Report 117 (2007) - Jury selection - Law Reform Commission : Lawlink NSW

6.3 The Commission considers that, save in the case of those who have previously served as jurors, there should no longer be an entitlement to claim exemption as of right. The difficulty with its preservation lies in the fact that many will regard it as an invitation to be excused from jury service, which they will readily accept, without giving any consideration to the wider public interest involved in that form of service. Moreover, some studies reveal it to be a cause for resentment and diminution in confidence on the part of those who do serve as jurors and then question why other members of the community seem able to avoid that commitment.⁵

6.4 The continuation of the wide categories of potential exemption in fact denies the system of the service of many qualified and experienced people, and threatens both the representative nature of juries and the fairness of the trial. There was substantial support in the submissions and consultations for this conclusion.⁶ It is also to be noted that exemption as of right no longer exists in Victoria, Tasmania, Queensland, SA, or in England and Wales.

6.5 It is recognised that this would involve a significant change for those who currently fall within the exemption as of right category, since any removal of that right would necessitate them serving unless, on a case by case basis, they can provide a good reason not to serve. This could lead to some increase in the work of the jury section of the Sheriff’s Office in processing such applications,⁷ although in most instances that could be done on paper, or reserved for a judge in cases where the merits of the request to be excused are not obvious.

6.6 Lord Justice Auld, who supported eliminating the categories for exemption, observed that any applications to be excused would have to be tested carefully according to “the individual circumstances” of each case “otherwise there could be a reversion to the present widespread excusal of such persons by reason only of their positions or occupations”.⁸ We agree with this conclusion.

6.7 A number of occupations and professions are entitled to be excused as of right. The categories have been reduced over time and those within some of the previously listed categories now need to apply to be excused for good cause. The following people may currently be exempted from jury service as of right:

6.9 The UK Departmental Committee on Jury Service recognised that the entitlement to be excused as of right extended to people who were “well fitted to be jurors”. The Committee said:

6.12 The Auld Review of the criminal courts of England and Wales, for example, considered that, while there may be “good reason” for excusing people when they must perform “important duties over the period covered by the summons”, there was no reason why they should be entitled to be excused as of right “simply by virtue of their position”.¹⁶

6.13 The New York jury project observed that many of the exemptions dated from an earlier time when jury service might have involved removing people who were considered essential to small, sometimes isolated, communities, such as doctors, clergy, school teachers and emergency services personnel who could not otherwise be replaced.¹⁷ It is questionable whether such an observation has any relevance for conditions in NSW today, although the availability of an entitlement to seek to be excused for good cause would provide a sufficient remedy for those who may reside and work in poorly served regional communities, particularly where the trial is likely to be lengthy.

6.14 The NSW Jury Task Force in 1993 considered that the “maintenance of the present system is likely to encourage more special interest groups to claim an entitlement to exemption as of right in the future”.¹⁸ Although it is impossible to undertake any statistical analysis of the percentage of people within each category who currently claim the right of exemption in NSW,¹⁹ the subjective impression is that a high proportion of these people do so.²⁰ This would accord with the expectation that most people will avoid any kind of duty that is tagged with a popular perception of being onerous. It also accords with the Victorian Parliamentary Law Reform Committee observation that the initial hopes of the Departmental Committee that people with the right to be exempted might nevertheless elect to serve, were not realised. The Victorian experience was that people “who have a right to be excused from jury service almost always exercise the right”.²¹ In that State, it was observed, in 1996, that the exercise of the right to be excused was the “main cause of under-representation within the jury system”.²²

6.15 As we noted at the outset, most of the submissions received considered this category of exemption. Many submissions supported the removal of the general category of exemption as of right from the Jury Act, subject to the availability of an opportunity for potential jurors to seek to be excused for good cause,²³ while one supported a lessening of the exemptions available.²⁴

6.16 There is no convincing reason why exemptions should continue to be available based on occupational category alone, since this risks being regarded as elitist, results in the burden of jury service being borne disproportionately by those outside the existing exempt categories, and can have the effect of limiting the collective skill and experience of the jury. The granting of exempt status to particular “privileged” occupational groups may also impact upon the willingness of others in the general community to serve, since they may well resent having to bear the major burden of jury service,²⁵ or query why they should not receive equivalent treatment if they work in similar areas. For example, allied health professionals such as nurses, midwives, physiotherapists, optometrists and veterinary surgeons have no occupational exemption.

