Updates and background for this project (Digest)
A project funded by the NSW Law Reform Commission and
the Macquarie University External Collaborative Grant Scheme.
2. Literature review
2.1 This literature review provides an overview of issues relevant to this study, with a survey of key factors that need to be considered when assessing deaf jurors’ comprehension of the interpretation of courtroom proceedings. Thus we draw on research relating to linguistic, signed and spoken language interpreting in order to discuss legal interpreting and the role of the legal interpreter, legal discourse and interpreting for courtroom discourse, interpreting for jurors, legal text comprehension and comprehension testing.
LEGAL INTERPRETING
2.2 Most research and discussion on legal interpreting focuses on court interpreting, with a reasonably large body of literature that discusses courtroom interpreting practice, the role of the court interpreter, and ethical dilemmas faced by court interpreters.18
2.3 There has been some discussion of other aspects of legal interpreting, such as solicitor-client interviews, police interviews, police interrogations and confessions, tribunals or immigration/refugee hearings.19
2.4 In Australia, there have been several publications which explore the cultural barriers for Aboriginal people in accessing court proceedings.20 In all aspects of legal interpreting, the person typically requiring the interpreter is the victim, witness, defendant or complainant, although there are cases of deaf lawyers relying on signed language interpreters.21
2.5 In Australia, any interpreter who works in court must be accredited by the National Accreditation Authority for Translators and Interpreters (NAATI) at the professional interpreter level, which is the minimum standard for professional practice in Australia.
The role of the legal interpreter
2.6 Much of the literature concerning legal interpreting focuses on the role of the legal interpreter, and the challenges of working in the legal system due to potentially conflicting expectations from different stakeholders involved in the process.
2.7 The case of Gaio v The Queen22 has been influential in determining the court’s view of the interpreter’s role in Australia. In this case, the High Court of Australia had to determine whether a confession to a patrol officer via an interpreter was admissible as evidence before a court, or whether the confession should be considered as hearsay because it was not obtained directly, but rather indirectly via an intermediary (ie, an interpreter). The debate focused on the role of the interpreter, in order to clarify this issue. The court concluded that if the interpreter translated ‘word by word’ or ‘sentence by sentence’ and remained faithful and accurate to the original message, then the translation should not be deemed as hearsay.
2.8 This judgment perpetuates the notion among legal professionals that the more literal a translation, the more correct it is likely to be, and that interpreters should function in ‘conduit’ mode, like a telephone, relaying the content of a message without having any influence on that message.23 Realistically, however, interpreter practitioners know that in order to convey the content of a message effectively, they should function as a linguistic and cultural mediator and ensure that the disadvantaged minority language speaker has full access to court proceedings and understands what is going on.24
2.9 In order to explore these differing perceptions, Banna25 interviewed three signed and three spoken language interpreters, and three legal professionals, about their experiences with interpreting in the courtroom. The legal professionals and the spoken language interpreters were found to have similar expectations to those expressed in the Gaio case, in terms of the interpreter functioning in a conduit role. The signed language interpreters, however, leaned more towards the ally role, and were focused on ensuring equal access to court proceedings.
2.10 This approach is highlighted in another decisive case in terms of the interpreter role – that of Gradidge v Grace Bros Pty Ltd26 in the New South Wales27 Supreme Court. In this case, a signed language interpreter was held in contempt of court when she continued to interpret for an argument between counsel, after she had been directed to stop interpreting by the judge. Her rationale for continuing was that it was her role to provide access to everything spoken in the courtroom to her deaf client. After being taken to the Supreme Court, the contempt decision was withdrawn, as it was decided that the deaf client was entitled to have the argument interpreted as long as she was present in the courtroom, so that she could ‘see’ the argument the same way that everybody else could hear it.
2.11 In a study of British Sign Language (BSL) interpreters working in court, Turner and Brown28 also found that the interpreters did not adhere to a conduit model of interpreting, and instead participated in co-construction of the message with their deaf clients. Thus, they suggest that a different perspective is needed with regards to the role of an interpreter in the courtroom. They advocate for recognition of interpreters’ linguistic and cultural expertise as coordinators of interaction between people who do not use the same language, as a means of enhancing the quality of the judicial process.
