed, namely, “deliberate or reckless disregard of the law by those whose duty is to enforce it.”
Pollard v R  176 CLR 177 is another example, although it was a decision on Victorian provisions similar to the investigation provisions in Part 1C of the Crimes Act 1914 and is considered further below.
Although Ridgeway v R (supra) is not a decision on confessions it contains a useful statement in the majority judgement of Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ @ 53 on when impropriety which has procured the commission of the offence with which the accused is charged will be reached in police investigations:
“...impropriety will be reached in the case of conduct which is not illegal only in cases involving a degree of harassment or manipulation which is clearly inconsistent with minimum standards of acceptable police conduct in all the circumstances, including, amongst other things, the nature and extent of any known or suspected existing or threatened criminal activity, the basis and justification of any suspicion, the difficulty of effective investigation or prevention and any imminent danger to the community.”
Clearly it was compliance with minimum standards of police conduct which was of great importance in relation to the exercise of the Ireland discretion at common law, and this is a factor of great importance when the provisions of part 1C of the Crimes Act 1914 are considered.
Statutory modification of the Ireland discretion in the Evidence Act 1995
The Ireland discretion, as it existed at common law, has been re-formulated with some modification in section 138 of the Evidence Act 1995, which clearly refers to unlawfully or improperly obtained evidence. Subsection 138(1) provides as follows:
Evidence that was obtained:
The test involving competing requirements of public policy stated by Stephen & Aickinn JJ in Bunning v Cross (supra) @ 74 has been replaced, but should still be persuasive authority on the principal considerations, these being the desirability of bringing wrongdoers to conviction versus the undesirability of court approval of unlawful conduct by law enforcement officers.
The Australian Law Reform Commission 1985 Interim Report prepared in the lead up to the introduction of the Evidence Act 1995 contains a useful consideration of the reformulated balancing test. Of “the desirability of admitting the evidence”, the Report states as follows, Volume 1 para 958:
There is a public interest that reliable evidence of an accused person’s guilt be admitted into the trial and considered by the tribunal of fact. This interest may be seen from two different perspectives:
This public interest supports relevant evidence of an accused person’s guilt being admitted into the trial to form the basis for the necessary factual determination. If the evidence is excluded for reasons not associated with the fact finding process then this interest is satisfied.
- Accurate Fact Determination. There is a public interest in accurate determination of facts in criminal (as well as civil) trials. A legal system lacks legitimacy if it does not operate on an accurate assessment of material facts.
- Crime Control. There is a public interest in punishing criminals and deterring crime. From the perspective of crime control the legal system should effectively, and efficiently, apprehend, convict and punish the guilty (and screen out the innocent at as early a stage as possible). Ultimately, the claim of the crime control process is that the criminal process is a positive guarantor of social freedom.
Of “the undesirability of admitting evidence that has been obtained in the way in which the evidence has been obtained” the Report states as follows, Volume 1 para 959:
... there is a public interest in minimising the extent to which law enforcement agencies act outside the scope of their lawful authority ... Particular relevant concerns may be:
- Discipline police for illegality or impropriety ...
- Deter future illegality ...
- Protection of individual rights ...
- Fairness at trial ...
- Executive and judicial legitimacy ...
- Encourage other methods of police investigation...
Subsection 138(2) deems an admission to have been obtained improperly in certain circumstances. It provides as follows:
Without limiting subsection (1), evidence of an admission that was made during or in consequence of questioning, and evidence obtained in consequence of the admission, is taken to have been obtained improperly if the person conducting the questioning:
Paragraph (a) is aimed at interrogations involving coercion, whereas paragraph (b) is aimed at interrogations involving deception. Under the new scheme contained in the Evidence Act 1995 the provision dealing with admissions obtained by false representations is included in these public policy discretion provisions rather than the “voluntariness” provisions in sections 84 and 85. This is a departure from the scheme contained in section 410 of the Crimes Act 1900. As a result of this change will be that confessions obtained through untrue representations made by police officers will no longer necessarily be automatically excluded (as they were by section 410) but only if the trial judge chooses to exercise his or her discretion under section 138 to exclude them, unless section 85 applies. For section 85 to apply, the court must be satisfied that the confession, where there was such an untrue representation, was made in circumstances where it was not unlikely that the truth of the admission was adversely affected. Only then will a confession obtained as a result of an untrue representation be mandatorily excluded.