6.17 Most professionals are able, as a matter of course, to arrange for their duties to be performed by locums or substitutes when they take various forms of leave.²⁶ Those whose duties must be performed by another, but who are not able to arrange such substitutes easily or conveniently, should be able to apply to be excused or granted a deferral on a case by case basis, as could those whose services are in particular demand at any given time.

6.18 In Victoria, the UK and many of the US States, the elimination or substantial narrowing of the existing categories of exemption and ineligibility has not caused difficulty. We next examine the individual categories of exemption as of right under the current NSW law.

6.19 Clergy and vowed members of any religious order may currently claim exemption as of right in NSW.²⁷ Only three other Australian jurisdictions have an express provision granting a right of exemption to clergy and religious.²⁸

6.20 Preliminary submissions were received from churches supporting the retention of the right of exemption. The arguments for its retention related to the nature of pastoral duties, which brought the clergy and religious into contact with those who might be victims of crime or people charged with or convicted of crime, and their families, either through the confessional or in a pastoral support role.²⁹ They also related to the need for clergy to be available to officiate at funerals, weddings and the like during the working week, and to visit the poor and sick.³⁰ It was also suggested that an apprehension of bias may arise because some clergy and religious undertake “advocacy work for the less privileged and marginalised in society... as a necessary condition in service to the wider community”.³¹ Finally, it was suggested that some clergy may have a conscientious objection to jury service generally.³²

6.21 Most submissions supported the removal of the right to exemption for clergy and vowed members of any religious order.³³ A submission from the Diocese of Wangaratta, an Anglican diocese with parishes in both NSW and Victoria, expressed general satisfaction with the arrangements in Victoria whereby there is no general exemption but a discretionary power to excuse for good reason.³⁴ That power is defined as exercisable by reference to various matters, such as distance and inconvenience and, in particular, the circumstance that “the person is a practising member of a religious society or order the beliefs or principles of which are incompatible with jury service”.³⁵

6.22 We recognise that there are circumstances where clergy may need to be excused because of some direct knowledge or contact with those who become involved in the justice system, and where, particularly in small communities, it may not be possible for them to be replaced when performing jury duty. We also recognise that there may be groups such as closed orders or those whose religious faith may be inconsistent with them sitting in judgment on others. They can, however, be catered for, on a case by case basis, by applying to be excused for good cause, by reason of one or other of these factors. We are not persuaded by an argument that clergy or religious as a class cannot bring themselves to participate impartially and fairly in the role of juror, or that they risk being unduly judgmental, and we do not consider it appropriate for this category of exemption to continue as of right. The special case of those whose religious faith is inconsistent with jury service, or of those who may have some pastoral association with people involved in a particular trial, can be adequately dealt with by an application to be excused for cause.

6.23 People practising as pharmacists, dentists and medical practitioners are also entitled to claim an exemption as of right in NSW.³⁶ This accords with the recommendation of the Departmental Committee on Jury Service in England and Wales that practising medical practitioners, dentists and pharmaceutical chemists should be entitled to claim exemption because of their “special and personal responsibilities... for the immediate relief of pain or suffering”.³⁷ The UK recommendations also included practising nurses, midwives and veterinary surgeons in this category.³⁸ Members of these additional groups are not given an exemption as of right in NSW, although nurses are currently listed in the Sheriff’s guidelines as people who may be excused for “good cause”.³⁹

6.24 In Queensland and Victoria, medical practitioners are not entitled to exemption. Other jurisdictions, however, continue to grant exemptions to health professionals, some in quite broad terms. For example, in Western Australia, in addition to practising medical practitioners, dentists and pharmacists, practising veterinary surgeons, psychologists, nurses, chiropractors, physiotherapists and osteopaths are also entitled to exemption as of right.⁴⁰