2.12 With respect to deaf people’s involvement in the legal system, there have been a number of publications that specifically discuss deaf people’s access to justice via signed language interpreters.29 Katrina Miller and Vernon McCay have contributed significantly with their discussions of the potential linguistic barriers that deaf people face in the legal system.30
2.13 All of these discussions have focused on the deaf person as a member of a minority group being disadvantaged in accessing the legal system. In all of these publications, the role of the interpreter has been considered in light of the position of the client as a participant in the legal system as a defendant, witness, or complainant. None have considered what the role of an interpreter might be in working with a juror. This is probably because non-English speaking people have not historically been allowed to serve on juries. Similarly, deaf people have traditionally been excluded from serving on juries. This situation is beginning to change, however, and the notion of interpreting for jurors is discussed further in paragraphs 2.38 - 2.42.
LEGAL DISCOURSE
2.14 Regardless of the role of the client, legal discourse will always provide challenges for interpreters of any language. Legal discourse encompasses various relationships between language use and the realm of law. Forensic linguistics is the branch of linguistics that applies discourse analysis to legal contexts, and identifies clear features of linguistic behaviour.31 The challenge for interpreters does not only relate to legal terminology, but also to how language is used in legal contexts.
2.15 Legal language (or ‘legalese’) differs from colloquial language on lexical, semantic, and syntactic levels, and in particular, the nature of courtroom interaction influences the type of language used.
2.16 It is for this reason that the legal discourse used by lawyers and judges in the courtroom is often found to be too complicated for the layperson to comprehend. Berk-Seligson32 identifies a number of factors that lead to this level of complexity, including the practice of oral legalese often being written to be read aloud. Berk-Seligson refers to the work of Danet33 in discussing nine lexical features of legal English: (1) technical terms; (2) common terms with an uncommon meaning; (3) words whose origin is Latin, French or Old English; (4) polysyllabic words; (5) unusual prepositional phrases; (6) doublets (combination of Anglo-Saxon words with French or Latin words); (7) formality; (8) vagueness; and (9) over-precision.
2.17 Berk-Seligson also refers to 11 syntactic features of legal English: (1) nominalizations; (2) passive constructions; (3) conditionals; (4) unusual anaphora; (5) whiz deletion (deletion of relative pronouns); (6) high frequency of prepositional phrases and their unusual placement between the subject and predicate of a sentence; (7) lengthy sentences; (8) unique determiners; (9) impersonality; (10) wide variety of semantically negative words; and (11) parallel structure in the linking of words and phrases by means of conjunctions ‘or’ and ‘and’. Berk-Seligson also states that discourse features in legalese which contribute to incomprehensibility include lack of cohesion and overly compact sentences.
2.18 Further features of legal discourse include information seeking, clarification, reframing, reformulation, paraphrasing, summarizing, option-presenting, questioning strategies, testimony as narrative, double negatives, hedges, hesitation fillers, polite forms, question-intonation statements, intensifiers, direct speech, and answering questions (“is it not true that…”).34
2.19 Conley and O’Barr35 investigated language use in trials, and noted that courtroom language is deliberately manipulated by lawyers in order to influence the credibility of witnesses. Strategies used include, for example, abrupt topic shifts and returns, use of tag questions (eg, isn’t that correct?), and use of silence (either witness’s silence treated as problematic or silence after testimony as inference of witness credibility).
2.20 In his analysis of courtroom cross-examinations, Drew36 states that courtroom participants co-construct a hostile system of cross-examination, with contrasting versions of the story via turn design within interactional sequences of cross-examination, following a specialised sequence of questions and answers. Lawyers design questions to discredit witnesses, paying particular attention to inconsistencies in witness testimony. Witnesses behave in a guarded fashion and give defensive answers. In addition, lawyers will critique statements based on semantics (eg, knocking vs banging on the door) and use partial repeats to emphasise understanding. Drew concludes that this interaction is all designed for an “overhearing audience” (ie, the jury), who then make inferences about the events and then make their decision regarding guilt.