Subsection 138(3) sets out a list of factors a court should take into account when contemplating the exercise of the public policy discretion. The list is not exclusive:
Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account under subsection (1), it is to take into account:
(a) the probative value of the evidence; and
(b) the importance of the evidence in the proceeding; and
(c) the nature of the relevant offence, cause of action or defence and the nature of the subject-matter of the proceeding; and
(d) the gravity of the impropriety or contravention; and
(e) whether the impropriety or contravention was deliberate or reckless; and
(f) whether the impropriety or contravention was contrary to or inconsistent with a right of the person recognised by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and
(g) whether any other proceeding (whether or not in a court) has been or is likely to be taken in relation to the impropriety or contravention; and
(h) the difficulty (if any) of obtaining the evidence without impropriety or contravention of an Australian Law.
The Australian Law Reform Commission in its 1985 Interim Report recognised departure from minimum standards of conduct as critical in the assessment of the gravity of the impropriety or contravention referred to in paragraph (d) above. The Commission stated at Volume 1 paragraph 964 that the more serious the departure from set standards and procedures the greater the need for discipline and deterrence so as to avoid patterns of similar misconduct developing. In the same paragraph of the Report, the Commission also stated that the mental state of the officer is relevant, as reflected in paragraph (e) above. Contraventions occurring through mistake or inadvertence would tend to be viewed less seriously from the point of view of the officer’s culpability. But this factor was seen to be less important from the point of view of deterrence, given that this will not redress the infringement of the defendant’s rights and given that an important point of the discretion is to prevent even mistaken contraventions occurring in the future.
Section 139 of the Evidence Act 1995 deems a statement made or act done by a person during questioning by an investigating official to have been obtained improperly if the person is not properly cautioned prior to the questioning. The provision applies where the person is under arrest and the investigating officer had the power to arrest, or, where the investigating officer did not have such power, he or she had formed a belief at the time of
the questioning that there was sufficient evidence to establish that the person had committed an offence.
Exclusion of evidence of admissions as against third parties
83. (1) Section 81 does not prevent the application of the hearsay rule or the opinion rule to evidence of an admission in respect of the case of a third party.
(2) The evidence may be used in respect of the case of a third party if that party consents.
(3) Consent cannot be given in respect of part only of the evidence.
(4) In this section:
“third party” means a party to the proceeding concerned, other than the party who:
(a) made the admission; or
(b) adduced the evidence.
This provision is intended to ensure that evidence of an admission by one defendant (D1)cannot be used against another defendant (D2) in the proceedings unless D2 consents. Where D2 does wish to rely on parts of the admission, the entire admission will be admissible both for and against him or her. (See Odgers, p.135)
It is to be noted that this is a significant departure from the old law where a confession of a co-accused was not admissible against an accused person unless adopted. See GAC (unreported, NSW CCA, 19 December 1996).
Statutory provisions governing the admissibility of confessions in proceedings for Commonwealth offences - Part 1C Crimes Act 1914
Minimum standards of conduct for investigating officials’ investigations of Commonwealth offences have been enshrined in statutory form by Part 1C of the Crimes Act 1914. “Investigating official” for these purposes means a member of the Fede4ral Police or the police force of any State or Territory of Australia, or any person with power to investigate Commonwealth offences who is empowered by a Commonwealth law because of that office to make arrests for such offences. All Commonwealth offences are covered except for service offences under the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982.
The four main requirements in Part 1C of the Act which are relevant to the admissiblity of any confessions or admissions are as follows:
1. Investigation Period
Subsection 23C(2) allows for the detention of a person suspected of having committed a Commonwealth offence for the “investigation period” which is specified not to exceed four hours, but which does not include certain types of “dead time” referred to in sub-section 23C(7). An investigating official may apply for an extension of the investigation period at or before its expiry under section 23D. The investigation period may be extended by up to eight hours under this provision.