6.25 The 1994 AIJA review recommended that the exemption of doctors and dentists should not be retained “without [an] explanation of duties”.⁴¹

6.26 We see no reason to resile from our general view that people engaged in the above occupations should not be able to claim exemption as of right. The categories currently given that right of exemption fail to take into account the diversity of ways in which such professionals may now deliver services. Cases of genuine inconvenience or demonstrated need to be present at work or to be available to attend to patients for whom specialised services are required, or because of an absence of substitute services,⁴² can be dealt with on a case by case basis by way of an application to be excused. In most instances alternative arrangements can be made such as are already made for annual leave or leave to attend conferences.

6.27 In each case, the inconvenience of a personal attendance in answer to a summons could be avoided if the jury administrator can deal with the application in writing, with a right of review if it is refused.

6.28 Mining managers and under-managers of mines⁴³ were first granted a right to exemption in 1918.⁴⁴ The exemption was granted “in the interests of the men whose lives these managers have in their charge”, it being noted that “mining accidents cannot be regulated to suit the convenience of the sittings of the courts”.⁴⁵ At that time, a manager or under-manager was required to exercise daily personal supervision of his or her mine.⁴⁶ The Coal Mines Regulation Act 1982 (NSW) now allows for the appointment of deputy managers who have “full charge and control” in the absence of the mining manager.⁴⁷ Under-managers also have “full charge and control” in the absence of the mining manager or deputy manager.⁴⁸

6.29 In WA, mining managers were removed from the list of those entitled to claim an exemption, following recommendations by the Law Reform Commission.⁴⁹

6.30 Given the possibility of appointing deputy managers, there would appear to be no compelling reason for granting mining managers and under-managers of mines a blanket right of exemption. Staffing issues for particular mines, or cases where there are particular safety concerns, or current problems underground, could be dealt with by an application to be excused for good cause, on a case by case basis.

6.31 In NSW, people “employed or engaged (except on a casual or voluntary basis) in the provision of fire, ambulance, rescue, or other emergency services, whether or not in the public sector” also have a right to be exempted from jury service.⁵⁰ Until recently, such people were ineligible for service,⁵¹ rather than entitled to an exemption as of right, presumably on the ground that their jobs were considered essential to the well-being of the community in emergency situations. It seems odd that individuals within this category are now given the right to determine for themselves how essential their job is, and whether they wish to serve.

6.32 We similarly consider that people engaged in the above occupations should not be able to claim a general exemption as of right. The category is currently too broad and fails to take into account the fact that many of the people listed above will not be permanently on call, but will rather be subject to rosters that take account of other forms of leave. Cases of genuine inconvenience or demonstrated need to be present at work can be dealt with on a case by case basis by way of an application to be excused, either for a particular case, or permanently in the most pressing of cases, or for a defined period. For example, Rural Fire Service employees may be justifiably excused during the bushfire season.

6.33 The following people may also currently claim exemption from jury service as of right:

6.35 In NSW, people who are at least 70 years old have the right to claim an exemption.⁵⁴ Until 1997, the age for a right to exemption was set at 65 years.⁵⁵ The NSW Law Reform Commission recommended a change in the age limit, in 1986, because of concerns about the serious under-representation of jurors aged 65 and over.⁵⁶

6.36 Exemptions based on age still represent a substantial proportion of the exemptions claimed in NSW.⁵⁷ This has also been the case in other jurisdictions.⁵⁸ There is no uniformity in the way that age is approached so far as jury service is concerned. Some jurisdictions have seen an increase in the age limit for jury service where age has been a precondition to eligibility rather than a basis for obtaining an exemption, and in other jurisdictions service after the relevant age has been made optional.