2.21 Gibbons37 states that these particular forms of language use are adopted to maintain power in the court. He refers to the following strategies used by the court to maintain authority: (a) use of specialist language; (b) control of turn-taking in the courtroom; (c) formality; (d) address forms; (e) coercion in questioning; and (f) rules of interaction of the courtroom.
2.22 The complexities of legal discourse present two challenges of interest to this study in relation to the key research questions:
- How well do lay people understand legal discourse?
- How accurately can interpreters convey the terminology, strategies and conventions used in courtroom discourse in order to match the intention of the speaker?
INTERPRETING COURTROOM DISCOURSE
2.23 Several in-depth linguistic studies, with spoken and signed language interpreters, have explored the complexities involved when interpreting in court, with the analysis of pragmatics and discourse in courtrooms, and in particular the challenges of interpreting legalese.
Spoken language interpreting studies
2.24 Observation and analysis of English-Spanish interpreted interactions in the courtroom in the United States38 and in Australia39 have demonstrated that interpreters make a range of linguistic decisions during the interpreting process based on their understanding of courtroom discourse, which influences elements of the interaction, such as turn taking, pragmatic force, interruptions or clarifications, variation in register, discourse markers and politeness. Thus, as an inherent part of the process of interpreting, the interpreter alters the dynamics and therefore impacts on the interaction.
2.25 It has also been suggested that in influencing language and interaction in the courtroom, the interpreter challenges the authority of the court and the lawyers in the courtroom.40 Gibbons41 suggests that lawyers often feel discomfort about working with interpreters due to loss of control over the discourse, misunderstanding the interpreting process, and the fact that an interpreter does not function as a conduit.
2.26 These studies of spoken language interpretation of courtroom discourse have also informed the practices of signed language interpreters in court, as the linguistic, pragmatic and power dynamics present challenges for all interpreters alike, regardless of the languages actually being used. There are two specific studies, however, that have advanced our understanding of signed language interpretation of courtroom discourse.
Signed language interpreting studies
2.27 Brennan and Brown42 conducted a major study to assess the extent of deaf people’s access to justice in the UK. They observed British Sign Language (BSL) interpreters working in court, administered a survey of legal interpreters, and interviewed deaf people and interpreters about their legal interpreting experiences in police, court and other legal settings. They highlight the fact that signed language interpreters experience conflict in terms of perceptions of their role. However, the most interesting aspect of their study is their discussion of linguistic issues. In addition to the linguistic and discourse challenges faced by interpreters of all languages, signed language interpreters work bimodally, that is, between two languages that are expressed in different modalities (ie, spoken and visual-gestural). This presents further challenges for interpreters, as Brennan and Brown explain:
BSL encodes visual information as a matter of course. Let us imagine what might seem like a fairly straightforward piece of information: person X recounts how he went into a pub, bought a pint of beer and was short-changed by the bar-tender. We know that in English we could embellish this account in all sorts of ways, but a typical BSL account would include certain types of visual information automatically; it would be more unusual to exclude those than to include them. Thus, we may well be able to glean from the BSL account what kind of doors the pub had, e.g., double swing doors, a single swing door, a door with a round knob or a door with a vertical handle; we may be able to discern that the bar-tender was a large man with stubble and a cigarette hanging out of his mouth; we may be able to tell that the counter was curved, that the place was crowded and X had to elbow his way in and so on. Now it is quite possible to present all of this information in the English language. However, when we say ‘I went into a pub’ in English we do not typically add information which indicates how we went in, what kind of door we opened, what kind of handle it had and so on. In BSL, not only is it typical to include such information, it is often unavoidable.43
2.28 This level of visual encoding may provide a challenge for a signed language interpreter, for example, who hears the phrase ‘I ran up the stairs’ in English. How should the phrase be interpreted into a signed language? What kind of staircase is it? Is it a spiral staircase or a staggered staircase? The interpreter is then faced with a dilemma—do they interrupt proceedings to clarify in order that the deaf person accesses the right information? How important is it that they give visually accurate information? Likewise, in the other direction, if a deaf person signs that he ran up a spiral staircase—does the interpreter voice-over that level of detail? It may sound strange to someone to hear the sentence ‘I ran up a spiral staircase’ as people do not normally provide that level of detail in English. Thus if people are perturbed by what they hear, they may question the credibility of the person speaking. This has potentially major ramifications for deaf people in the justice system.