6.37 For example, in Tasmania in 2003, the age limit of 65 years was removed as a ground of ineligibility and substituted by a provision allowing those aged over 70 years to elect not to serve.⁵⁹ In Queensland, where previously males aged between 65 and 70 years could opt out of jury service,⁶⁰ people aged over 70 years are now ineligible unless they elect to be eligible.⁶¹ In Western Australia, people aged over 70 years are ineligible to serve, while those between 65 and 70 years may elect not to serve.⁶² In the ACT, people aged over 60 years are eligible to serve but are entitled to claim an exemption as of right.⁶³ In Victoria, there is no exemption based on age, however, “advanced age” amounts to a good reason to be excused.⁶⁴

6.41 The existence of a right of exemption, whether based on age or otherwise, is likely to encourage those to whom it applies to seek exemption. It may even mislead them into believing that they are unable to serve, or alternatively that they are discouraged by the authorities from doing so. Any such impression would seem to involve discrimination based on age, which some would regard as offensive and a disparagement of their capacity to provide a useful service.

6.42 Figures supplied by the Sheriff’s Office indicate that there is a significant reduction in the number of jurors serving as they progress from age 60 years to 75 years. In the 2005-2006 financial year, 171 people aged 60 years served but only 11 people aged 75 years.

6.43 Some of the decline will be due to a decline in the population of people aged 60 years and over, as well as to the increased incidence of illness and infirmity within that population. However, the quite substantial drop between those aged 69 and those aged 70 and 71 must be attributed, at least in part, to the existence of the right to claim an exemption.

6.44 Some submissions proposed retaining some age limit, suggesting that the 75 year limit for service as an acting judge provided a guide.⁷³ However, other submissions supported a case by case assessment of people seeking to be excused on the ground of age.⁷⁴

6.45 We do not believe that it is appropriate to select the age of 70 years as an arbitrary point for exemption. We have an active aging population, and there are many people in the community aged more than 70 years who are able to serve as jurors. It would be more appropriate to allow elderly people to be excused for good cause, for example, on the grounds of illness or other incapacity, or the likely length of the trial, or personal discomfort, rather than relying on a presumptive right to exemption based on an arbitrary age alone. We see no reason why applications to be excused could not be dealt with sympathetically by the Sheriff or by a judge without any personal embarrassment to the potential juror.

6.46 Alternatively, if it is considered, on a pragmatic basis, that most people aged over 75 years would successfully apply to be excused from jury service, then as a fall back we recognise that this could be achieved by the adoption of a suitable guideline, which would facilitate excusal of those who do not wish to serve, while allowing those who are able to do so to exercise that right.

6.47 The entitlement of pregnant women to be excused as of right⁷⁵ was first introduced in NSW in 1977, when a woman’s general entitlement to be excused as of right was removed.⁷⁶

6.48 The NSW Jury Task Force, in 1993, questioned why pregnant women “irrespective of the stage of the pregnancy” should have a right to be excused.⁷⁷ The 1994 AIJA review recommended amendment or removal of the pregnancy exemption.⁷⁸ The Victorian Parliamentary Law Reform Committee considered that most women in the early stages of pregnancy would be capable of serving,⁷⁹ and noted that anyone unable to perform jury service on account of pregnancy could apply to be excused on an individual basis.⁸⁰ In the ACT, pregnant women are entitled to apply to be excused on the grounds of “good cause”.⁸¹

6.49 It would appear that this category of exemption is too broad if applied on a class basis, since there are many people in the early or mid term stages of pregnancy who could sit as jurors without difficulty or discomfort. One submission suggested that pregnant women should continue to be entitled to exemption, on the basis that complications associated with the condition could interrupt trials and cause delays.⁸² However, those who have medical or other reasons to be excused could apply to be excused for cause, as could those in the later stages of pregnancy. This approach was supported by a number of submissions,⁸³ and it reflects the view which we adopt in relation to this current ground of exemption.

6.50 In NSW, an exemption as of right is available for people who have the “care, custody and control of children under the age of 18 years (other than children who have ceased attending school) and who, if exempted, would be the only person exempt... in respect of those children”.⁸⁴

6.51 A large number of otherwise eligible people are effectively deleted from the NSW roll by reason of their exercise of this right to exemption, as are those who reside with, and have full-time care of, a person who is “sick, infirm or disabled”.⁸⁵ This is also the case in other jurisdictions.⁸⁶ The consequence is to exclude a large number of women from serving as jurors, particularly those in the 25-50 year age group, some of whom are employed in the workforce while still providing for the sole care, custody or control of their children.

6.52 In other jurisdictions, such as SA, NT, ACT, Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria, care of children no longer entitles a person to exemption, although in some of these jurisdictions it is an express ground for excusing a person from service. In Victoria, for example, one of the grounds for excusing a person is that “the person has the care of dependants and alternative care during the person’s attendance for jury service is not reasonably available for those dependants”.⁸⁷

6.53 Unlike NSW, most other jurisdictions that retain exemptions based on the need to care for children, or have it as a reason to be excused, make no reference to the age of the children. In WA, however, an age limit for the exercise of this ground is set so that it is only applicable where the children are aged under 14 years.⁸⁸

6.54 Two submissions supported the continuing availability of carer obligations as a reason to be exempted or excused,⁸⁹ although one questioned whether such a reason for excuse should continue to apply to those having the care, custody or control of children up to the age of 18 years.⁹⁰ By the age of 18 years, many children have left school, while others under that age are left by working parents to care for themselves after school. In other cases, arrangements are made for their supervised care.

6.55 The need to care for young children should, in our view, be a matter to be assessed on a case by case basis in determining whether a juror should be excused for good cause, and only applicable where reasonable alternative arrangements cannot be made, or where a particular need is demonstrated for care of the child by the person having the responsibility for the child’s care, custody or control. This position was supported by most other submissions.⁹¹ Excusal from service on this ground could be dealt with on a case by case basis, which would almost permit deferral for a period of time so as to minimise any inconvenience attaching to the need for repeat applications.

6.56 In NSW, exemptions as of right are also available for people who reside with, and have full-time care of, a person who is “sick, infirm or disabled”.⁹² This right of exemption is not qualified by the additional provision attaching to those who have the care of children, namely that they be the sole carer.

6.57 In the case of most care obligations, alternative arrangements can be made if sufficient notice is given, although we recognise that, in some instances, the costs of engaging an alternative helper, or the risk of distress to the person receiving the care, or the special dependency or demands that attach to that relationship may be persuasive when determining an application to be excused.

6.58 One suggestion that could encourage such people to serve would be to allow jurors to claim any fees paid for substitute carers who were engaged during the period of the jury service.⁹³ We address that possibility, which also has relevance for those who have the responsibility for the care and control of children, later in this Report.⁹⁴

6.59 Otherwise, our view is that the same considerations should apply to people in this position as to carers of children, that is, replacing the existing right of exemption, but allowing applications to be made, on a case by case basis, for excusal for good cause.

6.60 Alternatively, if a right to exemption is to be preserved for this group, then it should only be available to sole carers.

6.61 Currently, a person who resides more than 56 km from the place where he or she is required to serve as a juror is entitled to claim an exemption as of right.⁹⁵ The origin of the 56 km distance, which was first prescribed in 1977,⁹⁶ is unclear, although it can be noted that the distance from the Sydney CBD to the nearest part of the Blue Mountains National Park is approximately 56 km.⁹⁷ It is arguably an arbitrary provision which does not take into account modern transport or work patterns, or the availability, or non-availability in particular regions, of public transport. It is also likely, in rural districts, to place a greater burden on town residents and to exclude those from outlying districts, even though they are very much part of the local community who will have an interest in the proper working of the justice system, and who will normally conduct their business and shopping in those towns. In most cases, they will possess private transport, and the added burden of travel can be compensated by a suitable allowance.

6.62 A number of submissions generally questioned the utility of the current right to claim exemption if a potential juror lives more than 56 km from the court house at which the trial will be held.⁹⁸ This was particularly so in the case of regional areas, where the 56 km limit was considered to be quite impractical.⁹⁹

6.63 Several submissions supported a change to the current 56 km limit, provided there was an appropriate regime to excuse people for good cause¹⁰⁰ where the need to travel between home and a courthouse would occasion excessive hardship, or where sufficient means of private or public transport were not available; and provided adequate travel¹⁰¹ and accommodation allowances¹⁰² were available.