2.29 This issue is particularly relevant to the use of super-ordinate terms which often come up in court, such as ‘murder’, which do not have one established sign in BSL (or Auslan). Instead people usually give examples of what it could be, perhaps signing strangle, stab, shoot, or slit-throat,44 and either with or without mouthing the word ‘murder’ and fingerspelling m-u-r-d-e-r. Fingerspelling and mouthing English words on the lips are common strategies used by signed language users, which Brennan and Brown discuss in depth, and which Brennan has discussed elsewhere.45 Such strategies are referred to as ‘borrowing’. Brennan46 describes how BSL users utilise fingerspelling and lip patterns (mouthing) to borrow English words strategically into BSL. The key points that she raises include:
- initialised signs are a common form of borrowing (eg, confidence);
- fingerspelling is used to introduce new or technical terms;
- mouthing of full English words typically co-occurs with production of fingerspelled items or abbreviated signs;
- mouthing of full English words co-occurring with established signs is used to introduce a different register (eg, mouthing ‘injury’ while signing hurt).
2.30 These strategies have also been observed in deaf people and interpreters using American Sign Language (ASL),47 Italian Sign Language (LIS),48 and Auslan.49 This linguistic phenomenon is a result of language contact, where linguistic features are transferred from one language to another at different levels of language.50 The borrowing described by Brennan51 is a form of language contact between signed and spoken languages, also referred to as code-mixing52 or code-blending.53 This borrowing strategy used by interpreters can be referred to as a literal translation style. This style is commonly used in contexts where participants need to access formal registers of language, technical terms or context specific language use, such as university lectures.54
2.31 Brennan and Brown,55 and Brennan56 essentially discuss court interpreters’ use of literal translation, borrowing from English as a linguistic strategy, in order to cope with legalese and to convey legal concepts effectively. Their research is particularly relevant to one of the research questions for this study, in relation to how accurately Auslan can convey legal concepts.
2.32 Another significant investigation of signed language interpreting in court was conducted by Russell.57 She investigated the accuracy of Canadian English-ASL interpretations in courtroom discourse by contrasting the outcomes of simultaneous and consecutive interpreting approaches.58
2.33 Spoken language interpreters typically work in simultaneous whispered mode, or long or short consecutive mode when working in court. Yet signed language interpreters typically work simultaneously as they work between a ‘silent’ and a spoken language, so there is no apparent intrusion between languages as is evident with spoken language interpreting. Research has identified that consecutive interpretations can be more accurate, due to the fact that interpreters have time to process the message and search for equivalence in the target language without interference from the source language.59 Russell sought to investigate which technique would be more effective in court.
2.34 In her study, Russell60 conducted four mock trials with real judges and lawyers, some with experience of working with spoken and signed language interpreters. The interpreters worked in either the consecutive or simultaneous mode. Three different discourse events were analysed:
(i) entering of direct evidence;
(ii) cross-examination; and
(iii) expert witness testimony.
Russell found a statistically significant difference in terms of accuracy, with simultaneous interpretations 87% accurate, as compared with consecutive interpretations, which were 95% accurate.
2.35 Post-trial interviews with participants revealed that the lawyers and judges seemed to prefer experiencing interpretation in the simultaneous mode, especially during the cross-examination (for the lawyers). They stressed the importance of preparation with interpreters, and that interpreters should request permission from the judge to clarify information, or consult with one another. Deaf witnesses said that interpreters should be confident and well prepared. The expert witness felt that it was important to prepare with interpreters, and commented that they did not seem comfortable using the consecutive approach or note-taking. The interpreters also stressed the importance of preparation, and recognised that the quality of their interpreting was better when they used the consecutive mode.
2.36 In summary, Russell stated that interpreters should recognise the value of using consecutive or simultaneous interpreting techniques for different discourse types in court, and should negotiate carefully with lawyers and judges about what strategies to use and when.