6.64 In our view, the 56 km radius is an inappropriate, arbitrary criterion for exemption as of right, or for the determination of an application to be excused, and should not be retained.

6.65 We deal with the question of distance from the relevant courthouse further when addressing excuse for good cause¹⁰³ and the system for the establishment of jury districts.¹⁰⁴

6.66 The following people may currently be exempted from jury service as of right:

6.67 We consider that it would be appropriate to maintain the current exemption as of right for those who fall within this category. It would then be the only remaining category of exemption and it would be the one that does not require any exercise of judgment or discretion beyond that of the juror, who would have the choice of relying on it or making himself or herself available for further service.

6.68 We do not make any recommendation for the amendment of s 39 of the Jury Act 1977 (NSW). We regard this as providing for a significant symbolic gesture, recognising the fact that those who have served as jurors in inquests or trials which the presiding judge or coroner assessed were sufficiently lengthy, demanding or harrowing to justify a s 39 direction, have provided a valuable community service. It would remain open for such people to serve again within the relevant time period if they were willing to do so. We note that current administrative practice is to ask jurors at the end of the trial whether they want to be removed from the roll.¹⁰⁶ We see no reason why a similar practice could not continue, which would be assisted if our recommendations for upgrading the computerised records of the Sheriff were to be adopted.¹⁰⁷ Such an upgrade would facilitate recording any entitlement to be exempted and the duration of that entitlement.

6.69 Most submissions supported retaining this head of exemption,¹⁰⁸ which also serves the purpose of sharing the burden of jury service on an equitable basis. This has some relevance for rural areas where, as a result of the smaller size of the potential jury pools, there is a risk of people being summoned more frequently than in metropolitan areas.

6.70 While we recognise the fact that, if our recommendations are accepted, previous jury service as defined above would be the sole basis for exemption as of right, we also believe that it would be reasonable to extend this exemption to anyone employed by a small business (fewer than 25 employees) which has had another employee actually serve as a juror in NSW within the preceding 12 months.

Table of contents

5. J Goodman-Delahunty, N Brewer, J Clough, J Horan, J Ogloff, and D Tait, Practices, Policies and Procedures that Influence Juror Satisfaction in Australia, (Draft) Report to the Criminology Research Council (2007) not yet published, 34 and 72.

6. NSW Young Lawyers, Submission, 12; J Kane, Submission; Redfern Legal Centre, Submission, 9; G J Samuels, Submission, 2; M J Stocker, Submission, 7; NSW Bar Association, Submission, [23]; NSW Public Defender’s Office, Submission, 6; NSW Jury Taskforce, Submission, 2; NSW Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW), Submission; J Goldring, Submission, 3; A Abadee, Consultation.

8. R E Auld, Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales (HMSO, 2001), 151.

10. M Findlay, Jury Management in New South Wales (Australian Institute of Judicial Administration Inc, 1994), 173.

11. United Kingdom, Home Office, Report of the Departmental Committee on Jury Service, Cmnd 2627 (1965), [100].

12. United Kingdom, Home Office, Report of the Departmental Committee on Jury Service, Cmnd 2627 (1965), [148].

13. United Kingdom, Home Office, Report of the Departmental Committee on Jury Service, Cmnd 2627 (1965), [151].

14. See United Kingdom, Home Office, Report of the Departmental Committee on Jury Service, Cmnd 2627 (1965), [98]; NSW, Report of the NSW Jury Task Force (1993), 23-25; Supreme Court of Queensland, Litigation Reform Commission, Reform of the Jury System in Queensland, Report of the Criminal Procedure Division (1993), [2.5]-[2.11].

15. See M Findlay, Jury Management in New South Wales (Australian Institute of Judicial Administration Inc, 1994), 173; Parliament of Victoria, Law Reform Committee, Jury Service in Victoria, Final Report (1996), [3.149]; R E Auld, Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales (HMSO, 2001), 149, 150.

16. R E Auld, Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales (HMSO, 2001), 150.

17. The Jury Project, Report to the Chief Judge of the State of New York (1994), 32.

19. Since the Sheriff is unaware of the occupation of those who receive notices of inclusion unless a claim for exemption is made.