2.37 Although informative in terms of signed language interpretation in court, these studies focused on interpreting for people who are accessing the justice system, in the form of witnesses, defendants or complainants. The results of the study set out in this Research Report are seminal, because it is the first linguistic study to examine signed language interpretation for deaf jurors in the court system.
INTERPRETING FOR JURORS
2.38 In the interpreting literature, very little consideration has been given to interpreting for jurors, as people are typically not eligible to serve as jurors if they cannot understand the language of the court. Non-English speaking people can now serve as jurors in the state of New Mexico in the United States.61 Additionally, deaf people in some states in the US, and also in New Zealand, can serve as jurors, as it has been established that they are prevented from accessing the language of the court due to hearing loss, rather than the fact that they cannot use English (as discussed in paragraph 1.2).
2.39 There are different challenges for interpreters working with jurors, because the role of the client is different. The goal of the interpretation is also different.62 The role of a juror is:
to listen and accurately remember each piece of evidence, where necessary to draw inferences of fact from that evidence, using their experience of everyday life and at the same time evaluate the credibility of witnesses and the relative importance of evidence… to understand and apply directions individually and, when they retire as a jury, to collectively compare the facts with the contents of the judge’s instruction on the law and arrive at a verdict.63
According to Findlay,
In their role of fact-finder, the jurors should understand and weigh up the evidence presented, assess the credibility of witnesses and decide on the likelihood of certain events having occurred in the light of the jurors’ personal experiences.64
2.40 Thus it can be seen that, as opposed to witnesses, defendants or complainants who typically report, or listen to, versions of events, a juror has to make critical decisions based on the understanding and interpretation of information received. Therefore their information access needs are different.
2.41 In a volume dedicated to discussions of language, the law and deaf communities,65 Mather and Mather explore the needs of deaf jurors in receiving information via English/ASL interpreters, and evaluate whether this should occur through meaningful interpretations or through the verbatim transmission of information. In effect, they revisit the point raised in Brennan and Brown’s work,66 acknowledging that interpreters need to borrow from English in order to convey legal concepts, terminology, and key facts of the case so that jurors can sufficiently access information for deliberation purposes. To date, no linguistic studies have been carried out on the efficacy of interpreting for the purposes of a deaf juror, confirming that this study is pioneering a new aspect of research on courtroom interpreting
2.42 In addition to the analysis of interpretation accuracy and the evaluation of the effectiveness of English to Auslan interpretations in conveying information to deaf jurors, this study also focuses on juror comprehension. Very few studies have explored the actual comprehension of signed language interpretations generally,67 let alone in court. Therefore key questions to be considered include:
- What do deaf jurors understand in court?
- How does that compare to hearing jurors?
- Is comprehension influenced by receiving the information directly or indirectly (via an interpreter)?
JUROR AND LEGAL TEXT COMPREHENSION
2.43 In a recent article in an Australian newspaper, there was discussion around the role of juries, and more importantly in relation to this study, whether jurors understand directions from judges:
But there’s another problem: understanding the baffling language of the law. The state’s Senior Crown Prosecutor, Mark Tedeschi, QC, said he could easily understand confusion arising from directions given by judges to jurors before they go to reach a verdict … Trial judges are tightly restricted in their summing up. Their words are governed by a complex, interwoven set of rules established by appeal courts and legislation… Incomprehensible directions were sharply criticised in the Court of Criminal Appeal in South Australia when it ordered a retrial of Ronald Gordon Hill, who shot his wife in the forehead with a revolver … Justice Robin Millhouse said: “I wonder how much of a summing up the jury ever understands? For how long is the average juror able to concentrate on what the judge is saying? Not much and not for long, I fear. Judges may overlook that jurors are laymen who before their jury duty know little, if anything, of the courts system and even less of the law which we administer in the courts. Yet they are expected to grasp, at one hearing, the most complex legal concepts! I’ll bet not one juror in a hundred does grasp them!” The chairman of the NSW Law Reform Commission, James Wood, QC, a former Supreme Court judge, said yesterday he was very concerned that directions had become “unmanageable and not understandable”. For example, Australian judges cannot do much to explain what “beyond reasonable doubt” means…68
2.44 This debate demonstrates that the comprehension of deaf jurors may not be the only issue. Instead, we need to consider deaf jurors’ comprehension of courtroom proceedings in comparison to the comprehension of hearing jurors.
2.45 There have been several studies of the comprehension of legal texts which have highlighted that even hearing people listening directly to spoken English can experience difficulty in comprehending legal texts, such as police cautions or jury instructions. For example, Cotterill69 found that the way that a police officer delivers a caution can influence its comprehensibility. Dumas70 asserts that jurors experience difficulty in understanding the syntactic and semantic complexities of jury instructions, and that any misunderstanding can be minimized through the use of standardized jury pattern instructions.
2.46 The seminal study on juror comprehension was conducted by Charrow and Charrow,71 which tested and proved the hypothesis that standard jury instructions are not well understood by most jurors. First, they identified a series of complex linguistic constructions in 14 standard jury instructions, which they hypothesised would be difficult to understand. Then they measured the comprehensibility of these instructions by administering a test, whereby jurors listened to these instructions and paraphrased their understanding of what the instructions meant. Charrow and Charrow then re-wrote the instructions, eliminating the problematic constructions, and re-tested the jurors. They found that the re-written instructions were better understood. Subsequent related studies have also confirmed that jury instructions fail to communicate central points of the law.72
2.47 In a more recent study, similar to that of Charrow and Charrow, which focused on written rather than oral comprehension, Hansen, Dirksen, Kuchler, Kunz and Neumann73 combined three methodological steps to investigate the comprehensibility of rephrased syntactic structures in German court decisions. First, they analysed an annotated corpus of court decisions, press releases and newspaper reports on the decisions, in order to detect complex structures that distinguish court decisions from the other text types. Secondly, the complex structures were rephrased into two simplified versions. Finally, all versions were subjected to a self-paced reading experiment. Their findings correspond with those of Charrow and Charrow in suggesting that rephrasing greatly enhances the comprehensibility for the lay reader.
2.48 A particularly interesting study is that of Judith Levi74, who conducted a linguistic evaluation of jury comprehension of instructions in her role as a linguistic expert witness. Levi analysed and discussed the language of the Illinois Pattern Instructions (IPI), which are used in the sentencing phase of a murder trial, in order to assess how well the language used in these instructions clearly communicated the legal concepts to the jury. The study served as a follow up to a survey conducted by Zeisel75, which concluded that a consistent majority of jurors misunderstood central points of law concerning deliberations on the death penalty, resulting in an increased likelihood that the jurors will impose the death penalty. Levi’s linguistic analysis of the IPI also found:
- a consistent theme of presumption of death at all levels of the text (syntax, semantics, pragmatics and discourse organisation);76
- syntactical challenges, for example, use of multiple negatives, covert negatives, and embedded clauses;
- semantic ambiguity, for instance, use of the words ‘you’ and ‘your finding’ and whether this should be interpreted as a singular or group reference;
- incohesive discourse organisation, that is, confusing sequencing of points, discontinuity, and needless interruptions to the flow with unrelated information; and
- and pragmatic problems in that “jurors were given wholly insufficient information from which they had to deduce, or infer, a number of highly significant but regrettably obscured components of both federal and state law”.77
2.49 In order to investigate deaf and hearing jurors’ comprehension of courtroom proceedings, it is necessary to acknowledge the intrinsic factors that contribute to comprehension, and consider elements necessary for comprehension testing.
Comprehension testing
2.50 In their analysis of the cognitive components of discourse comprehension, Graessar, Mills and Zwaan78 identify the following key variables and processes that contribute to the comprehension of a message:
- background knowledge;
- spreading activation of nodes in knowledge networks;
- memory stores—short-term memory (most recent clause), working memory (approximately two sentences) and long-term memory;
- discourse focus—analogous to a mental camera that zooms in on particular characters, objects, actions, events, and spatial regions;
- how much the information resonates with the listener;
- activation, inhibition, and suppression of nodes;
- nodes activated by several information sources;
- repetition and automaticity—familiar words are processed faster than unfamiliar words;
- explanations actively sought out; and
- goals of the receiver influence text comprehension and memory.