20. In a two week period (13 November 2006 – 29 November 2006), of the 57 people who claimed a right to exemption based on occupation at the notice of inclusion stage, eight were clergy, nine were members of a religious order, two were dentists, three were pharmacists, 21 were medical practitioners, two were mining managers; 12 were emergency services employees: information supplied by the NSW Sheriff’s Office (8 December 2006).

21. Parliament of Victoria, Law Reform Committee, Jury Service in Victoria, Final Report (1996), [3.146].

22. Parliament of Victoria, Law Reform Committee, Jury Service in Victoria, Final Report (1996), [3.147].

23. NSW Bar Association, Submission, [23], [28]; NSW Public Defender’s Office, Submission, 6; Redfern Legal Centre, Submission, 9, 10; J Goldring, Submission, 3; NSW Jury Task Force, Submission, 2, 3; NSW Young Lawyers, Submission, 12; G J Samuels, Submission; M J Stocker, Submission, 5, 7.

25. Redfern Legal Centre, Submission, 9. See also The Jury Project, Report to the Chief Judge of the State of New York (1994), 33.

26. Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, Exemption from Jury Service, Report, Project No 71 (1980), [3.39].

28. Juries Act 1957 (WA) Sch 2 Part 2 cl 3; Juries Act 1963 (NT) s 11, Sch 7; Juries Act 1967 (ACT) Sch 1 Part 2.2 item 1, 2.

29. Churches of Christ in NSW, Preliminary submission at 1; Catholic Archdiocese of Sydney, Preliminary submission at 4.

33. NSW Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, Submission; NSW Public Defender’s Office, Submission, 7; NSW Jury Task Force, Submission, 2; J Goldring, Submission, 3; NSW Young Lawyers, Submission, 13; Redfern Legal Centre, Submission, 9; NSW Bar Association, Submission, [23]; G J Samuels, Submission; M J Stocker, Submission, 7.

37. United Kingdom, Home Office, Report of the Departmental Committee on Jury Service, Cmnd 2627 (1965), [148] and [149].

38. United Kingdom, Home Office, Report of the Departmental Committee on Jury Service, Cmnd 2627 (1965), [150].

39. Sheriff’s Office of NSW, Jury Act, 1977: Policy and Practice Guidelines (November 2005), [3.4.2].

41. M Findlay, Jury Management in New South Wales (Australian Institute of Judicial Administration Inc, 1994), 173.

45. NSW, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Legislative Assembly, 1 October 1918, 1831.

46. Coal Mines Regulation Act 1912 (NSW) s 5(1). See also NSW, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Legislative Council, 26 November 1918, 3004.

49. Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, Exemption from Jury Service, Report, Project No 71 (1980), [3.43].

53. NSW Bar Association, Submission, [23]; NSW Public Defender’s Office, Submission, 8; Redfern Legal Centre, Submission, 10. See also J Goldring, Submission, 4; NSW Jury Task Force, Submission, 2-3.

56. NSW Law Reform Commission, Criminal Procedure: The Jury in a Criminal Trial, Report 48 (1986), [4.35]. See also M Wilkie, “Inside the Jury” in D Challinger, The Jury, Australian Institute of Criminology, Seminar: Proceedings No 11 (1986), 189.

58. Parliament of Victoria, Law Reform Committee, Jury Service in Victoria, Final Report (1996), [3.147].

60. Jury Act 1929 (Qld) s 3, s 6(1)(b) and s 8(3). At the time women under 70 were entitled to claim exemption irrespective of age: Jury Act 1929 (Qld) s 8(3).

65. United Kingdom, Home Office, Report of the Departmental Committee on Jury Service, Cmnd 2627 (1965), [68].

66. Supreme Court of Queensland, Litigation Reform Commission, Reform of the Jury System in Queensland, Report of the Criminal Procedure Division (1993), 5; Queensland, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Legislative Assembly, 16 May 1996, 1192.

67. Queensland, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Legislative Assembly, 16 May 1996, 1192; Parliament of Victoria, Law Reform Committee, Jury Service in Victoria, Final Report (1996), [3.166].