2.51 Fundamentally, comprehension is influenced by a range of factors. Thus, any test of comprehension must be carefully designed and include a combination of rubric, item and response questions, and should assess representation of meaning (semantics, pragmatics, body of knowledge).79
2.52 Factors affecting test comprehension difficulty include:80
- the nature of the input: speech rate, length of passage, syntactic complexity, vocabulary, discourse structure, noise level, and accent;
- register: propositional density and amount of redundancy;
- the nature of the assessment task: amount of context provided, clarity of instructions, response format, and availability of question preview;
- individual listener factors: memory, interest, and background knowledge, motivation;
- amount of lexical overlap between the text and the response format;
- length of text preceding the information required to respond;
- length of required response;
- repetition of tested information; and
- whether responses and repetitions of information are verbatim or paraphrases.
2.53 Hughes81 discusses a range of issues relating to language testing and raises several points that are of relevance to this study. One issue is the inherent differences in modality that make the design of tests applicable across spoken and written texts challenging. Listeners cannot usually move backwards or forwards over what is being said in the way that they can a written text unless the spoken text is also somehow recorded and able to be manipulated by the reader. However, this places additional strain on the listener, whereas a reader usually can quite easily search a written text for information required. In this study, Auslan users are similarly disadvantaged, as there is no agreed method for recording Auslan (or any other signed language for that matter) in written form.82 An Auslan text must therefore either be observed live or recorded on video for later viewing.
2.54 A possible solution would be to utilise only written text for comprehension testing. Unfortunately, although possibly highly fluent in Auslan, some deaf people may not have a sufficient literacy level in written English due to the sometimes significant educational disadvantage experienced by those with a hearing loss.83 The ideal is to develop a test which is conducted in the same language as that of the information text (ie, people are tested in their first language).
2.55 Hughes84 (1989) also presents a summary of the macro-skills involved in listening (comprehending), which include (i) listening for specific information; (ii) obtaining the gist of what is said; (iii) following directions; and (iv) following instructions. Hughes’s85 suggestion for preparing test items is for the researcher to listen to the text to be used, noting what the candidate should be able to understand from the text. Hughes suggests that items (concepts) to be tested are chosen from parts of the text that are sufficiently far apart, so that a momentary break in concentration does not result in the candidate missing all the necessary information.
2.56 Hughes86 also comments on response items and the challenge posed by multiple choice items, in that candidates have to hold the options in their memory as they listen to and assess the options. Although live presentation of material is usually closer to real life, this is outweighed by the benefit of uniformity in what is presented to the candidates if recorded.
Footnotes
18. For example, Angelelli, 2004; Carroll, 1995; Colin and Morris, 1996; Edwards, 1995; Fenton, 1997; Fowler, 1997; Gonzalez, Vasquez, and Mikkelson, 1992; Kadric, 2000; Kelly, 2000; Lane, McKenzie-Bridle, and Curtis, 1999; Mathers, 2006; Mikkelson, 1998, 2000; Morris, 1999; Robinson, 1994; Schweda Nicholson, 1994.
19. Barsky, 1996; Fowler, 2003; J I E Gibbons, (p ) 1995; Krouglov, 1999; Maley, Candlin, Koster, and Crichton, 1995; Pöllabauer, 2004; R. Shuy, 1998; Zambrano, 2006.
20. Cooke, 2002; Eades, 2003; Fryer-Smith, 2002; Goldflam, 1995; Howard, Quinn, Blokland, and Flynn, 1993.
21. Kurlander, in press.
22. (1960) 104 CLR 419.
23. Laster and Taylor, 1994; Mikkelson, 1998.
24. Berk-Seligson, 1990; Brennan and Brown, 1997.
25. Banna, 2004.
26. (1988) 93 FLR 414; Roberts-Smith, Frey, and Bessell-Browne, 1990.
27. New South Wales (capital: Sydney) is an Australian State. Australia has six States and two self-governing territories with independent criminal jurisdictions.
28. Turner and Brown, 2001.
29. Brennan, 1999; Fournier, 1997; K Miller, 2001; K Miller and McCay, 1994; Nardi, 2005; Russell, 2002; Stevens, 2005; Tilbury, 2005; G Turner, 1995; Wilcox, 1995.