68. United Kingdom, Home Office, Report of the Departmental Committee on Jury Service, Cmnd 2627 (1965), [68].

69. Parliament of Victoria, Law Reform Committee, Jury Service in Victoria, Final Report (1996), [3.165].

70. Parliament of Victoria, Law Reform Committee, Jury Service in Victoria, Final Report (1996), [3.165].

71. Parliament of Victoria, Law Reform Committee, Jury Service in Victoria, Final Report (1996), [3.165].

72. Queensland, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Legislative Assembly, 16 May 1996, 1192.

73. J Goldring, Submission, 4; M J Stocker, Submission, 8, also proposed 75 years.

74. NSW Jury Task Force, Submission, 2; NSW Young Lawyers, Submission, 15, NSW Public Defender’s Office, Submission, 8; NSW Bar Association, Submission, [24]; Redfern Legal Centre, Submission, 10.

76. See Jury Act 1912 (NSW) s 3(3) inserted by Administration of Justice Act 1968 (NSW) s 10.

78. M Findlay, Jury Management in New South Wales (Australian Institute of Judicial Administration Inc, 1994), 174.

79. Parliament of Victoria, Law Reform Committee, Jury Service in Victoria, Final Report (1996), [3.172]-[3.173]. See also NSW Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, Preliminary submission, 4.

80. Parliament of Victoria, Law Reform Committee, Jury Service in Victoria, Final Report (1996), [3.172]-[3.173].

83. J Goldring, Submission, 4; NSW Public Defender’s Office, Submission, 8; Redfern Legal Centre, Submission, 10. But see M J Stocker, Submission, 8; NSW Jury Taskforce, Submission, 2.

85. See L Anamourlis, Preliminary consultation. See also M Wilkie, “Inside the Jury” in D Challinger, The Jury, Australian Institute of Criminology, Seminar: Proceedings No 11 (1986), 188; and NSW Law Reform Commission, The Jury in a Criminal Trial: Empirical Studies, Research Report 1 (1986), [4.4].

86. Parliament of Victoria, Law Reform Committee, Jury Service in Victoria, Final Report (1996), [3.147].

87. Juries Act 2000 (Vic) s 8(3)(h). See also Juries Act 2003 (Tas) s 9(2)(g); Juries Act 1967 (ACT) s 14(c).

91. NSW Jury Task Force, Submission, 2; NSW Public Defender’s Office, Submission, 8; Redfern Legal Centre, Submission, 10; NSW Bar Association, Submission, [24]. NSW Young Lawyers, Submission, 15 preferred to retain the exemption as of right for carers of under school-aged children.

93. NSW Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, Preliminary submission, 4.

97. It should be noted that people living near the centre of Sydney are only required to serve in the South Sydney jury district. This is because the South Sydney jury district consists of postcodes in the electoral districts surrounding the courthouses in the centre of Sydney. There are also jury districts for Penrith, Campbelltown and Parramatta, each of which consist of the postcodes in the electoral districts surrounding the courthouses in Penrith, Campbelltown and Parramatta respectively. There is no overlap between the jury districts. Under current arrangements it is, therefore, not possible for a person living near the Blue Mountains to be called for jury service in a court in the South Sydney jury district.

98. NSW Bar Association, Submission, [25]-[27]; NSW Young Lawyers, Submission, 16, 20; Legal Aid Commission of NSW, Submission, 12.

100. NSW Bar Association, Submission, [27]; Redfern Legal Centre, Submission, 10; NSW Jury Task Force, Submission, 3; NSW Young Lawyers, Submission, 16; NSW Public Defender’s Office, Submission, 8.

102. NSW Bar Association, Submission, [27]. See also M J Stocker, Submission, 8.

108. Legal Aid Commission of NSW, Submission, 13; NSW Public Defender’s Office, Submission, 9; Redfern Legal Centre, Submission, 10; NSW Jury Task Force, Submission, 3; NSW Young Lawyers, Submission, 16; M J Stocker, Submission, 8. One also suggested more generous provisions: J Goldring, Submission, 4.