30. McCay and Miller, 2001, 2005; K Miller, 2003; K R Miller and McCay, 2001.
31. J Gibbons, 1999; J Gibbons, 2003; Olsson, 2004; R Shuy, 2001, 2003.
32. Berk-Seligson, 1990.
33. Danet, 1980.
34. Tiersma, 1999.
35. Conley and O’Barr, 1998.
36. Drew, 1990.
37. Gibbons, 2003.
38. Berk-Seligson, 1990, 2002.
39. S Hale, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c, 1999, 2001, 2002; S Hale and Gibbons, 1999.
40. Berk-Seligson, 1990; Brennan and Brown, 2004; J Gibbons, 2003; S Hale and Gibbons, 1999; S B Hale, 2004.
41. Gibbons, 1999.
42. Brennan and Brown, 1997.
43. Brennan and Brown, 1997, 121-122.
44. Sign language transcription typically involves the ‘glossing’ of signs using English words for established signs (eg, MOTHER), two words joined together to represent the meaning of one sign (eg, RUN-FAST) and letters divided by hyphens to indicate a fingerspelled word (e.g., L-E-G-A-L) (Johnston and Schembri, 2007).
45. Brennan, 2001.
46. Brennan, 2001.
47. Davis, 1990, 2003; Lucas and Valli, 1992.
48. Fontana, 1999.
49. Johnston, 2002; J Napier, 2006.
50. Clyne, 2003.
51. Brennan, 2001.
52. Lucas and Valli, 1992.
53. Emmorey, Borenstein, and Thompson, 2003.
54. J Napier, 2002.
55. Brennan and Brown, 1997.
56. Brennan, 2001.
57. Russell, 2002.
58. “Consecutive interpreting is where a speaker/signer delivers their message in. discrete chunks, pausing for the interpreter to pass on each piece of the message. These segments can be as short as a phrase or as long as the entire speech, but are commonly around 300–600 words…Interpreters working consecutively often rely on note-taking to aid retention of information within each chunk”: Napier, McKee and Goswell, 2006, 15.
“Simultaneous interpreting is where the speaker/signer talks continuously, while the interpreter passes their message on as soon as they hear/see enough to understand…. When interpreters are working in simultaneous mode, they generally do not know what the speaker will say, or mean, until they have said it. So rather than starting their interpreting at exactly the same time as the speaker, there is always some time lag”: Napier, McKee and Goswell, 2006, 16.
59. Stone, 2005.
60. Russell, 2002.
61. Montalvo, 2001.
62. Mather and Mather, 2003; Montalvo, 2001.
63. Darbyshire, Maughan and Stewart, cited in NSWLRC, 2004, p 17.
64. Cited in NSWLRC, 2004, p 13.
65. Lucas, 2003.
66. Brennan and Brown, 1997.
67. Napier and Rohan, submitted.
68. Dick, 2007, 16.
69. Cotterill, 2000.
70. Dumas, 2000.
71. Charrow and Charrow, 1979a, 1979b.
72. Elwork, Sales and Alfini, 1982; Luginbuhl, 1992; Steele and Thornburg, 1988.
73. Hansen, Dirksen, Kuchler, Kunz and Neumann, 2006.
74. Levi, 1993.
75. Zeisel, 1990, cited in Levi, 1993.
76. For example, “At one point… the judge first tells the jurors how to sentence the defendant to death and then how to give him a sentence that preserves his life—and then inexplicably restates how to sentence him to death. This death-life-death sequence clearly emphasizes the option of death, not only by repeating it twice but also by presenting it in the two most salient positions within a list, first and last” (Levi, 1993, 47).
77. Levi, 1993, 31.
78. Graessar, Mills and Zwaan, 1997.
79. Graessar, Mills and Zwaan, 1997.
80. Brindley and Slatyer, 2002; McNamara, 2000.
81. Hughes, 1989.
82. Johnston and Schembri, 2007.
83. Johnston, Leigh and Foreman, 2002.
84. Hughes, 1989.
85. Hughes, 1989.
86. Hughes, 1989.